Productivity is magical, but don't forget the side effects

Something we’ve had to relearn in this annus horribilis is that the state governments still play a big part in the daily working of the economy. Another thing we’ve realised is that the Productivity Commission is so important that some of the states are setting up their own versions.

When you put the word “productivity” into the name of a government agency, you guarantee it will spend a lot of its time explaining what productivity is – a lot of people think it’s a high-sounding word for production; others that it means we need to work harder – and why it’s the closest economics comes to magic.

Earlier this year the NSW Productivity Commission issued a green paper that began with the best sales job for the concept I’ve seen. Its title said it all: Productivity drives prosperity.

Its simple definition of productivity is that it “measures how well we do with what we have. Productivity is the most important tool we have for improving our economic [I’d prefer to say our material] wellbeing,” it says.

“Our productivity grows as we learn how to produce more and better goods and services using less effort and resources. It is the main driver of improvements in welfare and overall [material] living standards.

“From decade to decade, productivity growth arguably matters more than any other number in an economy . . . Growth in productivity is the very essence of economic progress. It has given us the rich-world living standards we so enjoy.”

Productivity improvement itself is driven by increases in our stock of knowledge and expertise (or “human capital stock”) and by investment in physical capital (“physical capital stock”).

But by far the biggest long-term driver of productivity is the stock of advances known as “technological innovation” – a term that covers everything from new medicines to industrial machinery to global positioning systems.

Technology’s contribution to overall productivity growth has been estimated at 80 per cent, the paper says.

“Our future prosperity depends upon how well we do at growing more productive – how smart we are in organising ourselves, investing in people and technology, getting more out of both our physical and human potential.”

The (real) Productivity Commission has pointed out that on average it takes five days for an Australian worker to produce what a US worker can produce in four. (That’s not necessarily because the Yanks work harder than we do, but because they have fancier equipment to work with, and better organised offices and factories – not to mention greater economies of scale.)

The paper notes that productivity improvement hinges on people’s ability to change. “Unwelcome as it has been, the COVID-19 episode has shown that when we need to, we can change more rapidly than we thought. There is no reason we can’t do the same to achieve greater productivity and raise our future incomes.”

Technological innovation is the process of creating something valuable through a new idea. You may think that new technology destroys jobs – as the move to renewable energy is threatening the prospects of jobs in coal mining – but, if you take a wider view, you see that it actually moves jobs from one part of the economy to another and, because this makes our production more valuable, increases our real income and spending and so ends up increasing total employment.

“All through history,” the report adds, “[technological innovation] has been a huge source of new jobs, from medical technology to web design to solar panel installation. And as these new roles are created and filled, they in turn create new spending power that boosts demand for everything from buildings to home-delivered food.

But the thing I liked best about the NSW Productivity Commission’s sales pitch was the examples it quoted of how technology-driven productivity has improved our living standards.

Take, medicine. “The French king Louis XV was perhaps the world’s richest human being in 1774 – yet the healthcare of the day could not save him from smallpox. Today’s healthcare saves us from far worse conditions every day at affordable cost.”

Or farming. “In 1789, former burglar James Ruse produced [Australia’s] first successful grain harvest on a 12-hectare farm at Rose Hill. Today, the average NSW broadacre property is 2700 hectares and produced far more on every hectare, often with no more people.”

Or (pre-pandemic) travel. About “67 years after the invention of powered flight, in 1970, a Sydney-to-London return flight cost $4600, equivalent to more than $50,000 in today’s terms. Today, we can purchase that flight for less than $1400 – less than one-30th of its 1970 price.”

Or communications. “Australia’s first hand-held mobile call was made at the Sydney Opera House in February 1987 on a brick-like device costing $4000 ($10,000 in today’s terms). Today we can buy a new smartphone for just $150, and it has capabilities barely dreamt of a third of a century ago.”

There are just two points I need add. The first is that there’s a reason we’re getting so many glowing testimonials to the great benefits of productivity improvement: for the past decade, neither we nor the other rich countries have been seeing nearly as much improvement as we’ve been used to.

Second, economists, econocrats and business people have been used to talking about the economy in isolation from the natural environment in which it exists and upon which it depends, and defining “economic wellbeing” as though it’s unaffected by all the damage our economic activity does to the environment.

As each month passes, this not-my-department categorisation of “the economy” is becoming increasingly incongruous, misleading and “what planet are you guys living on?”.

What’s more, the growing evidence that all this year’s “social distancing” is having significant adverse effects on people’s mental health is a reminder we should stop assuming that ever-faster and more complicated economic life is causing no “negative externalities” for our mental wellbeing.

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Productivity problem? Start at the bottom, not the top

Whenever we’re told we’re not achieving much improvement in our productivity, a lot of people assume it must be something the government’s done – or more likely, failed to do. Such as? Isn’t it obvious? Failed to cut the tax on companies and high income-earners.

But though the national rate of productivity improvement is merely the sum of the performances of all the industries that make up the economy, no one ever imagines the problem might be something the nation’s businesses have been failing to do.

This, however, is where a lot of research is pointing, as summarised by the Labor shadow minister and former economics professor, Dr Andrew Leigh, in a recent speech. He starts by explaining that productivity measures how efficiently the economy turns labour and capital into goods and services.

"Last year, Treasury’s Megan Quinn revealed that researchers in her department, led by Dan Andrews, had been investing in a new analysis that links together workers and firms, and delving into fresh data about the dynamics of the Australian economy," he says.

"Since 2002, Quinn showed, the most productive Australian firms (the top 5 per cent) had not kept pace with the most productive firms globally. In fact, Australia’s 'productivity frontier' has slipped back by about one-third. The best of 'Made in Australia' hasn’t kept pace with the best of 'Made in Germany', 'Made in the Netherlands' or even 'Made in America'."

And then there’s the other 95 per cent. In the past two decades, their output per hour worked has barely risen. So 19 out of 20 Australian firms don’t produce much more per hour than they did when Sydney hosted the Olympics.

What’s going wrong? "Part of the problem is that many firms aren’t investing in new technologies," Leigh says. "Less than half have invested in data analytics or intelligent software systems. Only three in five have invested in cyber security, making them vulnerable to hacking and ransomware attacks.

"It’s not just that companies aren’t investing simply in technology – they’re not investing in anything at all." In the Productivity Commission’s regular report, it measures how the amount of capital equipment per worker has increased, a process known as "capital deepening".

The commission has had to invent a new term to describe what happened last financial year – "capital shallowing". For the first time ever, the amount of capital per worker went backwards. "Given that capital deepening has accounted for about three-quarters of labour productivity growth, this is frightening," Leigh says. (To which Scott Morrison might well respond: do I look frightened?)

Across the economy, businesses are cutting back on research and development and investing less in good management. Just 8 per cent of our firms say they produce innovations that are new to the world, down from 11 per cent in 2013.

A Productivity Commission study has found that half the slowdown in productivity improvement in the market economy in recent years is accounted for by manufacturing. A separate survey of management practices in manufacturing firms found that Australia’s managers rank below those in Canada, Sweden, Japan, Germany and the US.

Leigh argues that newborn firms are as critical to an economy as newborn babies are to a society’s demography, bringing fresh approaches, shaking up existing industries, and offering new opportunities to workers.

Yet our new-business creation rate isn’t accelerating, it seems to be stopping. Defining new businesses as those that employ at least one worker, Treasury estimates that the new-business formation rate in the early 2000s was 14 per cent a year. Now it’s down to 11 per cent a year.

"Another sign that the economy may be stagnating comes from figures on job-switching," Leigh says. "Workers who switch jobs typically experience a significant pay increase. In the early 2000s the rate of job switching was 11 per cent of employees a year. Now it’s down to 8 per cent. And "Treasury’s analysis finds that a drop of one percentage point in the job-switching rate is associated with a 0.5 percentage point drop in wage growth across the economy".

The drop we’ve experienced is "not the fault of employees: there are simply fewer good opportunities available. According to Treasury’s analysis, much of the drop in job-switching is because workers are less likely to transition from mature firms to young firms. With fewer start-up firms, it stands to reason that there are fewer start-up jobs."

It’s all pretty dismal – and, of course, all the fault of the government. But I know just the reform we need to fix the problem. Morrison should offer chief executives of ASX200 companies a cut in their tax rate, provided they can show they were too busy during the financial year sticking to their knitting to attend any meetings of the Australian Business Council called to discuss lobbying the government for favours.

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No progress on wages, but we’re getting a better handle on why

In days of yore, workers used to say: another day, another dollar. These days they’d be more inclined to say: another quarter, another sign that wages are stuck in the slow lane. But why is wage growth so weak? This week we got some clues from the Productivity Commission.

We also learnt from the Australian Bureau of Statistics that, as measured by the wage price index, wages rose by 0.5 per cent in the three months to the end of December, and by just 2.2 per cent over the year - pretty much the same rate as for the past two years.

It compares with the rise in consumer prices over the year of just 1.8 per cent. If prices aren’t rising by much, it’s hardly surprising that wages aren’t either. But we got used to wages growing by a percentage point or so per year faster than consumer prices and, as you see, last year they grew only 0.4 percentage points faster.

It’s this weak “real” wage growth that’s puzzling and worrying economists and p---ing off workers. Real wages have been weak for six or seven years.

So why has real wage growth been so much slower than we were used to until 2012-13? Various people, with various axes to grind, have offered rival explanations – none of which they’ve been able to prove.

One argument is that real wage growth is weak for the simple and obvious reason that the annual improvement in the productivity of labour (output of goods and services per hour worked) has also been weak.

It’s true that labour productivity has been improving at a much slower annual rate in recent years. It’s true, too, that there’s long been a strong medium-term correlation between the rate of real wage growth and the rate of labour productivity improvement.

When the two grow at pretty much the same rate, workers gain their share of the benefits from their greater productivity, and do so without causing higher inflation. But this hasn’t seemed adequate to fully explain the problem.

Another explanation the Reserve Bank has fallen back on as its forecasts of stronger wage growth have failed to come to pass is that there’s a lot of spare capacity in the labour market (high unemployment and underemployment) which has allowed employers to hire all the workers they’ve needed without having to bid up wages. Obviously true, but never been a problem at other times of less-than-full employment.

For their part, the unions are in no doubt why wage growth has been weak: the labour market "reforms" of the Howard government have weakened the workers’ ability to bargain for decent pay rises, including by reducing access to enterprise bargaining.

But this week the Productivity Commission included in its regular update on our productivity performance a purely numerical analysis of the reasons real wage growth has been weak since 2012-13. It compared the strong growth in real wages in the economy’s “market sector” (16 of the economy’s 19 industries, excluding public administration, education and training, and health care and social assistance) during the 18 years to 2012-13 with the weak growth over the following six years.

The study found that about half the slowdown in real wage growth could be explained by the slower rate of improvement in labour productivity. Turns out the weaker productivity performance was fully explained by just three industries: manufacturing (half), agriculture and utilities (about a quarter each).

A further quarter of the slowdown in real wage growth is explained by the effects and after-effects of the resources boom. Although the economists’ conventional wisdom says real wages should grow in line with the productivity of labour, this implicitly assumes the country’s “terms of trade” (the prices we get for our exports relative to the prices we pay for our imports) are unchanged.

But, being a major exporter of rural and mineral commodities, that assumption often doesn’t hold for Australia. The resources boom that ran for a decade from about 2003 saw a huge increase in the prices we got for our exports of coal and iron ore. This, in turn, pushed the value of our dollar up to a peak of about $US1.10, which made our imports of goods and services (including overseas holidays) much cheaper.

This, of course, was reflected in the consumer price index. When you use these “consumer prices” to measure the growth in workers’ real wages before 2012-13, you find they grew by a lot more than justified by the improvement in productivity.

In the period after 2012-13, however, export prices fell back a fair way and so did the dollar, making imported goods and services harder for consumers to afford. So there’s been a sort of correction in which real wages have grown by less than the improvement in labour productivity would have suggested they should. Some good news: this is a one-time correction that shouldn’t continue.

Finally, the study finds that a further fifth of the slowdown in real wage growth is explained by an increase in the profits share of national income and thus an equivalent decline in the wages share.

Almost three-quarters of the increase in the profits share is also explained by the resources boom. It involved a massive injection of financial capital (mainly by big foreign mining companies, such as BHP) to hugely increase the size of our mining industry – which, as the central Queenslanders lusting after Adani will one day find out, uses a lot of big machines and very few workers. Naturally, the suppliers of that capital expect a return on their investment.

But harder to explain and defend is the study’s finding that more than a quarter of the increase in the profits share is accounted for by the greater profitability of the finance and insurance sector. Think greedy bankers, but also the ever-growing pile of compulsory superannuation money and the anonymous army of financial-types who find ways to take an annual bite out of your savings.

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We could increase bank competition if we wanted to

Would you like to put your savings in a super scheme presently reserved for public servants? Would you like your bank account or mortgage to be with the Reserve Bank?

Impossible to imagine such a crazy idea? Well, that’s what the Productivity Commission thinks, but it’s neither as impossible nor as crazy as it may sound.

Everyone says they believe in innovation, but when we’re used to thinking and doing things one way and some bright spark argues we should be doing it the opposite way, they’re more likely to be dismissed than grappled with.

And our econocrats are no more receptive to innovative ideas than the rest of us, it seems.

The bright spark in question is Dr Nicholas Gruen, principal of consulting firm Lateral Economics. The Bank of England and Martin Wolf, of the Financial Times, think he’s worth taking seriously, but in the Productivity Commission’s final report on competition in the financial system his ideas are brushed off as though he’s a nut job.

So let’s have a look at them. In his submission to the commission’s inquiry, Gruen argued we needed to give a twist to a widely accepted principle of micro-economic reform, established in 1996, called “competitive neutrality”.

In those days there were a lot of (mainly state) government-owned businesses. Sometimes they had a natural monopoly over some network, sometimes it was an “unnatural” monopoly granted by legislation, sometimes it was a bit of both.

The reformers’ concern was that, being monopolies, these government businesses weren’t terribly efficient. They tended to be overstaffed and do “sweetheart” pay deals with their unions because they knew they could pass the cost straight on to their customers.

Clearly, it would be much better for customers if these outfits could be exposed to competition from private firms, to force their prices down. But this competition would emerge only if the public businesses were robbed of any special advantage arising from their government ownership.

Fine. Almost a quarter-century later, most of those businesses have been privatised – many of them with their anti-competitive advantages intact or restored, so as to boost their sale price.

Today, of course, the big problem is the lack of competition in, say, the oligopolised national electricity market or, as the commission’s inquiry acknowledged, in oligopolised banking. With super, the big problem is workers’ reluctance to engage with all those boring comparisons.

This is where Gruen’s twist on competitive neutrality comes in. If what we needed back then was to increase private competition with government businesses, surely an answer to our present problem of inadequate competition between private players is increased competition from public businesses.

In the case of banking, he asks why, in these days of online banking, the significant benefits of being able to bank with the central bank should be restricted to producers (the commercial banks) and denied to consumers (households and other businesses). What’s competitively neutral about that?

In the case of superannuation, why should savers be prevented from giving their money to funds managing the super savings of public servants? Surveys show public sector funds achieve returns to members even higher than the non-profit industry funds, let alone the for-profit “retail” funds run by banks and insurance companies.

Gruen notes that public sector funds would offer only modern, defined-contribution super and involve no subsidies – that is, they’d be competitively neural. (More radical reformers would say, so what if public providers had a government-related advantage they could pass on to customers? If the government can give the public a better deal, why shouldn’t it?)

Sometimes public providers would have an advantage because they were so big. But that’s not an unfair advantage. It’s exploitation of economies of scale that mean so many private industries are dominated by only a few firms. Only problem is insufficient price competition between them to ensure the cost savings are passed to customers, not owners.

In response to Gruen’s idea of opening up access to central banks, the commission raised practical objections that could be solved if you really wanted to.

In brushing off the idea of public super providers, the commission quoted the case of the Swedes doing something similar. Bad idea, apparently. More than two-thirds of new contributors defaulted into the public fund – perhaps because it earned better returns than the private sector funds.

Of course, you wouldn’t expect privately own banks or super funds to welcome reform that could cost them customers or force down their profit margins. Perhaps this explains the commission’s lack of interest in the idea – it knew the proposal wouldn’t appeal to a Coalition government.

But it's more likely the econocrats are just stuck in an ideological rut. Economic reform was always about reducing public and increasing private. Going the other way is so obviously wrong it doesn’t need thinking about.

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Economists do little to promote bank competition

The royal commission into banking, whose public hearings start on Monday, won't get a lot of help from the Productivity Commission's report on competition within the sector. It's very limp-wristed.

The report's inability to deny the obvious - that competition in banking is weak, that the big four banks have considerable pricing power, abuse the trust of their customers and are excessively profitable – won it an enthusiastic reception from the media.

Trouble is, its distorted explanation of why competitive pressure is so weak and its unconvincing suggestions for fixing the problem. It offered one good (but oversold) proposal, one fatuous proposal (to abolish the four pillars policy because other laws make it "redundant") and a lot of fiddling round the edges.

It placed most of the blame for weak competition on the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, egged on by the Reserve Bank, for its ham-fisted implementation of international rules requiring banks to hold more capital, and for its use of "macro-prudential" measures to slow the housing boom by capping the banks' ability to issue interest-only loans on investment properties.

The banks had passed the costs of both measures straight on to their customers. It amounted to an overemphasis on financial stability (ensuring we avoid a financial crisis like the Americans and Europeans suffered) at the expense of reduced competitive pressure on the banks.

This argument is exaggerated. Even so, it's quite likely that, in their zeal to minimise the risk of a crisis, APRA and the Reserve don't worry as much as they should about keeping banking as competitive as possible.

The report's proposal that an outfit such as the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission be made the bureaucratic champion of banking competition, to act as a countervailing force on the committee that makes decisions about prudential supervision, is a good one.

The report's second most important explanation for weak competition is inadequacies in the information banks are required to provide to their customers. Really? That simple, eh?

See what's weird about this? It's blaming the banks' bad behaviour on the regulators, not the banks. If only the bureaucrats hadn't overregulated the banks, competition would be much stronger.

Why would the bureaucrats in the Productivity Commission be blaming other bureaucrats for the banks' misdeeds? Because this is the prejudiced, pseudo-economic ideology that has blighted the thinking of Canberra's "economic rationalist" econocrats for decades.

Whatever the problem in whatever market, it can never be blamed on business, because businesses merely respond rationally (that is, greedily) to whatever incentives they face. If those incentives produce bad outcomes, this can only be because market incentives have been distorted by faulty government intervention.

Market behaviour is always above criticism; government intervention in markets is always sus.

When the report asserted that the big banks had used the cap on interest-only loans as an excuse for raising interest rates, and would pass the new bank tax straight on to customers, there was no hint of criticism of them for doing so. They were merely doing what you'd expect.

In shifting the blame for these failures onto politicians and bureaucrats, the report fails to admit that the distortion that makes interest-only loans a worry in the first place is Australia's unusual tolerance of negative gearing and our excessive capital gains tax discount.

In criticising the bank tax, the report brushes aside the case for taxpayers' recouping from the banks the benefit the banks gain from their implicit government guarantee, and the case for taxing the big banks' super-normal profits (economic rent), doing so in a way that stops the impost being shunted from shareholders to customers.

Here we see a hint that the rationalists' private-good/public-bad prejudgement​ is only a step away from Treasury being "captured" by the bankers it's supposed to be regulating in the public's interest, in just the way it (rightly) accuses other departments of being captured.

The report's criticism of existing interventions would be music to the bankers' ears. Its fiddling-round-the-edges proposals for increasing competitive pressure have one thing in common: minimum annoyance to the bankers.

The Productivity Commission's rationalists can't admit that the fundamental reason for weak competition in banking comes from the market itself: as with many industries, the presence of huge economies of scale naturally (and sensibly) leads to markets dominated by a few big firms.

Market power and a studied ability to avoid price competition come with the territory of oligopoly. Have the rationalists spent much time thinking about sophisticated interventions to encourage price competition in oligopolies? Nope.

Have they learnt anything from 30 years of behavioural economics? Nope. When you've learnt the 101 textbook off by heart, what more do you need?

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Politicians should get wings clipped on infrastructure

The more our ever-more "professional" politicians put political tactics ahead of economic strategy – put staying in government ahead of governing well – the more pressure they come under to cede more of their power to independent authorities.

The obvious instance is our move in the mid-1990s to transfer control over interest rates ("monetary policy") from the elected government to the independent central bank.

Shifting interest rates away from those tempted to move rates down before elections and up after them has proved far better for the stability of the economy.

Another issue on which voters don't trust politicians to make good decisions – mainly because of the risk of collusion between them – is their own remuneration.

So, first, responsibility for setting politicians' salaries, and now, their expenses, has been handed over to independent bodies.

Then there was the Gonski report's proposal that responsibility for determining the size of grants to public, Catholic and independent schools be taken away from deal-doing pollies and given to a properly constituted authority, following consistent and transparent criteria.

The idea was rejected by Julia Gillard but, particularly now the amazing variance in the deals Labor did with different school systems has been revealed under the Coalition's version of Gonski, there's still hope we'll end up with an independent, rules-based grants authority.

Some years ago, the Business Council took up a proposal by Dr Nicholas Gruen for the example set by monetary policy to be spread to fiscal (budget) policy. An independent body would set the budget's key parameters – for spending, revenue and budget balance – leaving the government to decide the specific measures to take within those parameters.

The idea didn't gain traction, but it may have boosted the push for independent evaluation of infrastructure projects.

You can see an admission that "something needs to be done" in the establishment of Infrastructure Australia by the Rudd government, and its rejig by the Abbott government, as a supposedly "independent statutory body providing independent research and advice to all levels of government".

Trouble is, the authority has little authority. Its role is to create the illusion of independent evaluation and reformed behaviour, while the reality continues unchanged.

There's no obligation for even the federal government to have all major projects evaluated, for them to be evaluated before a government commits to them and begins work, nor for those evaluations to be made public as soon as they're completed, so voters can debate the merits of particular projects with hard evidence.

Promises to build particular projects in a state, or even an electorate, are a key device all parties use to buy votes in election campaigns.

As Marion Terrill, of the Grattan Institute, has demonstrated, few of the projects promised by the government, opposition and Greens at last year's election had been ticked by Infrastructure Australia, and many of those it had ticked weren't on anyone's list of promises.

Terrill's research has revealed the huge proportion of government spending on capital works that's unlikely to yield much economic or social return to taxpayers.

For some years the Reserve Bank, backed by the International Monetary Fund and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, has argued that fiscal policy should be doing more to help monetary policy get our economy back to trend growth by spending more on worthwhile infrastructure projects. These would add to demand in the short run, and to supply capacity in the medium run by improving private sector productivity.

This changed approach would involve shifting the focus of fiscal policy from the overall budget deficit (including capital works spending) to the more meaningful recurrent or operating deficit.

This year's budget seemingly accepted this proposal, promising to give greater prominence to the NOB – net operating balance – and announcing two huge new infrastructure projects: the second Sydney airport and the Melbourne to Brisbane inland freight railway.

See the problem? Government infrastructure spending does wonders for the economy only if the money's spent on much-needed projects. As a proper evaluation would show, the inland railway is a waste of money (the product of a deal with the Nationals).

So it's little wonder that cities and infrastructure are the third big item, after healthcare and education, on the Productivity Commission's new agenda for micro-economic reform.

It's first recommendation? "It is essential that governments ensure that proposed projects are subject to benefit-cost evaluations and that these, as well as evaluations of alternative proposals for meeting objectives, are available for public scrutiny before decisions are made."

This is something the professed believers in Smaller Government, and those professing to be terribly worried about lifting our productivity, should be making much more noise about.

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Unis should never be allowed to set their own fees

The Productivity Commission has changed its ideological tune, shifting away from the slavish adherence to an idealised version of the "neoclassical" model of the economy for which it and its predecessors became notorious.

It's moved to a more nuanced approach, recognising the many respects in which real-world markets differ from those described in elementary textbooks.

This shift has been underway since the present chairman of the commission, Peter Harris, succeeded Gary Banks in 2012.

You could see it in the commission's 2015 report on the Workplace Relations Framework, which acknowledged, readily and in detail, the factors that made the simple neoclassical, demand-and-supply model unsuitable for analysing the labour market.

But it's even more apparent in the commission's blueprint for a very different approach to economic reform, Shifting the Dial. Consider this.

Remember the plan in the Abbott government's first budget, of 2014, to deregulate the fees universities are allowed to charge students doing undergraduate degrees?

It was a logical next step following the Gillard government's decision some years earlier to deregulate the number of undergraduate places each university was permitted to offer.

The unis had responded by hugely increasing the number of government-funded places, at greatly increased cost to the federal budget, after successive governments had spent decades trying to quietly privatise the unis and get them off the budget.

The economic rationale was that "market forces" – competition between the unis – would prevent them for using their new fee-setting power to overcharge students.

It was a reform that all right-thinking people should support, and those terrible popularity-seekers in the Senate should never have blocked.

Get this: as part of its plan to improve the teaching of uni students, and in the course of explaining how some students are being charged higher fees than they should be, the commission also shows why deregulating fees would have been a crazy idea.

At the same time as it allowed unis to set their own fees, the government's intention had been to cut its funding of places by 20 per cent. It wasn't hard to see that, as unis continued to raise their fees each year, the government would keep cutting its own funding contribution until it was no more.

The commission argues (on page 109) that government "regulation" of the maximum fees unis may charge for particular undergrad courses "is necessary because price competition [between universities] is difficult to establish in the domestic university market.

"This is primarily because the vast majority of domestic students have access to income-contingent HELP loans and consequently have a low price sensitivity, which was a necessary by-product of enabling university access on merit, rather than family income."

Get it? The elementary model's promise that "market forces" – competition between sellers, plus the self-interest of buyers – will stop firms overcharging rests on an assumption that customers have to pay the price upfront.

In the case of uni fees, however, the upfront price is paid by the government, and students incur a debt to the government, which they don't have to start repaying until their income reaches a certain level at some uncertain time in the future.

How long they'll be given to repay the debt is also uncertain, though it's certain their repayments will be geared to their ability to pay, and the only interest they'll pay is the rate of inflation. Cushiest loan you'll ever get.

With the cost of university tuition to a student so far into the future and so uncertain, it's unrealistic to assume students will shop around to find the lowest-charging uni. (Actually, they all charge the maximum allowed.)

Remember, too, that the fee is less than the full cost of the tuition, meaning the unis are "selling" a product whose retail price has been heavily subsidised by the government.

The commission notes that price competition is further limited by the geographic immobility of students. Because more than 80 per cent of commencing students live at home, and moving out would add greatly to their costs, you might get competition between the unis in a particular capital city, but that's all.

But even that's unlikely. The elementary model assumes "perfect knowledge" – both buyers and sellers know all they need to know about the prices and qualities of the products on offer.

In reality, knowledge is far from complete, and is often "asymmetric" – sellers know far more than buyers, usually because the sellers are professionals, whereas the buyers are amateurs.

The commission explains why all unis – big-name or bad-name, city or country – charge the maximum fees allowed.

"In the absence of good information, lower prices may undermine the prestige of a university and its capacity to attract good students," the commission says.

This is an admission of a weakness in the elementary model that affects far more than uni fees. The assumption of perfect knowledge leads to the further assumption that the prices market forces allow a firm to charge fully reflect the quality of its products relative to the quality of rival products.

As behavioural economists have pointed out, however, quality is something that's often very hard for buyers to know in advance. Only after they've bought it and tried it will they know. Think bottles of wine.

So whereas economists assume buyers' foreknowledge of differences in quality is what determines differences in the prices of similar products, buyers who don't know the differences in quality assume they can use prices as a quality indicator. Higher price equals higher quality.

So why don't lesser unis seek to attract more students by charging lower fees than the big boys? Because it would be taken as an admission of their inferior quality, and could lose as many customers as it attracted, maybe more.

The assumption that market forces would prevent unis from abusing their freedom to set fees as they chose was extraordinarily naive, as the commission is now happy to explain.

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Sorry, but Medicare needs to change

The apparent success of Labor's scare campaign on the Coalition's alleged plans to "privatise Medicare" at last year's election tells us many things – how much we care about the good performance of our healthcare system, how much we like the way healthcare is paid for under Medicare, and how suspicious we are of politicians' plans to change things.

But Medicare is showing its age. It was designed by health economists in the 1960s, implemented by Gough Whitlam in the 1970s, dismantled by Malcolm Fraser, then reinstalled by Hawke and Keating in the 1980s.

Our health has changed a lot since then. Whereas the system is designed to cope with acute illnesses – you catch a bug or have an accident, so you go to your GP, who fixes the problem or refers you to a specialist or, in the extreme, rushes you to hospital – these days we're more likely to suffer from chronic conditions, such as diabetes, mental illness, lung cancer or cardiovascular disease.

That's because higher living standards, improvements in public health and advances in medical technology have reduced the incidence of accidents and infectious diseases, leaving us living lives that are longer, but more anxious and overweight, while suffering from conditions that will stay with us until we drop off.

If you don't have a chronic illness yet, you probably will.

Trouble is, the ageing Medicare system isn't well-suited to this change. GPs are paid according to the number of patients they see for a few minutes – "fee for service".

They're not rewarded for helping patients change their behaviour in ways that prevent the onset of chronic diseases, nor for helping patients manage their conditions in ways that stop them getting worse over time, or needing to go to hospital.

As healthcare has become more expensive, it's clearer that visits to GPs and other frontline health professionals are relatively cheap, whereas visits to specialists are much dearer. Operations and stays in hospital are hugely expensive.

Get it? We could improve people's health and happiness and reduce expense if we made sure the "primary care" provided by GPs and others was as effective as possible in preventing and managing chronic conditions, reducing the need to call on specialists and hospitals.

All this is the thinking behind the Productivity Commission's advocacy of a "new policy model" that shifts tax changes, deregulation and privatisation onto the backburner, and shifts healthcare (and education and cities) to the forefront of economic reform.

The health system suffers from its division of responsibility between federal and state governments, with the states responsible for public hospitals and the feds for most of the rest.

Lack of co-ordination between the parts of the system generates much wasted time and money, not to mention inconvenience and frustration for patients.

So the commission wants a renewed effort to achieve an integrated system.

"The international and Australian experiences with integrated care indicate that, if properly implemented, it leads to gains in health outcomes for patients, improvements in the patient experience of care, reductions in costs, and improved job satisfaction for clinicians," the commission says.

The place for this integration to occur is at the local, regional level. There are about 30 regions in Australia. The commission wants regional health authorities to have freedom to modify national arrangements to suit local conditions.

Public hospitals have already been organised into "local hospital networks" but, after protracted disagreement between Labor and the Coalition, the feds are only now setting up private "primary health networks" contracted to co-ordinate patient care in their locality, including by working collaboratively with the local hospital network.

It's almost inevitable that big outfits like hospitals – but even doctors' surgeries – tend to be run for the convenience of the outfit, rather than the patient.

But the commission wants changes that encourage the system to focus on patients rather than suppliers.

"Patient-centred care gives prominence to the preferences, needs and values of consumers. In a better system, patients' time would be recognised. Patients would be given the information and power to be co-contributors to treatments and disease management," the commission says.

"Medical records would be owned by patients and they would be able to add comments. The commission sees such rights to data as a broad requirement across many public and private services. Where choice was feasible, it would be facilitated."

The digital age has largely eliminated the excuse for different parts of the system – including different doctors – not keeping each other fully informed, and doing so via the patient's own, digitised and portable medical record.

This idea isn't new, but doctors have been dragging their feet and governments need to renew their determination to make it happen.

Using fee-for-service as the main way of paying doctors encourages activity (more visits) whereas it would be better to reward outcomes – successful efforts at preventing chronic conditions or stopping people from needing to go to hospital.

Fee-for-service would continue under a regionally based integrated care model, but its role would diminish as primary health networks and local hospital networks found other ways to remunerate GPs for clinical outcomes.

Little of all this is new, and governments are unlikely to do it all next week. Rather, it's the commission setting priorities for economic reform in general, and healthcare in particular, and urging governments to get on with bringing it to pass.

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Report heralds big change in economic reform priorities

Government reports come and go with great rapidity. Some are acted on, most are quickly pigeonholed. Last week Scott Morrison tabled a report from the Productivity Commission called Shifting the Dial, but it was soon lost amid all the excitement about raids on a union and politicians being thrown out of their jobs.

Despite this inauspicious beginning, let me make a fearless prediction: when the history of the economy in the early decades of the 21st century is written, this report will get prominence.

Why? Not because this government or the next will rush out to implement its recommendations, but because it will be seen as a turning point in the thinking of the nation's economic advisers.

The populist revolt against the doctrines of "neoliberalism" – or economic rationalism, as we've called it in Australia – has been apparent for most of this year. It's been apparent since the middle of the year that the long-running bipartisan consensus in support of neoliberalism in the advanced economies has collapsed.

But where to now? The economy and its apparatus are far from perfect and there's always something that needs working on. The econocrats need something to be working on to justify their existence, so what are they to do now that so many citizens are jack of deregulation and privatisation?

Well, now we know. Ostensibly, the commission's report is just the first of many five-yearly reports on ways to improve the economy's "productivity" – its ability to increase its outputs of goods and services faster than the increase in its inputs of land, labour and capital – the magic that's made us so much richer than our great-grandparents.

The Productivity Commission, would you believe, is preoccupied with productivity. Same old, same old.

Don't be deceived. The commission – formerly a leader of the economic rationalist charge – has taken the initiative in proposing an agenda for economic improvement that's quite different to what we've had so far.

Its new agenda attempts to restore public support for economic "reform" (a word it tries to avoid) by responding to popular criticism of the push that, while well-intentioned and necessary when it originated in the Hawke-Keating years, has since seemed to degenerate into "bizonomics" – what's good for big business is good for the rest of us.

Gone is the unending obsession with tax reform (cutting the rates of tax on companies and high-earning individuals) and industrial relations (cutting penalty rates and shifting bargaining power in favour of employers).

In their place, the commission focuses on three big issues: healthcare, education and cities.

On health, it argues there needs to be more emphasis on preventing and managing the growing incidence of chronic illnesses, such as diabetes. This may involve less reliance on paying doctors according to fee-for-service.

The health system – state-run public hospitals in one box, most doctors in another and pharmaceuticals in a third – needs to be better integrated so as to make it more centred on the needs of patients rather than the suppliers of health care.

This greater co-ordination should happen at the local level.

On education, too many students are being let down at every level.

The commission finds that school results are deteriorating, vocational education and training is "a mess" and universities are more concerned with publishing research papers than improving teaching standards.

As for cities, they produce a growing portion of our gross domestic product – about 80 per cent, with Sydney and Melbourne accounting for half of that.

By the time we reach 2050, almost 11 million extra people will be squeezed into our capital cities, according to Morrison.

The social costs of congestion in our capital cities will grow from almost $19 billion a year in 2015 to more than $31 billion a year by 2030, we're told.

See how different all this is to the economic reform talk we're used to?

It's shifted the focus from business to the "non-market economy" run mainly by government bodies. It's less concerned with mining, farming and manufacturing, and more with the services sector.

Its approach to reform is bottom-up – concentrate on the needs of patients and students, on getting to work – not trickle down.

Putting it another way, it's people-friendly, not business-friendly.

The three issues are two-sided: they directly affect the wellbeing of individuals, but also the nation's productivity, as a healthier, better-skilled workforce gets to work more easily.

This means the "reform agenda" ought to be a lot more relevant and appealing to ordinary voters. It also means it can be pursued by either side of politics.

One of the great objections to the old agenda was fear that it benefited the better-off at the expense of the rest of us.

Rest easy – the commission has got the message.

"A key issue will be to ensure that future economic, social and environmental policies sustain inclusive [note that word]growth – by no means guaranteed given current policy settings, and prospective technological and labour market pressures ...

"One of the advantages of better healthcare, education systems and cities is that they provide strong prospects for improving lifetime outcomes for people from all backgrounds.

"Indeed, improvements in these areas have the potential to decrease health inequalities, and reduce job insecurity and wage risks for those whose skills are at most risk from technological change," the commission concludes.

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Turns out productivity's been fine all along

What a joke. A scholarly article in Treasury's latest Economic Roundup has admitted that all the years of handwringing over our poor productivity performance was just jumping at shadows.

Turns out all the angst was caused by not much more than the figures being distorted by the mining industry's construction boom.

This after our top econocrats gave speech after speech urging "more micro reform" to improve productivity and keep living standards rising. (They'd have advocated more reform even if productivity was improving at record rates; its supposed weakness was just a convenient selling proposition.)

Meanwhile, the business lobby groups, led by the Business Council of Australia, claimed – without any evidence – the supposed weakness had been caused by the "reregulation" of wage fixing under Labor's evil Fair Work changes, and demanded the balance of bargaining power be shifted yet further in favour of employers. (A claim even the Productivity Commission wasn't convinced by.)

Even at the time, it seemed the contortions of the mining industry during the decade-long resources boom were a big part of the story, but that didn't stop people who should have known better going into panic mode.

"Despite concerns", the paper by Simon Campbell and Harry Withers, says with masterful understatement, "Australia's labour productivity growth over recent years is in line with its longer-term performance.

"In the five years to 2015-16, labour productivity in the whole economy has grown at an average annual rate of 1.8 per cent.

"This compares to an average annual rate of 1.4 per cent over the past 15 years, and 1.6 per cent over the past 30 years," it says.

Let's take a step back. Productivity compares the quantity of the economy's output of goods and services with the quantity of inputs of resources used to produce the output.

When output grows faster than inputs – as it does most years – we're left better off. This improvement in our productivity is the overwhelming reason for the increase in our material standard of living over the years and centuries.

Productivity can be measured different ways. The simplest (and least likely to be inaccurate) way is to measure the productivity of labour: growth in output per worker or, better, per hour worked.

Labour productivity improvement is caused by two factors. The first is by increases in the ratio of (physical) capital to labour used in the economy.

This known as "capital deepening" – translation: giving workers more tools and machines to work with, which makes them more productive.

The second driver of labour productivity is improvements in the efficiency with which labour inputs and capital inputs are used, arising from such things as improved management practices. This is known as MFP – multi-factor productivity.

In recent years the figures have shown multi-factor productivity growth to be zero or even negative, causing great concern among some economists, including the Productivity Commission.

But Campbell and Withers argue this focus on MFP is misplaced. They remind us that MFP is calculated as a residual (the product of a sum), meaning its likelihood of mismeasurement is high.

And they criticise the conventional view that physical capital should grow no faster than output – known as "balanced growth" - because capital deepening is an inferior source of productivity improvement to MFP.

People take this view because (making the unrealistic assumption that the economy is closed to transactions with foreigners) increased investment in physical capital must come at the expense spending on consumption.

The authors point out that achieving improved MFP isn't costless, while the price of capital goods (most of which are imported) has fallen persistently relative to the price of consumption goods.

"This has allowed Australia to sustain its high rate of capital deepening without forgoing ever higher levels of consumption," they say.

Actually, they say, our economy has never fitted the "balanced growth" story. Of the 30-year average of 1.6 per cent annual growth in labour productivity, MFP contributed only 0.7 percentage points, while capital deepening contributed 0.9 points.

Next the authors examine the causes of the ups and downs in labour productivity improvement overall by breaking the economy into six sectors: agriculture, mining, manufacturing, utilities, construction and services (everything else).

They find that labour productivity in agriculture is now 2 1/2 times its level in 1989, but it's too small a part of the economy – 2.5 per cent – for this to make much difference to the economy-wide story.

The utilities sector showed strong productivity growth until the turn of the century, before steadily declining through to 2011-12, mainly because of one-off developments such as the building, then mothballing of many desal plants.

The story of mining is well-known: its productivity fell because of the delay between companies hiring more workers to build new mines and gas facilities and that extra production coming on line. Since 2012-13, however, mining productivity has shot up. What a surprise.

Productivity in manufacturing and construction has grown at similar rates to the economy overall, as has productivity in the services sector (hardly a surprise since services now account for 70 per cent of gross domestic product).

Over the past five years, more than half of our total labour productivity improvement was attributable to the services sector, compared with about a quarter attributable to mining.

Apart from productivity improvement in the various sectors, overall productivity can be affected when changes in the industry structure of the economy cause workers to shift from lower-productivity sectors to higher-productivity sectors, or vice versa.

Because mining, being highly capital-intensive, has by far the highest level of labour productivity, the authors say it's really only when workers move in or out of mining that structural change has much effect on economy-wide productivity.

"These movements of labour into and out of mining have been the key driver behind the fluctuations in ... aggregate labour productivity growth," the report concludes.

Now they tell us.

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Many guesses why productivity may have stopped improving

Conventional economics is falling apart, no longer making the sense we thought it made. Economists are entering a period of puzzlement and uncertainty, while their high priests struggle to hold the show together.

You can tell all that if you read between the lines of the Productivity Commission's discussion paper launching its inquiry into Increasing Australia's future prosperity, published last month.

It’s meant to be the first five-yearly review of our productivity performance, the micro-economic equivalent of Treasury’s (misnamed and now politically hijacked) five-yearly macro-economic intergenerational reports.

So it has potential to be a big deal. If you missed hearing about the discussion paper it may be because it was overshadowed that week by something that happened to a Mr Trump.

The commission opens its discussion with the alarming observation that "there is a justified global anxiety that growth in productivity – and the growth in national income that is inextricably linked to it over the longer term – has slowed or stopped".

Productivity is a measure of an economy's (or a business's) ability to convert inputs of resources into outputs of goods and services.

We commonly (and least inaccurately) measure it as output per unit of labour input – per worker or per hour worked.

But the commission prefers to measure it as output per unit of both labour and capital inputs, which it calls "multi-factor productivity". This is intended to be a measure of the essence of productivity improvement: technological advance and increased human capital.

Trouble is, the commission says, "since 2004, multi-factor productivity has stalled, here and around the developed world. This is a long enough period to suggest something is seriously awry in the economic fundamentals and the consequent generation of national wealth and individual opportunity."

Actually, by the commission's own figuring, Australia's labour productivity in the "12-industry market economy" improved by 1.9 per cent in 2014-15, the most recent year available, and our multi-factor productivity improved by 0.8 per cent, which was also our average rate of multi-factor improvement over the previous 40 years.

It's true, however, that our multi-factor performance has looked pretty sick since the turn of the century.

But the first point to note is that the problem is global, not just some weakness of ours – a fact a lot of those who've used our weak numbers to push their own favoured "reforms" have often failed to mention.

Next point, which is also often not mentioned: economists can't measure multi-factor productivity with even remote accuracy. That's mainly because they can only guess at the contribution one unit of physical capital (whatever that is) makes to production.

So it's hard to be sure the weak multi-factor productivity figures most developed countries are producing are real.

Next, assuming they are real, economists can only guess at the factors causing them. There's a lot of guessing going on by some of the world's top economists, but as yet there are no policy changes we could make with any confidence that they'd fix the problem.

Our eponymous commission produces an annual update on our productivity figures but, though it's been wringing its hands for years, its analysis has never once been able to put its finger on a causal factor we could do something about.

The few explanations it's found are either temporary or nothing to worry about.

The discussion paper acknowledges, but then dismisses, the argument of those wondering if the whole "problem" is merely a product of monumental mismeasurement.

I don't dismiss it. Had the economists not assured us of the opposite, most of us would look at the wonders of the digital revolution and the many industries being hit by digital disruption and assume the productivity indicators must be going gangbusters.

How can we be sure they aren't? One of our most thoughtful economists – one who's always gloried in digital advances – is professor John Quiggin, of the University of Queensland.

Quiggin argues that the economists' conventional model for thinking about the economy and how it grows is based on an industrial economy, which made sense in the 19th and 20th centuries, but is becoming increasingly outmoded and misleading.

We focus hard on the production of goods – agriculture, mining and manufacturing – but are vaguer about the production of services, which is the main part of the economy that's growing.

Today, he says, the primary engine of economic development is information, but information has radically different characteristics to a physical good or a service such as a haircut.

Information is often free ("non-excludable", as economists say) and it can't be used up ("non-rivalrous").

This outdated, industrial-age way of thinking about growth and productivity is reflected in the way we define and measure the economy and productivity via gross domestic product.

For instance, we measure only economic activity in markets, meaning we exclude all the activity taking place in households, and can't measure the productivity of the 20 per cent of GDP created in the public sector, including such minor industries as health and education.

And we ignore one of the most valuable outcomes of the greater prosperity that is the Productivity Commission's god: hours of leisure.

None of this, however, will stop the commission using its ultimate report to advocate a bunch of "reforms" intended to improve our small corner of the world's alleged productivity problem.

As we speak, Canberra's second biggest industry – the lobbyists – are busy churning out their self-interested submissions to the inquiry, advocating such radical new ideas as cutting company tax and weekend penalty rates.

To be fair, the commission says it's "particularly interested in new and novel ideas because there is already a strong awareness of many reform options that parties would like to see implemented. More of the same is not likely to be helpful."

We'll see how far it gets with that fond hope.

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Don’t be sure lower penalties mean more jobs

The argument that reducing or eliminating weekend penalty wage rates would have great economic benefits is obvious to all business people and economists – but not to me. I think it's fallacious.

The received wisdom was well expressed by Anna McPhee, of the Retail Council: "The rebalancing of penalty rates to reflect the needs of the modern economy will mean retailers can create jobs to meet increased consumer demand, which in turn will benefit the economy more broadly."

She was responding, of course, to the proposal in the Productivity Commission's draft report on Australia's Workplace Relations Framework that Sunday penalty rates in the hospitality, entertainment, retailing, restaurant and cafe industries be cut to the same level as Saturday penalty rates.

Even the commission goes along with the received wisdom: "Excessive penalty rates for Sundays reduce hours worked, mean unemployment is higher than it needs to be, and reduce options for businesses and consumers. Trading hours are likely to be lower and capital under-utilised."

But I believe such thinking rests on a fallacy of composition, that what's true for the individual must be true for the whole.

It's not hard to see why particular business people, thinking only of the circumstances of their own business, see lower penalty rates leading to more sales, higher profits and, as a pleasant side-effect, more not-so-well-paid casual employees.

There would be some, of course, who looked no further than benefit of the lower wage rates they'd be paying even if they didn't bother opening their business for more days or longer hours than they are at present.

And, indeed, since they'd now be earning more than they were, that might be enough for some.

But let's assume the owners of the affected businesses really did want to open longer, sell more and profit more. Their fixed costs would now be spread over more sales, while their main variable cost – wages – would be lower per hour.

Question is: where would all these extra sales come from? From rivals that didn't bother opening on Sundays? That advantage isn't likely to last.

From businesses in other industries that now sold less during the week because their customers were seizing the opportunity to spend more on the weekend?

Of course, even if that were true it need be of no concern to any business person confident of being able to sell more. Their motive is to make more money and that's all a market economy expects of them.

But here's my point: just because some businesses can make more and employ more, this doesn't do much for the economy overall if their success comes at the expense of other businesses that make less and employ fewer.

When the advocates of lower penalty rates tell us that many extra jobs will be created, they're surely expecting us to take that as meaning more jobs overall, not just more jobs in some industries but fewer in others.

So let's switch to a macro or, as the commission likes to say, "economy-wide" perspective. We're told it will be great because, with more businesses open on the weekend, consumers will spend more and it's this extra spending that will create more jobs.

But how much the nation's consumers spend is ultimately constrained by their income. Are we expecting that consumers will spend more by saving less? Why would this be a good thing?

Why are we compelling employees to save 9.5 per cent of their wages if we really don't care about people saving much? (And don't mind being more reliant on foreign investment as a consequence.)

Maybe so as to spend more on weekend entertainment the nation's consumers might borrow more – on their credit cards or however. Would this be good for the economy? In any case, borrowing to boost your consumption is not something the nation's consumers can go on doing for long.

I don't believe there is much scope for us to be consuming a lot more than we are already – certainly not over the medium term. If so, then a lot of the businesses that sell more will be taking sales from other businesses.

And there's another possibility, one I suspect is quite likely: those businesses that open for longer on the weekend will sell more at the weekend, but less during the week.

To the extent that businesses achieve nothing more than spreading essentially the same amount of sales over longer opening hours – which I think is quite likely – they're likely to be worse off rather than better. The economy-wide benefits will be small, as will the net gain in employment.

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We're not doing too badly on productivity

Rummaging through the media's rubbish bins this week, I happened upon some good news. According to the Productivity Commission's annual update, the productivity of labour improved by 1.4 per cent in 2013-14.

And get this: in the 12-industry "market sector" of the economy, it improved by 2.5 per cent in that year and by 3.7 per cent the year before.

To give you an idea, the 40-year average rate of market-sector productivity improvement is 2.3 per cent. So, despite all the worrying we've been doing in recent years about our poor productivity performance, it seems we're now doing quite well.

In which case, how come no one wanted to tell us? I can think of three reasons. First is the media's assumption that good news is of little interest to their customers.

Second is that the Productivity Commission's preference is for brushing aside the labour productivity figures and getting us to focus on the figures for "multi-factor productivity", which show an improvement of just 0.4 per cent in 2013-14 and 0.4 per cent the year before. This compares with the 40-year average of 0.8 per cent a year.

Third is that the nation's economists are engaged in a campaign to persuade us we need a lot more micro-economic reform so as to raise our rate of productivity improvement and, hence, the rate at which our material standard of living is rising.

They'd make the same argument whether our productivity performance was good, bad or indifferent, but it helps the selling job if they leave us with the impression our recent performance is poor.

Anyway, let's take a closer look at the commission's new figures. Productivity, which compares the growth in the output of goods and services with the growth in inputs of labour and capital, is a measure of the efficiency of our production. When outputs grow faster than inputs, the economy – the economic machine, so to speak – has become more efficient.

The simplest (and probably least inaccurate) way of measuring productivity is to take the increase in the quantity of goods and services produced during the year and divide it by the increase in the total number of hours worked to produce the stuff.

The main way to increase the productivity of workers is to give them more machines to work with. But the commission believes a more revealing measure is multi-factor productivity. You calculate this by dividing the increase in output by the increase in labour inputs plus the increase in capital inputs (use of machines and other equipment).

The main thing causing an increase in multi-factor productivity is technological advance – the invention of better machines plus improved ways of running businesses. But also improvements in "human capital" – the rising education and skill of the workforce.

That's all fine in theory, but it gets pretty ropey in practice. For a start, we have no way of measuring the productivity of the public sector (healthcare, education and public administration) because, for the most part, it doesn't sell its output in the market.

The market sector covers the financial services, mining, construction, manufacturing, transport, retail trade, wholesale trade, information media and telecommunications, electricity gas and water, agriculture, accommodation and food services, arts and recreation services, rental hiring and real estate services, professional scientific services, administrative support services, and "other" services industries.

That's 16 industries – though, for reasons it doesn't explain, the commission's 12-industry measure of market sector productivity doesn't include the last four industries on that list. Even so, the 12 industries account for 65 per cent of gross domestic product.

A much more serious problem is that the measurement of multi-factor productivity is quite dodgy. It's measured as a residual, meaning that any error in measuring the three other items in the sum will (and does) make the measurement of multi-factor productivity wrong.

More particularly, economists have no way of accurately measuring capital inputs. Just one of their problems is that they can't distinguish between more machines and better machines, meaning their so-called measure of multi-factor productivity excludes much of the technological advance it purports to measure.

The besetting sin of economists is the way they confidently quote their figures to a trusting public, without breathing a word about the data deficiencies and dubious assumptions that lie behind their calculations. When they fail to issue a product warning, it's the duty of the conscientious economic journalist to call them out.

In such circumstances, the commission's results need to be treated with scepticism – particular when, as was true in the noughties, they were so unprecedentedly low as to be implausible.

But let's look at the commission's breakdown of the latest year's supposedly weak result of 0.4 per cent. Half of the 12 industries – all of them in the services sector – achieved remarkably strong improvements, ranging between 1.1 per cent and 5.4 per cent.

Three industries – mining, construction, agriculture – had growing production but marginally declining multi-factor productivity. We know the problems in mining and construction are temporary. Agriculture's poor performance came mainly from drought.

The last three industries – utilities, manufacturing and transport – suffered declining production but lesser declines in inputs, meaning their multi-factor productivity deteriorated quite significantly.

We know the utilities, particularly electricity and gas, are coping with major structural changes, not helped by the earlier misregulation of poles and wires. We know manufacturing is still recovering from the high exchange rate caused by the resources boom. Whatever transport's problem is – we're not told – it will get over it.

That's the trouble with the supposedly worrying figures for multi-factor productivity. Apart from the ropiness of their calculation, when you investigate the stories for the particular industries involved you can't find anything major to worry about.

I'd say that, despite all the barrow-pushers wanting to use poor productivity figures to bolster whatever cause they're promoting, we're not doing too badly on productivity.

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How to reform industrial relations

Tony Abbott's strategy for getting back into government was to make himself a small target by adopting few controversial policies. He mollified his big business backers by promising to hold many inquiries and take any proposals for controversial reform to the 2016 election.

But once in government Abbott couldn't avoid announcing many unpopular measures to get the budget back on track. These have hit his standing in the polls, while causing difficulty and delay in getting budget measures through the Senate.

It's likely a lot of them won't pass, implying the government will have to put a lot of effort into finding more palatable savings. Even then, some of this year's unpopular measures - particularly the age-pension changes - will have to be defended at the election.

Meanwhile, most of a year has passed without the government getting on with its promised inquiries into controversial issues such as industrial relations, tax reform and federal-state relations (think three letters: GST).

Not a lot of time is left for the various inquiry processes to report, for the government to consider the reports, decide what reforms it proposes and then explain and justify them to voters before the election.

Does Abbott's unexpected radicalism on budget measures presage equally radical proposals in these other issues? If so, the next election campaign will be a lot more exciting than the last one.

Or does all the hostility he has aroused just with his budget measures make it more likely Abbott won't want to bite off a lot more trouble on other fronts?

On the question of industrial relations reform, Abbott and his minister, Eric Abetz - not to mention the Productivity Commission, which will be conducting the inquiry - would do well to ponder a recent speech by Geoff McGill, a long-experienced industrial practitioner and now a visiting scholar at Sydney University's Workplace Relations Centre.

McGill observes that the history of federal industrial relations legislation "has been punctuated by swings in the IR pendulum across the political cycle". First the Howard government's Work Choices swung the pendulum in favour of employers, then the Labor government's Fair Work swung it back towards the unions.

Now big business and its cheer squad in the national dailies want the restored Coalition government to give the IR pendulum another shove back in the direction to the employers. Isn't this the way the political game is played?

It is. But McGill questions whether continuing to play that way is the best way to get where we want to go. The advocates of yet another round of industrial relations "reform" justified it mainly by arguing the need for faster improvement in the productivity of labour.

That's something all sides can agree is a desirable objective. But McGill shoots down some wishful thinking on the topic. "Productivity growth is a complex process and usually described in simplistic terms," he says. "It can never be assumed and is only evident after the event.

"There is little evidence to support claims that particular changes in industrial relations legislation will boost national labour productivity."

It's the substance of the employment relationship, not its legal form, which determines whether people are engaged and productive, he says. Productive workplaces are not the outcome of legislation, but of the quality of leadership and culture at the workplace.

Surely there must be a law against someone speaking such obvious sense.

McGill brings to mind another point. Much of the thinking behind "the end of entitlement" and the unpopular budget measures is about saying governments can't solve all your problems for you (just the opposite of the message all politicians spread during election campaigns). It's not possible and, in any case, it's not healthy for people to be so dependent on the authorities.

True enough. But if that's what the government is telling everyone from the young unemployed to uni students to age pensioners, why is it allowing big business to imagine its industrial relations problems should - or even could - be solved by the government changing the law?

Actually, my guess is most of business isn't silly enough to think that. The push is probably coming from lobbyists trying to justify their fee, journos trying to sell newspapers and a relative handful of belligerent employers facing equally belligerent unions and hoping the government will give them some new stick to beat over the heads of their opponents.

Another point of McGill's: if we want better industrial relations leading to greater productivity improvement and the main way for employers to bring this about lies in the workplace, maybe a better way to encourage them to focus on the domestic challenge is to give them a period of legislative stability rather than more changes in the rules of the game.

Most successful managers understand that getting along with people - winning their regard, respect, support, trust, loyalty and co-operation - works better than getting heavy and legalistic. That's how you get better industrial relations - by, as McGill says, putting more emphasis on the relations and less on the industrial.

Managers like to be kept in the loop. Guess what? So do workers. Smart managers keep their staff well informed about the company's performance and the challenges it faces, and give early warnings - even to the union - about any need for nasties like redundancies. They never risk a breakdown in relations by telling workers things they subsequently discover to be untrue.

You engender co-operation by treating people well, consulting them, giving them a degree of autonomy, rewarding loyalty and sharing the business's proceeds fairly between shareholders, managers and staff. Workers accept a hierarchical pay structure, but you don't cause envy and disaffection by rewarding some equals more than others.

And if you don't like outside union officials coming into your workplace, you keep your workers so happy they never need to call them in.

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Your guide to business entitlement

With the Abbott government's close relations with big business, we're still to see whether its reign will be one of greater or less rent-seeking by particular industries. So far we have evidence going both ways.

We've seen knockbacks for the car makers, fruit canners and Qantas, but wins for farmers opposing the foreign takeover of GrainCorp and seeking more drought assistance, as well as a stay on the big banks' attempt to water down consumer protection on financial advice.

The next test will be the budget. Will the end of the Age of Entitlement apply just to welfare recipients (especially the politically weak, e.g. the unemployed and sole parents, rather than politically powerful age pensioners) or will it extend to "business welfare"?

With Joe Hockey searching for all the budget savings he can find, there's a lot of business welfare or, euphemistically, "industry assistance" to look at. The Productivity Commission measures it every year in its Trade and Assistance Review.

Government assistance to industry is provided in four main ways: through tariffs (restrictions on imports), government spending, tax concessions and regulatory restrictions on competition. Although much rent-seeking takes the form of persuading governments to regulate markets in ways that advantage your industry, the benefit you gain is hard to measure, so it's not included in the commission's figuring.

Assistance through tariffs is far less than in the bad old days before micro-economic reform, but there's still some left. However, its cost is borne directly by consumers in the form of higher prices. So it's not relevant to Hockey's search for budget savings. Even so, I'll give you a quick tour.

The commission estimates that, in 2011-12, tariffs allowed manufacturing industries (plus the odd rural industry) to sell their goods for $7.9 billion a year more than they otherwise would have.

In the process, however, this forced up the cost of goods used by manufacturers and other industries as inputs to their production of goods and services by $6.8 billion a year. About 30 per cent of this cost to inputs was borne by the manufacturers themselves, leaving about 70 per cent borne by other industries, largely the service industries.

(This, by the way, shows why import protection doesn't help employment as non-economists imagine it does. It may prop up manufacturing jobs, but it's at the expense of jobs everywhere else in the economy.)

So now we get to budgetary assistance to industry. On the spending side of the budget it can take the form of direct subsidies, grants, bounties, loans at concessional interest rates, loan guarantees, insurance arrangements or even equity (capital) injections.

On the revenue side of the budget it can take the form of concessional tax deductions, rebates or exemptions, preferential tax rates or the deferral of taxation. In 2011-12, the total value of budgetary assistance was $9.4 billion, with just over half that coming from spending and the rest from tax concessions.

Often people will virtuously assure you their outfit doesn't receive a cent of subsidy from the government, but omit to mention the special tax breaks they're entitled to. Think-tanks that rail against government intervention and the Nanny State, hate admitting they're sucking at the teat because the donations they receive are tax deductible (causing them to be higher than otherwise, but at a cost to other taxpayers).

This is why economists call tax concessions "tax expenditures" - to recognise that, from the perspective of the budget balance and of other taxpayers, it doesn't matter much whether the assistance comes via a cheque from the government or via the right to pay less tax than you otherwise would.

Of the total budgetary assistance in 2011-12 of $9.4 billion, 15 per cent went to agriculture, 7 per cent to mining, 19 per cent to manufacturing and 45 per cent to the services sector (leaving 14 per cent that can't be allocated to particular industries).

To put that in context, remember that agriculture's share of gross domestic product (value-added) is about 3 per cent, mining's is 10 per cent and manufacturing's is 8 per cent, leaving services contributing about 79 per cent.

Within manufacturing, the recipients of the most business welfare are motor vehicles and parts, $620 million, metal and metal fabrication, $270 million, petroleum and chemicals, $220 million, and food and beverage processors, $110 million.

Within services, the big ones are finance and insurance, $910 million, property and professional services, $610 million, and arts and recreation, $350 million.

But if you combine tariff and budgetary assistance, then compare it with the industry's value-added (share of GDP), you get a different perspective on which industries' snouts are deepest in the trough. The "effective rate of combined assistance" is 9.4 per cent for motor vehicles and parts, 7.3 per cent for textiles, clothing and footwear, and 4.7 per cent for metal and metal fabrication.

Get this: outside manufacturing, the most heavily assisted goods industry relative to the size of its contribution to the economy is forestry and logging on 7.2 per cent. We pay a huge price to destroy our native forests.

Within services, the most heavily assisted industry is the one where incomes are so much higher than anywhere else: financial services. Virtually all the assistance picked up in the commission's calculations comes via special tax breaks, such as the tax concession for offshore banking units and the reduced withholding tax on foreigners receiving distributions from managed investment trusts.

But that ain't the half of it. These calculations don't pick up two big free kicks: the benefit to the industry because the government forces almost all workers to hand over 9.25 per cent of their pay to be "managed" by it, and the benefit it gains from having one of its main products, superannuation, so heavily subsidised by other taxpayers.

Cut these fat cats? Naah, screwing people on the dole would be much easier.

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