Showing posts with label economic modelling. Show all posts
Showing posts with label economic modelling. Show all posts

Monday, March 13, 2023

Why economists keep getting it wrong, but never stop doing sums

Why are economists’ forecasts so often wrong, and why do they so often fail to see the freight train heading our way? Short answer: because economists don’t know as much about how the economy works as they like to think they do – and as they like us to think they do.

What happens next in the economy is hard to predict because the economy is a beehive of humans running around doing different things for different reasons, and it’s hard to predict which way they’ll run.

It’s true we’re subject to herd behaviour, but it’s devilishly hard to predict when the herd will turn. Humans are also prone to fads and fashions and joining bandwagons – a truth straightlaced economists prefer to assume away.

I think it embarrasses economists that their discipline’s a social science, not a hard science. Their basic model of how the economy works became entrenched long before other social sciences – notably, psychology – had got very far.

They dealt with the human problem by assuming it away. Let’s assume everyone always acts in a rational, calculating way to advance their self-interest. Problem solved. And then you wonder why your predictions of what “economic agents” will do next are so often astray.

Actually, the economists don’t wonder why they’re so often wrong – we do. They prefer not to think about it. Anyway, there’s this month’s round of forecasts we need to get on with.

The economists’ great mission over the past 80 years has been to make economics more “rigorous” – more like physics – by expressing economic relationships in equations rather than diagrams or words.

These days, you don’t get far in economics unless you’re good at maths. And the better you are at it, the further up the tree you get. The academic profession is dominated by those best at maths.

Trouble is, although using maths can ensure that every conclusion you draw from your assumptions is rigorously logical, you’ll still get wrong answers if your assumptions are unrealistic.

In the latest issue of the International Monetary Fund’s magazine, the ripping read named Finance and Development, a former governor of the Bank of Japan reminds his peers about the embarrassing time in 2008, after the global financial crisis had turned into the great recession, when Queen Elizabeth II, visiting the London School of Economics, asked the wise ones why none of them had seen it coming.

With frankness uncharacteristic of the Japanese, the former governor observed that King Charles could go back and ask the same question: why did no one foresee that the economic managers’ response to the pandemic would lead to our worst inflation outbreak in decades?

One answer would be: because all our efforts to use computerised mathematical modelling to make our discipline more rigorous have done little to make us wiser. The paradox of econometric modelling is that, though only the very smart can do it, the economy they model is childishly primitive, like a stick-figure drawing.

The best response some of the world’s economists came up with, long after the Queen had gone back to her palace, was that academic economists had largely stopped teaching economic history.

These days, economists can’t do anything much without sets of “data” to run through their models. And before computerisation, there were precious few data sets. But those who forget history are condemned to . . .

The great temptation economists face is the one faced by every occupation: to believe your own bulldust. To be so impressed by the wonderful model you’ve built, and so familiar with the conclusions it leads you to, you forget all its limitations – all the debatable assumptions it’s built on, and all the excluded variables it isn’t.

As part of the academic economists’ campaign for an inquiry into the Reserve Bank, some genius estimated that the Reserve’s reluctance to cut its already exceptionally low official interest rate even lower in the years before the pandemic had caused employment to be 250,000 less than it could have been.

Only someone mesmerised by their model could believe something so implausible. Someone who, now they’ve got a model, can happily turn off their overtaxed brain. There’s no simple linear, immutable relationship between the level of interest rates and the strength of economic growth and the demand for labour.

At the time, it was obvious to anyone turning their head away from the screen to look out the window that, with households already loaded with debt, cutting rates a little lower wouldn’t induce them to rush out and load up with more – the exception being first-home buyers with access to the Bank of Mum and Dad, who as yet only aspired to be loaded up.

To be fair to the Reserve in this open season for criticism, it’s far more prone to admitting the fallibility of its modelling exercises than most modellers are – especially those “independent consultants” selling their services to vested interests trying to pressure the government.

In its latest statement on monetary policy, the Reserve explains how its modelling finds that supply-side factors explain about half the rise in the consumer price index over the year to September 2022.

But then it used a more sophisticated “dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model” which found that supply factors accounted for about three-quarters of the pick-up in inflation.

The Reserve’s assistant governor (economic), Dr Luci Ellis, told a parliamentary committee last month that this “triangulation” left her very confident that the demand side accounted for at least a quarter and probably up to a third of the inflation we’ve seen.

(Remembering the debate about the extent to which the present inflation surge reflects businesses sneaking up their profit margins – their “mark-ups,” in econospeak – note that this second model includes “mark-up” as part of the supply side’s three-quarters. Always pays to read the footnotes.)

One of the tricks to economics is that many of the economic concepts central to the way economists think are “unobserved” – the official statisticians can’t measure them directly. So you need to produce a model to estimate their size.

A case in point is the economists’ supposed measure of full employment, the NAIRU – non-accelerating-inflation rate of unemployment – the lowest the rate of unemployment can fall to before this causes wage and price inflation to take off.

Some of those business economists who believe the Reserve hasn’t raised interest rates nearly enough to get inflation down justify this judgment by saying our present unemployment rate of 3.7 per cent is way, way below what conventional modelling tells us the NAIRU is: about 5 per cent.

But Ellis told the parliamentary committee that the Reserve had rejected this estimate. The “staff view” was that the NAIRU had moved from “the high threes to the low fours”, and this was what its forecasts were based on.

So why dismiss the conventional model? Because, Ellis explained, it’s driven solely by demand-side factors. It’s “not designed to handle the supply shocks that we have seen over COVID”.

Oh. Really. Didn’t think of that. Mustn’t have had my brain turned on.

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Monday, December 26, 2022

Never ask an economist to tell you a story

Tell me, are you planning to read any good books over the break? Maybe go to the movies? Certainly, watch a fair bit of streaming video? I bet you are. And I bet most of what you read or watch will be fiction.

If it’s non-fiction, it’s most likely to be a biography – the story of someone’s life.

How can I be so sure? Because, though it’s taken economists far longer than anyone else to realise – and many of them still haven’t read the memo – humans are a story-telling animal.

It’s something psychologists and other social scientists have long understood – although, being academics, they prefer to use the more high-sounding “narratives”.

Humans have been telling themselves stories since we lived in caves and sat around campfires. The eminent American biologist, E.O. Wilson, said storytelling was a fundamental human instinct. Evolution has wired our brains for storytelling.

Jonathan Gottschall, author of The Storytelling Animal, says we are, as a species, addicted to stories.

“Even when the body goes to sleep, the mind stays up all night telling itself stories,” he says.

You can say we like telling and listening to stories because we enjoy them and find them entertaining. Sure. But why has our evolution programmed us to enjoy stories so much?

Because stories add to our “fitness” to survive and prosper as a species. Because stories are the way humans make meaning out of the seeming chaos of life.

Gottschall says storytelling “allows us to experience our lives as coherent, orderly and meaningful”. Another author, Peter Guber, says stories have helped us share information long before we had a written language.

We turn facts we want to remember into stories, and we remember facts embedded in stories better than facts that aren’t.

Stories engage our emotions, not just our intellect, which is what makes them so powerful. We don’t remember much of the key figures and facts summarising the seriousness of the latest famine in Africa, but we do remember the story about a little girl, all skin and bones.

So, what have stories got to do with economics, especially when economics is more about impersonal concepts than about particular people? More than many economists want to admit.

Just as stories are our way of making meaning out of the seeming chaos of life, so the economists’ “models” – whether the ones they carry in their heads or the sets of equations they program into a computer – aren’t as scientific as economists like to think.

Models are an economist’s way of making sense of the seeming chaos of the economy, which makes them just another (less entertaining) form of story. As their name implies, models aren’t the economy, they’re just models of the economy, which don’t reproduce all the complexity of the actual economy.

Modellers select just a few of the economy’s moving parts – the ones they believe do most to drive the economy – and ignore the many hundreds of parts that usually don’t play a big part in moving the economy along.

Models that don’t simplify the story of how the economy works are of no use to anyone because they don’t reduce the seeming chaos.

All of which is true of the stories we tell each other of what motivates people to behave the way they do in particular circumstances, and of what are the main things that matter in our efforts to get rich or have a successful marriage or live a satisfying life. Like models, our stories cut to the chase.

Nobel laureate Robert Shiller, a pioneering behavioural economist, was among the first to explain “how stories go viral and drive major economic events” in his book, Narrative Economics.

He shows how simple economic stories, when widely believed, can shape economic policy decisions, as politicians and their advisers face pressure to act according to the public narrative.

Whether the results are good or bad depends on whether the narrative is true. His insights are particularly relevant to explaining financial crises, housing cycles and sharemarket bubbles.

If you haven’t decided what you think about globalisation and the latest push to roll it back, a good book to read is Six Faces of Globalisation, by Anthea Roberts, of the Australian National University, and Nicolas Lamp, of Queen’s University in Ontario.

One review says it’s not just a book about globalisation, but also “the power and importance of narrative: how it is constructed and how it can contribute to a far more nuanced and complex understanding of the forces of change”.

What the authors did is take all the conflicting arguments for and against globalisation and boil them down to six contesting “narratives”. Why? To make it easier for us to understand the debate and the differing perspectives.

Read more >>

Friday, October 29, 2021

Praying for costless climate change: Lord, send down a miracle

Picture Scott Morrison kneeling by his bed, hands together, eyes closed, asking God to send him another miracle. Or maybe just giving Santa a list of all the things he’d like for Christmas.

Five things, actually. First, technology not taxes. That is, a sudden, unforced flowering of new technology that allows us to go on selling our fossil fuel to the world while – at negligible cost – the technology eliminates all our net emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases.

Second, we reach net zero emissions by 2050 with “expanded choices, not mandates”. That is, no one should be forced to do anything. They’ll just choose to implement the new technology because it’s so wonderful.

Third, somebody somehow will “drive down the cost of a range of new energy technologies”. That is, reduce the cost of doing things without emissions so that it’s lower than the cost of doing things by, say, burning coking coal or burping methane. This, however, won’t destroy any jobs.

Fourth, we keep energy prices down with affordable and reliable power. That is, the solar and wind energy that we disparaged for many years is now cheaper than the coal-and-gas-fired power that we’re still trying to prop up, so you can thank us when electricity prices fall.

Fifth, we are accountable for progress. That is, just because we won’t show you our modelling, or tell you how much the deal with the Nationals will cost or what it’s going on, doesn’t mean we won’t tell you after the media’s lost interest.

We’re assured that Australia’s Long-term Emissions Reduction Plan will “achieve net zero emissions by 2050 in a practical, responsible way that will take advantage of new economic opportunities while continuing to serve our traditional export markets.

“This plan does not rely on taxes and it will not put industries, regions or jobs at risk. No Australian jobs will be lost as a result of the Commonwealth Government’s actions or policies under the Plan.”

As Energy Minister Angus Taylor summarised it, the plan “won’t impose new costs on households, businesses or regions.” Morrison says it will not “shut down coal and gas production”.

Other countries are pondering long and hard about how on earth they’re going to get to net zero. Until this week we had no idea either. Now, however, we have a plan that tells us how it can and will be done – at no perceptible cost to anyone or anything.

And if that isn’t hard enough to swallow, try this: the plan doesn’t involve announcing any new policy. So what’s changed since Monday? What’s different? What’s new is that Morrison now has modelling that says we’ll get to net zero with a bit to spare – without the need for any more changes.

The boffins added up the numbers and – surprise, surprise – we’re already on track to net zero. Is ScoMo lucky or what? The Americans, the Europeans, the Chinese, they’re all still struggling with it, but we’ve got it figured.

Funny thing is, it has the feel of Amateur Hour. Who wrote the report? The experts in the Energy Department? No, it was written by management consultants – McKinsey, and has all the colourful diagrams and big type and blank pages you expect from management consultants.

I hadn’t heard that McKinsey was expert on energy or climate science or technological innovation, but maybe I’m wrong.

So who did the modelling? Well, not Treasury – what would they know about modelling? We’ve been given the impression the modelling was done by McKinsey, but my guess is they contracted it out to some outfit that actually knows about modelling.

But management consultants and modellers do share a common temptation: to find out what bottom line the client’s after, and work back from that – a thought that came to me when I saw all the nice round figures in McKinsey’s lovely chart showing how net emissions in 2005 will be reduced to zero by 2050.

Reductions to date – 20 per cent (mainly from once-off land clearing restrictions in Queensland and NSW, which occurred before the 2005 starting point and the 2030 target were chosen). Next, reductions projected to arise from the government’s technology investment road map - say, 40 per cent.

Then reductions from “global technology trends” - say, 15 per cent. Reductions from “international and domestic offsets” – 10 to 20 per cent, but make it 10 per cent. Next, reductions from “further technology breakthroughs” - say, another 15 per cent.

Okay, you can stop there. We’ve made it to a neat 100 per cent. (I think I’m starting to see why Morrison isn’t keen to let the experts see the modelling.)

In a new paper from the Australia Institute, Bending the Curve, Dr Richard Denniss and colleagues assess the plausibility of the Morrison government’s belief that the course of our economy can be significantly altered without changes in policy, without the introduction of taxes and without new regulation or even legislated targets.

The authors say the plan “is based on the assumption that it is not just possible to forecast which technologies will be developed in the decades ahead, and the cost of deploying those technologies, but that such development is inevitable.

“In reality, as those who have pursued ‘carbon capture and storage’ in Australia for the last 30 years have clearly shown, it is not just possible that new technologies might be more expensive than expected, it is possible that they will fail completely to eventuate.”

The plan is just the latest iteration of “techno optimism,” albeit at the more optimistic end of the spectrum, they say.

“White it is inevitable that the cost of some existing technologies will fall rapidly, and that some new technologies will be developed, there is nothing inevitable about the timing of such improvements,” they conclude.

Morrison says his plan involves delivering net zero “the Australian way”. That bit I believe. This is the “no worries – she’ll be right, mate” way of doing it.

Read more >>

Wednesday, September 22, 2021

Timing the economy to fit a pandemic election is a tricky business

So, with Scott Morrison pulling the new AUKUS pact out of his hat, will we be off to a khaki election? It would hardly be the first election conservative governments have won by promising to save us from the threat to our north.

But that’s why I doubt it. For an issue to dominate an election campaign, it has to be in contention. National security is an issue that always favours the conservatives, so Labor won’t be offering any objection to AUKUS or nuclear subs.

Similarly, an issue that should figure large in the campaign is whether the Coalition is too conflicted over climate change to be worthy of re-election. But that issue naturally favours Labor, so Morrison won’t want to take up that fight.

Which leaves? The economy, stupid. Until the end of June, the economy was looking in great shape, better than it had been even before the pandemic. But the arrival of the Delta variant means that, right now, more than half the national economy is back in lockdown, and looking mighty sick.

Does it surprise you that Morrison’s so keen to see the south-eastern mainland states out of lockdown and the others opening their borders, and is pressing the premiers accordingly? He desperately needs the economy back looking trim and terrific by March – May at the latest.

Add to this the business community’s pressure to get back to business – “don’t bother me with all the COVID details” – and the public’s impatience to get life back to normal. Sydneysiders have had enough of lockdowns; Melburnians have had more than enough – something even “Dictator” Dan Andrews can see.

So Gladys Berejiklian and Andrews have added their separate modelling by the Burnet Institute to Morrison’s National Plan modelling by the Doherty Institute – not to mention the independent modelling by the Kirby Institute – and announced their “road maps” for opening up their economies progressively once vaccination rates have reached 70 per cent and 80 per cent of the eligible population, expected in mid-to-late October and early November.

NSW is projected to be only about a week ahead of Victoria, and the gap between 70 and 80 per cent only about two weeks.

Everyone’s so pleased to be getting on with it that we risk losing sight of the high risks the two premiers are running. If all goes to plan, we’ll be back to a new (still-masked) normal by early next year, and the economy will be humming in time for a March election.

But models, based on a host of unmentioned explicit and implicit assumptions, inevitably give politicians and punters a false sense of certainty. No model can accurately predict something as mercurial as human behaviour. And, as we’ve learnt, a new coronavirus knows nothing of models and is a law unto itself.

The risk Andrews and Berejiklian face is that so many unvaccinated people contract the virus that our hospital system is overwhelmed, with people dying because they were turned away, leading to a number of deaths the public finds unacceptable. Whether they press on or turn back, the premiers would be in deep trouble.

The first risk comes from an ambulance and hospital system that, 18 months after the crisis began, is already at full stretch. The premiers tell us our wonderful health workers are coping; the message from ambos, doctors and nurses on the ground says they’re close to collapse.

The next risk comes from the inconvenient truth that our vaccination targets of 70 and 80 per cent of people 16 and older turn out to be just 56 and 64 per cent of the full population. That’s a huge proportion of unvaccinated friends and relations.

Remember, too, that these are statewide averages. They conceal less-vaccinated pockets of particularly vulnerable groups – the disabled, the Indigenous, for instance – and a city-country gap that leaves many rural towns hugely exposed, together with their limited hospital capacity.

Even the decision to move as soon as the 70 and 80 per cent targets are reached, rather than wait another fortnight for vaccines to become fully effective, carries a risk of higher infection.

Both the Burnet and revised Doherty modelling say starting to open up at 70 per cent rather than 80 per cent is likely to involve significantly higher infections, hospitalisations and deaths. Why take that risk just to avoid waiting another fortnight or so?

Morrison’s national plan called for all states to open up together once all had reached the 70 and 80 per cent targets, but now NSW and Victoria are going first. This increases the risk that, despite the other states’ closed borders, the virus will spread to them – where the lesser threat of catching the virus has caused vaccination rates to be much lower.

The risk for Berejiklian and Andrews is that they could be moving the Delta outbreak from the city to the country. The risk for Morrison is that, by pressing those two to open up early, he could be moving the outbreak from one half of the economy to the other.

Read more >>

Monday, June 14, 2021

Slowly, economists are revealing the weaknesses in their theories

Economics is changing. It’s relying less on theorising about how the economy works, and more on testing to see whether there’s hard empirical (observable) evidence to support those theories.

Advances in digitisation and the information revolution have made much more statistical information about aspects of economic activity available, and made it easier to analyse these new “data sets” using improved statistical tests of, for instance, whether the correlation between A and B is causal – whether A is causing B, or B is causing A, or whether they’re both being caused by C.

But another development in recent decades is economists losing their reluctance to test the validity of their theories by performing experiments. Let me tell you about two new examples of empirical research by Australian academic economists, one involving data analysis and the other a laboratory experiment.

We see a lot of calls for reform that take the form: change taxes or labour laws in a way that just happens to benefit me directly, and this will make “jobs and growth” so much better for everyone.

These reformers always convey the impression that the changes they want are backed by long established, self-evident economic principles. And they can usually find professional economists willing to say “yes, that’s right”.

But what gets me is that, when the self-declared reformers get their “reform”, it’s rare for anyone to bother going back to check whether it really did do wonders for jobs and growth. Wouldn’t there be something to learn if it was a great success, or if it wasn’t?

Do you remember back in 2017, when employers were campaigning for a reduction in weekend penalty rates? The retailers and the hospitality industry told the Fair Work Commission that making them pay much higher wage rates on Saturday and Sunday was discouraging some businesses from opening on weekends, to the detriment of the public’s convenience.

If only penalty rates were lower, more businesses would open on weekends, or stay open for longer, meaning consumers would spend more, and more workers would be employed for more hours, leaving everyone better off.

The employers got strong support from the Productivity Commission and some economist expert witnesses. So the commission decided to reduce the Sunday and public holiday penalty rates in the relevant awards by 25 to 50 percentage points, phased in over three years.

Associate Professor Martin O’Brien, of the University of Wollongong’s Sydney Business School, commissioned a longitudinal survey (looking at the same people over time) of about 1830 employees and about 240 owner-managers or employers, dividing the workers between those on awards and a control group of those on enterprise agreements (and so not directly affected).

The economists’ standard, “neo-classical” model of the way demand and supply interact to determine the market price, with movements in the price feeding back to influence the quantity that buyers demand and the quantity sellers want to supply, does predict that a fall in the price of Sunday labour will lead employers to demand more of it.

So what did the survey find? It could find no effect on employment in the retail and hospitality sectors. This is consistent with a growing body of mainly American empirical evidence that, contrary to neo-classical theory, increases in minimum wages have little effect on employment.

But here’s an interesting twist: a majority of employers reported not making the reduction in penalty rates and a majority of employees reported not receiving any reduction.

One explanation for this is that employers didn’t pass on the cuts because they valued staff loyalty and commitment. If so, this fits with the judgment of many labour economists that the relationship between a firm and its workers is far more nuanced than can be captured by the neo-classical assumption that price is the only motivator.

An alternative explanation, however, is that those employers didn’t cut the Sunday penalty rate because they weren’t paying it in the first place.

Turning to the laboratory experiment, it tests the much more theoretical assumption that the behaviour of people engaged in economic activities is guided by their “rational expectations” about what will happen in the future.

Economists have come to care about what people expect to happen because this affects the way people behave, and so affects the future we get. In recent decades, many mathematical models of the macro economy have used the assumption that people form their beliefs about the future in a “rational” way to make the maths more rigorous.

By “rational” they mean that people respond to new information by immediately and fully adjusting their expectations – beliefs – about what will happen to prices, the economy’s growth or whatever. Which is a lovely idea, but how realistic is it?

Dr Timo Henckel, of the Research School of Economics at the Australian National University, Dr Gordon Menzies, of the University of Technology Sydney, and Professor Daniel Zizzo, of the University of Queensland, analysed the results of an experiment conducted by Professor Peter Moffatt, of the University of East Anglia, involving 245 students answering questions.

On receiving each piece of new information, the subjects had first to decide whether to adjust their beliefs and then, if so, by how much. The experimenters found that the subjects reacted very differently.

They found that, in general, people don’t update their beliefs with each new piece of information. And when they do, they tend not to adjust their beliefs by as much as they probably should. In other words, people display a kind of belief conservatism, holding on to a belief for longer than they should.

They found that this conservatism is explained to some extent by people’s inattention – they were distracted by other issues – and to some extent by the complexity of the issue: it was “cognitively taxing”.

It turns out that very few people – just 3 per cent of the subjects – display the rational expectations economists assume in their model-building. Most people’s behaviour, the authors say, is better described as “inferential expectations”.

Now, you may not be wildly surprised by these findings. But, in the academic world, common sense doesn’t get you far. You must be able to demonstrate things the academic way.

Even so, Henckel says that the responses of the experiment’s subjects extend to many parts of life, from the behaviour of investors in the share and other financial markets – this is how bubbles develop – to people’s political convictions, where they hold on to beliefs for far too long, ignoring much contrary evidence.

Indeed, inferential expectations apply even to scientists, who form a view of the world which they will revise or overturn only if there is overwhelming evidence to the contrary. So don’t expect economic modellers to abandon their convenient assumption of rational expectations any time soon.

Read more >>

Monday, February 15, 2021

Flogging the monetary-policy horse harder won't help

It didn’t quite hit the headlines, but when Reserve Bank governor Dr Philip Lowe appeared before the House of Reps economics committee a week or so ago, he came under intense questioning from the Parliament’s most highly qualified economist, Labor’s Dr Andrew Leigh.

In my never-humble opinion, Leigh had the wrong end of the stick.

One criticism was that the board of the Reserve Bank is dominated by “amateurs” – business men and women appointed by successive federal governments. According to Leigh, pretty much every other central bank has its decisions on monetary policy (whether to raise or lower interest rates) made by committees of outside monetary experts, who are well equipped to challenge the bank’s own technical analysis.

This is a chestnut I’ve been hearing for decades. It smacks of the old cultural cringe: Australia is out of line with the big boys in America and Europe, therefore we’re doing it wrong. The people in our financial markets spend so much time studying the mighty US economy that their line’s always the same: whatever the Yanks are doing we should be doing.

Sorry, not convinced. It sounds to me like a commercial message from the economists’ union. Why give those plum appointments to businesspeople when you could be giving them to us? When you leave the “technical analysis” just to the hundreds of economists working in the Reserve, you risk them suffering from “group think”, we’re told.

And you’d escape group think by having a committee dominated by professional economists? Economics is the only profession that doesn’t suffer from “model blindness” – the inability to see factors that have been assumed away in the way of thinking about issues that’s been drummed into them since first year uni?

I don’t think so. It’s inter-disciplinary analysis that might improve the decisions, but that’s something most economists hate. After reading Kay and King’s Radical Uncertainty, I’m happier than ever with the idea that the governor and his minions should be put through their paces by people chosen for their real-world experience, not their membership of the economists’ club.

Leigh was on stronger ground when he asked why governments had stopped including a union boss along with all the businesspeople.

But Leigh’s main criticism was that the Reserve had been “too timid in focusing on getting inflation up into the target band”. For the “amateurs” reading this, he meant why hadn’t the Reserve cut the official interest rate earlier and harder since the global financial crisis, so as to get demand growing faster, creating more employment, lifting real wages and the inflation rate in the process.

After his board’s February meeting, Lowe announced that it would be doing $100 billion more “quantitative easing” (buying second-hand government bonds with created money, so as to lower longer-term public and private interest rates). Leigh asked why he hadn’t been more purposeful and announced $200 billion in purchases.

When you’re looking for things to criticise, saying that whatever’s just been done should have been done earlier or bigger is the easiest one in the book. Various other dissident economists are saying what Leigh’s saying.

But, as so often with economists, they’re not drawing attention to the assumptions – explicit and implicit – that lie behind their policy recommendations. Their key assumption here is that cutting interest rates is still as effective in encouraging borrowing and spending as the textbooks say it is.

If households are saving more than we’d like, the reason is that interest rates are too high; if businesses aren’t investing enough, the reason is that rates are too high. So, although interest rates have been at record lows for years, just a couple more cuts (achieved by conventional or unconventional means) would do the trick and get the economy growing strongly.

And although household debt is at record highs, this wouldn’t inhibit people’s willingness to load themselves up with more. Leigh and his mates seem to be having trouble with the concept of “diminishing returns” – that the third ice cream you eat never tastes as good as the first.

Though Lowe can’t or won’t admit it, the obvious truth is that, in the world economy’s present circumstances – “secular stagnation” and all that - monetary policy has pretty much run out of puff. Which explains why he’s been moving into unconventional monetary policy so reluctantly and why, for the whole of his term, he’s been pressing the government to make more use of its budget (fiscal policy) to get the economy moving.

Some of Lowe’s critics, being monetary specialists, have (like the Reserve itself) a vested interest in continuing to flog the monetary policy horse. Other’s deny the effectiveness and legitimacy of using fiscal policy to manage demand, as part of their commitment to Smaller Government.

But perhaps the most revealing exchange came when Leigh accused the Reserve of failing to act on what its own econometric model of the Australian economy, MARTIN, (as in Martin Place) would be telling it. The reply from Lowe’s deputy, Dr Guy Debelle (whose PhD from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology is a match for Leigh’s from Harvard) was dismissive.

“I would just note that macro models don’t do a very good job of modelling the financial sector [of the economy]. They failed pretty poorly in 2007 [the global financial crisis] when macro discovered finance. I think there’s an issue around transmission [the paths through which a change in interest rates leads to changes in other economic variables] which these models don’t take into account,” Debelle said.

“They’re linear. Actually, they assume that financial markets don’t exist, broadly speaking.”

I find it reassuring that our econocrats understand how primitive econometric models of the economy are, and don’t take their results too seriously.

Read more >>

Saturday, May 4, 2019

Only the stupid think the cost of climate change is simple

You know an election campaign has run off the rails when the pollies start hurling the results of economic modelling at each other. Voters find it incomprehensible and cover their ears, and the only people who think it proves something are the pollies themselves and the journalists silly enough to imagine their incessant demands to “show us your modelling” will expose the truth.

The more you know about modelling, the less it impresses you. There’s a place for economic modelling, but it’s in a seminar room, being pulled apart by experts, not in the argy-bargy of politicians seeking election, vested interests seeking more bucks, and journos who think their customers will just love a bit more meaningless conflict.

Thinking people know and accept that the future is unknowable. Unthinking people delude themselves that somewhere out there is an expert with a magic box – or maybe a crystal ball - who can give them a sneak peek at what only God knows in advance.

The only truly honest thing a modeller could tell you (which their need to earn a living invariably stops them doing) is: What on earth makes you think I’d know?

In the public debate, modelling is about misleading people – unknowingly or, more often, knowingly. It’s used like a drunk uses a lamppost: more for support than illumination.

There are two approaches you can take to modelling results. One, believe all results that fit with your prejudices and ignore all those that don’t. Two, be sceptical of them all and don’t accept any results where you haven’t been told which assumptions are the main drivers of those results.

Although Prime Minister Scott Morrison has only an unconvincing policy to achieve the 26 to 28 per cent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030, to which Australia has committed itself, the media is pounding Opposition Leader Bill Shorten to reveal the “cost” of his promise to reduce emissions by 45 per cent by 2030.

For reasons I don’t understand, Shorten is displaying a degree of honesty rarely seen in Canberra and claiming he doesn’t know the cost. The media can tell a lie when they see one, and are almost apoplectic in their efforts to extract the truth from him.

To the media, it’s a simple question, so it must have a simple answer and Shorten must know it. If he knows but won’t tell us, this can only be because the cost is absolutely horrendous. His climate change spokesman, Mark Butler, says it’s impossible to know the cost – but that’s obviously another lie.

Which, in a way, it is. It’s not possible to know the cost with the remotest degree of accuracy, but it’s perfectly possible to fudge something up and say it’s the cost.

What cost is that? The cost of whatever suits. Cost to the budget? Cost to the economy? Cost to the economy that ignores any benefit to the economy? Cost to the economy that ignores the cost of not doing anything?

Shorten’s in trouble because - for once – he isn’t playing the game the way the denizens of the House with the Flag on Top expect it to be played. Why won’t the man do the honourable thing and pay some “independent” economic consultancy to do some modelling that proves the cost would be minor?

An old political rule says that, whenever you leave a vacuum, your opponent will be happy to fill it for you. Enter Morrison, waving modelling carried out by Dr Brian Fisher, a former head of the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics, and now a consultant to the mining industry.

Fisher denies being a climate change sceptic and says the government didn’t sponsor his modelling. He’s been modelling the cost of acting against climate change since his time at ABARE in the 1990s and invariably finds it to be surprisingly high (I can remember decades ago writing to explain why his results weren’t as bad they could be made to sound).

His latest modelling finds that Labor’s policy would cause gross national product to be at least $264 billion, and as much as $542 billion, lower than it would otherwise be in 2030. By then the wholesale price of electricity would be up to 67 per cent higher than otherwise. Real wages would be up to 10 per cent lower than otherwise, and employment would be up to 300,000 lower than otherwise.

For what it’s worth, other economists who are experts on climate change have said these estimates of the costs are (to put it politely) far too high.

What’s more important to understand is that econometric models are built on a heap of assumptions – assumptions about how the economy works, and assumptions about what will happen in the future.

Dr Richard Denniss, of the Australia Institute, offers this list of things no one knows, but modellers have to make assumptions about if they want to claim they know what some policy change will cost: how far and how fast the cost of renewable energy and battery storage will fall; how far and how fast the cost of electric cars will fall; how quickly firms that face higher energy prices will adapt by increasing their efficiency; how the introduction of new sources of electricity generation and storage will disrupt the business models of today’s highly profitable electricity retailers; how regulation of energy prices will increase or decrease the monopoly profits of energy and petrol companies; how much the trend to household electricity generation and storage will increase the efficiency of the national grid by reducing problems with seasonal peaks in demand; whether the batteries of electric cars will be a form of free storage for the national grid; and how long it will take for autonomous vehicles to transform car ownership and use.

Still think the cost of Labor’s emissions policy is a simple question with a simple answer - that’s believable?
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Monday, March 7, 2016

Let’s stand against misleading modelling

Many people have been left with red faces following their part in last week's disastrous intervention into the negative-gearing debate by forecasters BIS Shrapnel. Let's hope they all learn their lesson.

This isn't the first time that "independent" modelling purchased from economic consultants has been used by vested interests to try to influence government decisions. Nor the first time the questionable results have been trumpeted uncritically by the media and misrepresented by the side of politics whose case it happens to suit.

But BIS Shrapnel's late entry into this dubious game has come at a time when the game's credibility is wearing thin and qualified observers are more willing to go public with their critiques of the quality of the modelling, the plausibility of its assumptions and the internal consistency of its findings.

As is common practice, various of the BIS Shrapnel model's findings were expressed in a highly misleading way. "Rents will rise by up to 10 per cent ($2,600) per annum", for instance, doesn't mean rents will rise by up to 10 per cent a year. It actually means that, by the 10th year, annual rents will be up to 10 per cent higher than they otherwise would be. Not nearly as bad as it was made to sound.

The first lesson for BIS Shrapnel is that when you publish commissioned modelling, but agree not to disclose who commissioned it, you attract a lot more criticism and scepticism. When it's not possible for those on the other side of the debate to say "they would say that, wouldn't they", they examine your assumptions and methodology a lot more critically.

Another lesson is that when what you're modelling looks like it's a party's policy but isn't, you should say so up front, not in mitigation after that party has denounced you from the rooftops.

Similarly, "unfortunate typos" saying $190 billion when you meant $1.9 trillion get you hugely adverse attention. Your "trust me, I'm an economist" line implodes.

I can't remember when so many economists of repute have gone out of their way to attack a modeller's findings, and done it so bluntly.

John Daley, of the genuinely independent Grattan Institute, referred to the report's "convoluted logic", "manifestly ridiculous predictions", "outlandish" and "fanciful" claims, and "implausible" and "unjustified" assumptions. It was "nonsense on stilts".

The lesson for other economic consultants is that the days when you could produce for a client a bit of happy advocacy posing as objective econometric analysis, and have the rest of the profession look the other way, are coming to an end.

There's now a far greater likelihood that other economists or economic journalists will subject your assumptions, methodology and findings to scrutiny and make their conclusions public.

There's now much greater familiarity with the standard tricks of the trade, such as misuse of the Bureau of Statistics' "input-output tables" to exaggerate the "indirect effects" of some measure; saying "employment will fall by X" when you really mean "the growth in employment will be X less than otherwise", or presenting effects that build slowly over many years as changes that occur fully in the first year and occur again in each subsequent year.

The lesson for relatively new treasurers trying to establish a reputation for economic competence, and the ability to explain complex economic concepts persuasively, is you'll never do it if you act like a political brawler and latch on to whatever third-party modelling seems to be going your way.

A treasurer looking for respect doesn't identify himself with any modelling before his experts – the economists in his department, not the ambitious young politicos in his office – assure him it's kosher.

If I was a subscriber to an Australian newspaper that led its front page with a wide-eyed account of BIS Shrapnel's findings as though they were established fact, only to have them exposed the same day as highly debatable, I wouldn't be impressed.

The lesson for the economics profession is that the modelling they value so highly is too often being used by other economists to mislead rather than enlighten. The reputation of models and modellers is being trashed, and with it the credibility of the profession.

If economists don't want to be regarded by the public as charlatans, they should consider the call by the Australia Institute – a noted debunker of misleading modelling – for a code of conduct for economic modelling. It would "require key assumptions to be revealed, context and comparison to be provided, and the identification of who, if anyone, commissioned the work".

Since the profession has failed to act, the institute wants the code implemented by governments.
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Saturday, February 27, 2016

Why economic modelling results are dodgy

Modelling is hugely fashionable in Canberra (joke intended). Any lobby group seeking to persuade the government to do something – or not do something – produces allegedly independent modelling that supposedly backs up their case.

Government isn't above using modelling to make its case, either. Had Malcolm Turnbull decided to go ahead with raising the goods and services tax, he would have produced modelling to show how wonderful that would be.

When he decided not to increase the GST, he naturally produced modelling to show that the gains to the economy would have been minor.

Have you detected my note of scepticism? The mathematical models of the economy that economists produce are supposed to be an aid to thinking. In the public debate, however, they're used as a substitute for thinking.

When it suited the government to make public a version of Treasury's modelling of a "tax mix switch" – raising the GST and using the proceeds to cut income tax – it came with a product warning: "This modelling is indicative at best and care should be taken with its use".

That was inserted to protect the modellers' professional reputation from criticism by people like me.

It's a gross understatement. What it should say is: we've been asked to answer a question our model is incapable of answering with any reliability but, because we enjoy modelling – and are quite well paid to do it – we've fudged up something that looks like an answer.

People are impressed by economic modelling because it's done on a computer. It has to be because it involves solving so many equations and so many calculations.

So, at one level, modelling is highly sophisticated. At another level, however – and this is the bit the punters never get – it's amazingly primitive. Why? Because the economy is so hugely complicated that no simplified model of it is capable of doing justice to its many possible reactions to some development.

Be clear on this. I was pleased when Turnbull decided not to increase the GST. It wouldn't have been a good change. And I happen to agree that a tax mix switch reliant on the GST would do little to increase economic efficiency or foster "growth and jobs".

So I'm not attacking Treasury's modelling for the usual reason people do: because its findings don't accord with their prejudices. No, what I object to is the way economists (who just want to be paid to keep playing with their models) collude with politicians and vested interests in using modelling to hoodwink the public.

Try to con my readers and I'm like the mother bear in The Revenant.

What if I told you that rather than a tax with an $18,200 annual tax-free threshold and rates of tax rising from 21 per cent to 47 per cent as incomes rise, the personal income tax modelled by Treasury was a flat-rate tax of 16.7 per cent, applying from the first dollar of income?

It's true. You can read all about it in a Treasury working paper published last April.

But we've never had such a tax and are never likely to. It's radically different to the progressive tax we do have. So why on earth would you use it for the modelling?

Because it's the best the model can do. It's simply not capable of modelling our real-world income tax. Why not? Because the model has just one household in it - the "representative" household.

But it does have 111 businesses – one for each of the 111 industry sectors it identifies. To this it adds one government (not eight) and one "foreign sector".

The basic model Treasury – and many other modellers – uses is called a "static, representative household, computable general equilibrium (CGE) model".

The CGE bit means the model attempts to cover the whole economy, not just one bit of it. This allows it to capture some of "the main second-round effects of taxes on households, firms and investors". It's also able to capture interactions between different taxes.

But that advantage comes with the huge disadvantage of the single, representative household. We know Australia's 9.2 million households differ greatly in many respects – size, age, income, spending patterns, saving rates, ability and desire to work.

But for "analytical tractability" (to stop the model becoming impossible to understand, even by the modeller) all these dimensions are reduced to averages. And, as we know, the statistical average household, being a mixture of everything, is often quite un-representative.

Apart from being unable to cope with a progressive income tax, the model is also unable to cope with means-tested welfare benefits. It was able to model only a fraction of the compensation that would have had to accompany an increase in the GST (the huge cost of which is the real reason Turnbull abandoned the idea, not the happy modelling about benefits to the economy).

The model assumes that an increase in the rate of tax discourages people from doing as many hours of paid work. But it uses a single, average "elasticity of labour supply" (the degree of workers' responsiveness to changes in their after-tax wage) for the representative household.

Really? Professor Patricia Apps, of Sydney University, points to the empirical evidence showing that "primary" earners (mainly husbands working full time) have quite low elasticity – have you tried telling your boss that from now on you'll be working only 37 hours a week, not 38? – whereas "secondary" earners (mainly mothers working part time) have quite high elasticity.

Averaging the two together makes the exercise meaningless.

The modellers concede that "general equilibrium models are necessarily a simplification of the economy and, as such, they can only incorporate a stylised representation of the tax system".

I'd say models are a cartoon caricature of the economy, quite incapable of answering the intricate questions we ask of them.
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Saturday, November 7, 2015

CSIRO fills Treasury's gap on environment modelling

After Treasury's hopelessly inadequate attempt to peer into the future in its intergenerational report earlier this year, just look at the far more fair dinkum future-viewing exercise that CSIRO unveiled on Thursday.

Treasury's effort was little more than a propaganda exercise about the need to restrain government spending, and showed clear signs of government interference. It was widely criticised for purporting to tell us what could happen to the economy over the next 40 years while making no allowance for the effects of climate change and other environmental problems.

By contrast, CSIRO's peer-reviewed modelling exercise attempts to look at what may happen to the economy out to 2050, after accounting for the economic effects of climate change – and our efforts to reduce it – plus other environmental problems such as energy use, water use and use of other natural resources.

This attempt to integrate changes in the natural environment with standard economic modelling is a heroic effort, the first time to my knowledge it's been attempted for our economy.

It's contained in CSIRO's first Australian National Outlook report, but also reported separately in this week's issue of the prestigious scientific journal, Nature.

The project was directed by Dr Steve Hatfield-Dodds, a former Treasury economist now with CSIRO, with participation by another three economists and 13 scientists, mainly from CSIRO.

The question they sought to answer was whether the mounting ecological pressures in Australia can be reversed while our population continues growing and our material living standards continue rising.

To put it another way, can economic growth be "decoupled" from natural resource use and environmental stress?

The modelling takes a fairly conventional "computable general equilibrium" model of our economy, but surrounds it with eight other models of different aspects of the environment – global climate change and economic growth, water use, energy use, transportation, land use, material flows and biodiversity – which have effects on the economy.

But can any person or model accurately predict what will happen in the future? Of course not. So the exercise identifies 18 different plausible "scenarios" of how things may unfold and runs each of them through the nine-model set-up.

Each scenario combines differing global drivers of change with differing domestic drivers. The global drivers cover differing rates of growth in the global population by 2050 – it may grow to 8 billion, 9 billion or 11 billion – and differing rates of greenhouse gas emission.

Limiting global warming to 2 degrees above pre-industrial levels by 2100 would require "very strong" efforts to "abate" (reduce) emissions. Limiting it to 3 degrees would require either a "strong" abatement effort if the global population was allowed to grow to 11 billion, or a "moderate" effort if the population grew only to 9 billion.

That leaves "no abatement action", with the global population growing to 11 billion and global warming reaching 6 degrees. Gasp.

The domestic drivers of change cover differing degrees of improvement in agricultural productivity, differing land-use changes from the development of reforestation markets for sequestration of carbon dioxide or for protection of biodiversity, individuals' take-up of opportunities to use energy and water more efficiently, how much of our improving productivity we take as reduced working hours rather than higher real incomes, and how much of our consumer spending we devote to buying "experiences" rather than goods.

(Turns out those last two drivers made little difference to environmental outcomes, according to the model.)

It's assumed that Australia's abatement effort is at the same rate as the global effort. Up to half our net reduction in emissions is achieved by "carbon sequestration" – withdrawing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and storing it in plants – achieved by reforestation of cleared land.

So, we build this amazing nine-model model, then run each of the 18 different scenarios through it. What results do we get?

In all scenarios, the economy and living standards are projected to grow strongly. The value of economic activity (gross domestic product) is projected to rise 10-fold over the 80 years to 2050 (the exercise actually starts in 1970, with actual data up to 2012).

This increase in GDP is driven by a 2.9-fold increase in population, leaving a 3.2- to 3.6-fold increase in GDP per person.

On some scenarios, net greenhouse emissions fall to zero or lower by 2040. From four times the global average today, our emissions per person could fall below the global average by 2050.

Apart from reforestation, emission reduction comes from reduced emissions (within Australia, not elsewhere) and from the economy's reduced resource-intensity (that is, fewer natural resources being used to generate each dollar of GDP).

National water extractions are projected to maybe double in 2050, but up to half this increase could be met by desalination in coastal cities and water recycling for industrial use.

Water stress – seen in rain-fed water use in water-limited catchments – improves or is stable in seven of the 18 scenarios.

Pressures on biodiversity (preservation of species) could also be reduced despite economic growth and increased agriculture. But carbon and biodiversity tree-planting could increase the pressure on river-based water systems.

Overall, 13 of the 18 scenarios show improvement in a least one environmental indicator, but only three – each requiring "strong" or "very strong" abatement effort and development of reforestation markets – show improvement in all three environmental indicators.

So the modelling suggests economic growth can continue without worsening – and even while improving – pressures on the natural environment, but only if we and the rest of the world greatly increase our efforts to reduce emissions.

Now, I should warn you that modelling exercises – economic and scientific – are always subject to limitations and open to criticism. They rely on many assumptions and are widely misused by vested interests.

I'm sure in 20 years' time, this CSIRO modelling will look very crude. Right now, however, it's a wonder of the modern world.
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Wednesday, August 19, 2015

We can't divorce the economy from the environment

In case you haven't noticed, a lot of economists are very concerned about Tony Abbott's choice of target for the reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030, to be taken to the international climate change conference at Paris in December.

But if you think that means they believe Abbott's target is too tough and will do too much damage to the economy, you've got the wrong end of the stick.

Most would be likely to believe the target should be more ambitious, and few would be concerned that such a target would do significant economic harm. Conventional economic modelling almost invariably shows the loss of economic growth would be surprisingly small, almost trivial.

They'd be more concerned to ensure the instruments used to achieve the target were those likely to do so at the lowest cost in terms of economic growth forgone. That's why few would have approved of Abbott's decision to abandon Julia Gillard's hybrid carbon tax/emissions trading scheme and replace it with "direct action" payments from the budget.

I'm not claiming every economist thinks this way, of course; just the great majority. There are a few exceptions, naturally, just as you can find the odd scientist who disagrees with the overwhelming majority view that global warming is real and caused by humans.

If you hadn't noticed, consider the leading part played by economists in urging that Australia be at the forefront of international efforts to reduce emissions. First, the various reports by Professor Ross Garnaut​, then the chairman of the independent Climate Change Authority, Bernie Fraser – former Reserve Bank governor and former secretary of the Treasury – then leading non-government experts such as Professor Frank Jotzo​ and Professor Warwick McKibbin, both of the Australian National University.

Note, too, the role of Dr Martin Parkinson, who worked first on John Howard's emissions trading scheme, then on Labor's as the first head of the Department of Climate Change. When Parkinson moved on to become head of Treasury, he was succeeded by another Treasury chap, Blair Comley​.

In fact, there were so many senior Treasury people at the top of the Climate Change department, it was a virtual outpost of Treasury. Both Parkinson and Comley were sacked as one of Abbott's first acts on becoming Prime Minister. Presumably, they were punished for caring too much about global warming.

Remember too that, internationally, both the emissions trading scheme and the carbon and other pollution taxes are inventions of economists. A trading scheme was used with great effect by the Americans in their efforts to reduce acid rain.

Two characteristics of economists stand out when it comes to climate change. First, they accept what the scientists are telling us without argument. Unlike some, they're not disposed to explain to the experts where they're getting it wrong.

Second, they don't believe we can go on thinking "the economy" can be kept in a separate box to "the environment". There are major interactions between the two that can't be ignored.

But, as a journalist, I'm not a member of the economists' union, so to speak, so let me stop describing their majority views and give you mine. My thinking has been influenced by the more radical opinions of yet another economist, Professor Herman Daly, of the University of Maryland.

In defending his latest target, Abbott pledged he'd never put the environment ahead of the economy and jobs. This separate-box thinking is like saying you'd never put staying alive ahead of going to work. Lose your life and whether you get to work or not hardly matters.

Daly says the economy is a "wholly owned subsidiary of the environment". Whether at a national or global level, the economy exists inside the environment – the ecosystem. It's a box inside a circle, if you like.

The point is, all human activity – all our producing and consuming – depends directly on the natural environment. The air we breathe, the water we drink, the food we eat, the clothes we wear, the shelters we build and the energy we use all come from the ecosystem that surrounds us.

Much of our economic activity involves misusing, overusing and abusing the natural environment. We've done great damage to our soil, rivers and aquifers, we've destroyed much habitat and many species, and now the world's overuse of fossil fuels is playing havoc with the climate.

We can be divided into those who want to do what we can to stop the destruction and start on the clean-up, and those who want to put it out of mind and keep on as we are, leaving the bill to be picked up by the next generation.

The latter group will always justify their insouciance by claiming to be putting jobs first. Yeah, sure. For the next few years, at least.

Let me be honest with you. I don't believe those modelling exercises seeming to prove that the economic costs of acting to reduce greenhouse gas emissions will be minor. Such results are a product of the assumptions built into all conventional economic models that, whatever shock the economy is hit by, after 20 years or so, everything will be back to where it would have been.

So, the cost in terms of growth and jobs forgone might be greater than we're being told. But of one thing I'm sure: the longer we leave it, the higher those costs will be.
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Wednesday, August 6, 2014

Modellers bamboozle over cost of renewable energy

There's a lot of public support for the renewable energy target, which requires electricity retailers to get 20 per cent of their power from renewable sources by 2020. But now the country's being run by climate change "sceptics", let's get with the program. Forget the threat of climate change, stop worrying about your grandchildren and focus on what matters most: what this do-gooder scheme is doing to your cost of living.

Although before the election Tony Abbott professed support for the target, since the election he has instituted an expert review of it, headed by businessman Dick Warburton, former chairman of Caltex and prominent "sceptic".

The review commissioned a leading firm of economic consultants, ACIL Allen, to undertake modelling on the future effects of the target.

The preliminary report found that, between 2015 and 2020, the target would increase the average household electricity bill by $54 a year - a tad over $1 a week. This five-year average, however, conceals the estimation that the cost of the scheme will fall as each year passes.

So by 2020 itself, the increase will have reduced to just $7 a year. By the end of another 10 years, in 2030, the scheme is estimated to be actually reducing average household electricity bills by $91 a year, or $1.75 a week.

It's common sense that requiring electricity retailers to buy a certain proportion of their power from more expensive renewable sources - mainly wind power, but also solar - would add to the cost of their power, with the extra cost being passed on to consumers.

So why has ACIL Allen's modelling concluded the target will add to the price of electricity initially, but eventually subtract from it? The short answer is because electricity pricing is a complicated business.

It turns out that adding to the supply of renewable energy available reduces the wholesale price of electricity. This is because the price being paid for energy being put into the national electricity grid by particular generators varies minute by minute according to the balance of supply and demand.

In the middle of the night, when little power is being used, the wholesale price is very low. But on a cold evening - or, more likely these days, a very hot afternoon - the wholesale price can be stratospheric.

The trick to renewable energy is that it tends to be available when the demand for electricity is high. Experience around the world confirms the Australian experience that renewable energy does a great job of reducing spikes in wholesale prices on very hot and very cold days.

Another part of it is that though it costs a lot to build wind and solar generators, once they're built there are few "variable" costs. Wind and sun are free; coal and gas aren't. So the renewable generators offer to supply power to the grid at very low prices and this lowers the prices the coal and gas generators are able to ask for.

But none of this changes the fact that the electricity retailers have to pay for the "renewable energy certificates" that the target scheme requires them to buy. These certificates reduce the capital cost of setting up the wind and solar generators whose operations then reduce the wholesale cost of power.

So it turns out the renewable energy target scheme has the effect of reducing the wholesale cost of electricity while also adding to the costs of the electricity retailers. ACIL Allen's modelling suggests that, for the next five years, the extra retail cost will exceed the saving in wholesale costs, but after that the saving will exceed the extra cost.

See what this means? The case for saying we must get rid of the renewable energy scheme because it's adding too much to the living costs of struggling families has collapsed.

But there's where the story takes a twist. Modelling of the future cost of the renewable energy target, published by an equally prominent firm of economic consultants, Deloitte, comes to opposite conclusions.

Deloitte's modelling accepts that the renewable energy scheme is reducing wholesale costs, and roughly confirms ACIL Allen's finding about the higher cost to household customers until 2020. But whereas ACIL Allen expects the scheme to start reducing household costs after that, Deloitte expects the cost to stay positive until 2030, causing household bills to be between $47 and $65 a year higher than if the scheme was scrapped.

Why have two leading economic consultants reached such opposing conclusions? Perhaps because Deloitte's modelling was commissioned by the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Business Council and the Minerals Council.

Deloitte doesn't conceal that its modelling is in reply to ACIL Allen's. Would it surprise you if the fossil fuel industry wanted to see the renewable energy target abolished and was alarmed to know that modelling commissioned by the review had demolished the argument that continuing the target would add to people's electricity bills? Now the review will be able to pick whichever modelling results it prefers.

How did Deloitte reach such different results? By feeding different assumptions into its model. It seems to have assumed the cost of wind farms won't fall over time (which it probably will), whereas the price of gas for gas-fired generators won't rise much (which it already has).

Regrettably, economic modelling has degenerated into a device for bamboozling the public.
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Monday, June 23, 2014

Economists face criticism over poor ethics

Are economists ethical? Short answer: no more than most. Long answer: well, it's not something they think about much.

The question of ethics is starting to raise its head among economists, both overseas and in Australia, particularly in NSW. It's an issue the Sydney branch of the Economic Society is likely to start debating in the next few months.

The issue is arising as more economists find ways to sell their services to big business for big bucks. Business is attracted by the status, expertise and authority economists bring, and is willing to pay for it.

Various aspects of conventional economics make economists susceptible to such transactions. Almost all economists believe in the market system and believe that the bigger the economy grows the better off we are. So they have an inbuilt sympathy with business and its objectives.

They believe self-interest is a good thing because it's what motivates a market economy. It should never be a bad thing because it's held in check by countervailing market forces.

And there's a belief among economists that their discipline is "positive" rather than "normative". It's a "value-free" description of how the economy actually works, not a statement of opinion about how it should work.

It's because of this belief that, for example, many economists take no account of the implications of their recommendations for the way income is distributed between rich and poor. That's a "value" question they aren't qualified to comment on and so leave to others, such as politicians.

That's what they say when challenged. When they're not challenged they usually give the impression that distributional issues don't arise and economic efficiency is the only issue worth considering.

In truth, the neo-classical model is loaded with values, the most important being that individualism is superior to communitarianism.

So you see why ethics isn't something economists think much about. And this is reinforced by the profession's lack of organisation. Economics is unregulated; anyone can call themselves an economist (I don't, by the way).

Economics has no true professional body. The Economic Society is the closest they come, but it's essentially a discussion group that anyone can join. Its other function is to sponsor the academic economists' annual conference and the main Australian economic journal (which the academics don't rate highly because it's only Australian).

Without a proper professional association you could argue economists aren't a profession, just an occupation. Most are employed by governments and, these days, by banks and other financial services firms, which means they're not free to express opinions at variance with those of their employer. Academic economists are free, but often don't bother.

The question of economists' ethical standards arose in the US after the global financial crisis, when impertinent journalists pointed out that academic economists were writing articles posing as independent experts, without disclosing the financial firms they were affiliated with or for whom they had done consultancy work.

In Australia the spur is the rise of the new breed of economic consultancy firms, which are paid to provide allegedly independent modelling to private interests seeking to lobby governments. Sometimes even governments commission private modelling to provide evidence supporting some policy the pollies are pursuing.

For some reason, when the independent consultants run their models they invariably reach conclusions that support their paying customer's proposal. Remarkable.

These carefully contrived conclusions are then used to bamboozle the public, politicians and even judges who don't know enough economics to know how dodgy many modelling exercises are and how easily models can be tweaked to produce whatever answer you're seeking.

The issue has reached a head in NSW, where Dr Richard Denniss, of the Australia Institute, has appeared as an expert witness in a couple of court cases disputing the "independent" modelling being used to claim the development of a new mine will bring huge economic benefits to the district.

One judge was scathing in his condemnation of the use of an "input/output model" to exaggerate the indirect job creation from a project. A report by the independent Planning Assessment Commission on another project criticised the NSW Department of Planning for its uncritical acceptance of estimates of the project's economic benefits that had been challenged and were "not credible".

Last week the department's new minister, Pru Goward, announced that it would commission separate expert economic analysis of all future major mining projects. Good luck.

Issues of independence and conduct will be discussed during the NSW Economic Society's forum on cost-benefit analysis on July 18. And a later meeting of the society is expected to debate whether economists need a code of ethics. I'd start with an ethical code for modellers.
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Wednesday, March 5, 2014

Job prospects not as gloomy as you may think

I can always tell when people are getting anxious about unemployment - including their own. It's when a journalist thinks they'll be increasing the sum of human knowledge by adding up the number of redundancies announced in recent weeks.

The latest list is Qantas 5000, Holden 2900 (by 2017), Toyota 2500 (by 2017), Forge Group 1470, Alcoa 980, Sensis 800, WA hospitals 250 and BHP Billiton Mitsubishi Alliance 230.

That's more than 14,000, we're told, and doesn't count the expected job loss among the makers of car parts, which "experts" put at between 25,000 and 50,000. To this you can add declining job opportunities among public servants - though no one seems to worry much about them.

There are two tricks in exercises such as this. The first is that although 14,000 or even 64,000 may seem huge numbers, they're not. Most people have no feel for just how big our economy is. Those figures have to be seen in the context of a total workforce of 11.5 million people, which grows by 170,000 in an average year, or more that 14,000 a month.

Most people have no idea how much turnover there is in the jobs market. Every month tens of thousands of people leave their jobs and a similar or bigger number take up new jobs. The economy is in a continuous state of flux.

The second trick is that the media only ever show us the tip of the iceberg. We're told about only a fraction of the things that happen. Only a fraction of them are announced to the media, so most of what happens goes unreported. And among all the things that are announced, the media select just a few of the juicier items to tell us about.

The items they select tend to be the bigger and badder ones. News that a new business has just hired 100 workers may get reported somewhere - probably in the local rag - but it won't get the trumpeting Qantas' announcement did.

So we're told about the big job losses but not the small losses and almost nothing about the job gains, big or small - even though we know from the official statistics that the gains usually outnumber the losses.

When people hear news reports about redundancies at this factory and that, many conclude we must be heading for recession. This time it ain't that simple. After a record 21 years since the severe recession of the early 1990s, we're overdue for another one and, with the economy quite weak at present, it wouldn't be impossible for us to slide into recession this year.

But the explanation for the planned job losses we're hearing so much about isn't a downturn in the economy, it's continuing change in the structure of the economy - the size of some industries relative to others.

Much of the pressure for structural change is coming from advances in technology, particularly the digital revolution. It's this that's turning the newspaper industry inside out - no one seems to shed many tears over us - and is in the early stages of cutting a swath through retailing.

In Qantas' case, it's still making the painful adjustment to the deregulation of airlines initiated by Jimmy Carter in the 1970s, combined with management incompetence and union intransigence.

But the biggest source of structural change is the resources boom and the likely permanent rise in the dollar it has brought about. People tell you it's all behind us, but when the mining industry's share of the economy doubles to 10 per cent in the space of a decade, the adjustment this imposes on the rest of the economy is profound and protracted.

Clearly, these forces for structural change are beyond the control of any federal government, Labor or Coalition. The truth so many people find so hard to accept is that there isn't a lot we can do about them except ride them out.

In its impotence, the Abbott government is claiming its plans to remove the mining and carbon taxes will be a great help. Only the one-eyed would believe that. Labor has sunk to the depths of attacking the government for its failure to protect Australian jobs and demands to see its "jobs plan". What's Labor's jobs plan? Maintain the handouts to crumbling industries.

It's seeking to exploit the fears of people who are uncertain about where it's all going to end. Well, last week Dr David Gruen, of Treasury, published projections of the various industries' shares of total employment in 16 years' time, 2030.

I must warn you these figures come with zero guarantee. Just because you're smart enough to turn the handle of an incomprehensible econometric model doesn't mean you know any more about what the future holds than the rest of us.

Surprisingly, the projections suggest manufacturing's share of total employment will decline by only a further 1 percentage point. Similar declines are projected in transport and warehousing, construction and (thankfully) financial services. The biggest relative employment decline would be in wholesale and retail trade.

Utilities, media and telecommunications, and, surprisingly, mining are projected to experience minor declines in their shares of total employment. Agriculture's share may rise by a percentage point, while that of education and health may rise by more than 1.5 points, and professional and administrative services by almost 3 percentage points.

We won't all be dead.
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Wednesday, March 6, 2013

Labor first out of blocks in race to mislead

I guess you've heard the news: the Gillard government has obtained new analysis of data from the Bureau of Statistics showing that Tony Abbott's election commitments inflict brutal damage on working families, particularly those in western Sydney, increasing taxes and cutting support to families.

According to Treasurer Wayne Swan, Abbott's commitments include scrapping the tripling of the tax-free threshold, axing the new schoolkids' bonus and abolishing family payments from the household assistance package introduced in June last year.

The government tripled the tax-free threshold from $6000 to $18,200 a year from July last year, we're told, delivering tax cuts to all taxpayers earning up to $80,000 a year. Most of these people received savings of at least $300 a year, with many part-time workers receiving up to $600.

The schoolkids' bonus is worth $410 a year for primary school students and $820 a year for secondary school students to families who receive family tax benefit part A.

The household assistance package increased payments to families who receive benefit part A by up to $110 per child and by $70 per family for those receiving benefit part B. The median family income in Fairfield is $106,000. This family, with two children both in primary school, father working full-time on $86,000 a year and mother working part-time on $20,000 will be almost $1500 a year worse off, we're told. The mother will pay $600 more in tax and they will lose $820 in schoolkids' bonus and $72 in other benefits.

The median family income in Penrith is $118,000. This family, with two primary and one high school student, the father earning $70,000 and the mother on $48,000, will be $2300 a year worse off, we're told. The father will pay $250 more in tax, the mother will pay $300 more, and they'll lose $1640 in schoolkids' bonus and $108 in other benefits.

Terrible, eh? There's just one small problem. This stuff is so misleading as to be quite dishonest.

For a start, this is just politically inspired figuring, which doesn't deserve the aura of authority the government has sought to give it by having it released by the Treasurer with a reference to "new analysis of Bureau of Statistics data" and allowing the media to refer to it as "modelling".

It's true you'd have to look up the bureau's census figures to get the details of the median family in a particular suburb, but after that the "modelling" could be done on the back of an envelope.

There's a key omission from Labor's description of its wonderfully generous household assistance package: why it was necessary. Its purpose was to compensate low and middle-income families for the cost of the carbon tax. Since the Coalition promises to abolish the carbon tax, Abbott has said that all the compensation for the tax will also go. (Strictly speaking, the schoolkids' bonus is linked to the mining tax, but the Coalition is also promising to abolish this tax, and Abbott has said the bonus, too, will go.)

The trick is that Abbott has yet to give any details of how or when these concessions would go and what they'd be replaced with. But this hasn't inhibited Labor. It has happily assumed what the Coalition intends and is presenting its assumptions as hard facts.

The most glaring omission from Labor's calculation of the hip-pocket effect of all this is its failure to acknowledge the saving households would make from the abolition of the carbon tax.

Based on Treasury's original calculations, this should be worth about $515 a year per household, including $172 a year from lower electricity prices and $78 a year from lower gas prices.

Some Labor supporters argue that even if the carbon tax is abolished, prices won't fall. This is highly unlikely. The state government tribunals that regulate electricity and gas prices would insist on it. And a Coalition government would no doubt instruct the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission to police the wider price decrease.

Labor's repeated claim to have tripled the tax-free threshold from $6000 to $18,200 a year has always been literally true, but highly misleading. That's because it conveniently ignores the complex operation of the low-income tax offset.

When you allow for this offset, which Labor has reduced and changed without removing, the effective tax-free threshold has increased by a much smaller $4500-odd from $16,000 to $20,542. This explains why the tax cut arising from the seemingly huge increase in the threshold is so modest (for many, $5.80 a week) and also why the move yields no saving to anyone earning more than $80,000 a year. For them, the threshold increase has been "clawed back".

The idea of a Coalition government bringing about an actual increase in income tax is hard to imagine. Labor omits to mention Abbott has promised a modest tax cut, though he hasn't said when it would happen.

Labor also omits to mention that the generous schoolkids' bonus replaced its earlier 50 per cent education tax refund, which offered savings of up to almost $400 a year on the eligible expenses of primary school students and up to almost $800 for secondary students.

Labor has assumed that Abbott would merely abolish the schoolkids' bonus without reinstating the education tax refund. Maybe he would; maybe he wouldn't - he hasn't yet said. But only a one-eyed Labor supporter would trust Labor to read Abbott's mind.

It didn't take the announcement of an election date to ensure the informal election campaign would begin as soon as we were back at work in January. It's a daunting thought.

But at least it gives people like me plenty of time to demonstrate the dishonesty of the claims being made.
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Wednesday, August 22, 2012

Big Tobacco as caring corporate citizen

Surely we're being far too tough on Big Tobacco, as so many disparagingly refer to it, after the failure of its High Court challenge to the plain packaging legislation. If we'd only open our minds to what British American Tobacco and the others are saying, we'd see how remarkably public spirited they are.

They're worried not for themselves but about the "serious unintended consequences" they fear plain packaging will bring. According to their spokesman, Scott McIntyre, its only benefit will be to "organised crime groups which sell illegal tobacco on our streets".

Huh? "The illegal black market will grow further when all packs look the same and are easier to copy," he says.

In case you hadn't heard, this country faces a rampant illicit tobacco problem, with "criminal gangs now smuggling three times the amount of counterfeit and contraband cigarettes into Australia" last year, compared with the year before.

Overall, the illegal tobacco market is equal to 13.4 per cent of the legal market. How does the industry know? It commissioned a report from Deloitte, a financial services firm.

The industry has been terribly concerned about the illicit tobacco market for some years. Why? Not for itself, of course, but for what it's costing the taxpayer in lost tobacco excise. Last year, almost $1 billion, according to Deloitte.

You've often seen me criticise industries trying to hit the taxpayer for subsidies but with the tobacco people it's all the other way. Last year they ran ads desperately trying to dissuade the government from persisting with its plain packaging notion and thereby obliging the industry to cost the taxpayer millions in legal fees responding to Big Tobacco's High Court challenge - not to mention the billions the government stood to lose in compensation should the court agree the government had appropriated the industry's intellectual property.

Fortunately, the court didn't agree. It also awarded costs against the industry, which I'm sure will come as a great relief to the public-spirited tobacco people.

But the industry's concern for the taxpayer doesn't end there. It opposed the 25 per cent increase in the tobacco excise in 2010 because of the hit to revenue it would cause as the jump in the price of legal cigarettes forced more of the market into the hands of the cut-price criminal black market.

You may in your innocence think plain packaging will reduce the number of young people taking up smoking but that's where you would be wrong.

As the industry explained in full page ads last year, plain packaging "could drive the cost of [legal] tobacco down. Because with no branding, companies will have no option but to compete on price. And lower prices will make tobacco more accessible to young adults".

The boss of British American elaborated elsewhere that this was a worry because it would undermine government health initiatives to curb tobacco consumption. See what caring people we're dealing with?

As I discuss in my little video on the website today, I think plain packaging may force down the prices of "premium-brand" cigarettes. That wouldn't be a good thing but it would be easily (and lucratively) remedied by increasing the tobacco excise.

The tobacco companies aren't the only critics. According to the Australian Retailers Association, "retailers now face the costs of plain packaging transactions, which will see a significant increase in the time taken to complete a transaction as all products will be near identical".

"Transaction time increases are estimated to cost businesses up to half a billion dollars, which is the equivalent of 15,000 jobs," we're told. No back-of-an-envelope was offered in support of this remarkable claim, in which case I'd be inclined to view it with scepticism.

But what about the supposedly booming black market - how worried should we be about it? Not very. We've really only got the industry's word for how big it is and a detailed critique by Quit Victoria casts doubt on the reliability of the report commissioned from Deloitte.

Deloitte's calculations are built on a poll with a very small sample, which doesn't seem completely random. It asks smokers about their purchases of unbranded tobacco (mainly loose tobacco in plastic bags), contraband cigarettes (those imported without excise payment) and counterfeit cigarettes (those with fake brand names) and adds their answers together, even though you'd expect virtually all counterfeit smokes also to be contraband.

How do people know the cigarettes they've bought are illicit? Because of perceived poor quality, cheap prices, labelling in foreign languages and a different taste. Trouble is, these days a lot of cheap, foreign-made, funny-looking cigarettes are imported legally.

According to Quit Victoria, Deloitte's estimates imply one cigarette in eight is illicit. That's a bit hard to swallow.

Quit Victoria used an official survey by the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare in 2010, which had a very much bigger sample, to estimate the total use of illicit tobacco products is more like 2 per cent to 3 per cent of the overall market.

This implies the revenue forgone by the taxpayer is closer to $165 million a year than $1 billion.

I'm sure taxpayers everywhere thank the industry for its concern on our behalf but I don't think we need to be losing too much sleep over it.
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Saturday, February 4, 2012

Why economic modelling is so tricky

When I was studying economics at university in the mid-1960s, I wasn't quite sure what a "model" was. These days, politicians and business people are always using the word, and most of us think we know what they mean.

In case you're not sure, here's an explanation I would love to have seen at uni, provided by Dr Richard Denniss, executive director of the Australia Institute, in his new paper, The Use and Abuse of Economic Modelling.

"A model, be it a model car or an economic model, is a simplified representation of a more complex mechanism. A model is typically smaller, simpler and easier to build than a full-scale replica. A model sheds light on the main features of the reality it seeks to represent," Denniss writes.

"An economic 'model' is not a physical thing, like a model car. Rather, it is a mathematical representation of the linkages between selected elements of the economy."

Thus an economic model is, unavoidably, a simplified version of the economy, or an aspect of the economy. It includes those aspects of reality the model-builder regards as most important in explaining what happens, and leaves out all those aspects that don't seem to make a big difference.

So the results you get from a model are only as good as the modeller's choice of what to include and what to leave out. In practice, the model's predictions will often prove astray because some factor the modeller assumed wouldn't be important turned out to be.

Different types of economic models are used for different purposes. Earlier this week I used Denniss's paper to discuss the input-output model that industry lobbies use to make their industry sound bigger than it is.

Today let's discuss the most sophisticated models economists have developed; "computable general equilibrium" models. These are often used to shed light on the effect of a major policy change on the economy over the next 10 or 20 years.

Economists often analyse only a part of the economy, called a "partial equilibrium analysis", while assuming ceteris paribus (all other things remain equal) in the rest of the economy. This is unrealistic because, in the economy, everything is connected to everything else. Changes in one bit lead to changes in other bits, which then feed back on the first bit. So general equilibrium models attempt to capture all these interactions between different industries and markets. (In practice they can't capture all of them, so they still rely on the ceteris paribus assumption to cover those they leave out.)

If you remember nothing else about models, remember this: their weakness is they are built on a host of assumptions, and therefore are only as good as the assumptions on which they are built. Some assumptions are obviously unrealistic and couldn't possibly hold; some happen to be overtaken by events.

Models are sets of equations with dependent and independent variables. The modeller decides the values of the independent (or "exogenous") variables and the model calculates the values of the dependent ("endogenous") variables. So, if the modeller puts in the wrong independent variables (usually assumptions or guesses about the future), the dependent variables will be wrong, too.

The model-builder also specifies the "elasticity" (sensitivity) of the relationships between the variables. For instance, when the exchange rate rises will the reduction in exports be big or small? Elasticities are partly based on empirical evidence, but they also reflect the model-builder's beliefs about how the economy works. Should that belief be wrong, the model's results will be wrong.

It's common for general equilibrium models to be Keynesian in the short run (up to 10 years) but neoclassical in the long run (20 years or more). That is, key variables such as inflation, unemployment and economic growth are determined by the strength of aggregate (total) demand in the short run, but by the strength of aggregate supply in the long run.

This means the economy is assumed to be at full employment in the long run, and economic growth over the period is assumed to be determined solely by the growth in the labour force (the population of working age and its rate of participation in the labour force) plus the rate of improvement in the productivity of labour.

How do you know what the average rates of growth in population and productivity will be over the next 20 years? You take an educated guess, then plug them in. But here's the trick: once you've done that, you've predetermined where the model's results will end up, regardless of whatever policy changes you simulate happening to the economy in the meantime.

No matter how much some change knocks the economy off its assumed long-run course, the model's specifications assume it will not only get back on course but also catch up to where it would have been.

The economy can take up to 10 years to return to its "steady state".

So, the bigger the initial departure from the long-run trend, the bigger the ultimate bounce back - by design. And, by design, nothing can ever happen that changes our destiny.

Thus the model assumes away "path dependency" - the idea that where we end up is determined by what happens to us on the way; that some developments leave us permanently better off, while some leave us permanently worse off. This is clearly unrealistic.

But see what it means? It means the policy change you're purporting to be testing doesn't stand a chance of making much lasting difference, for good or ill. And that means your test is a sham. You give the appearance of testing some proposition, but the outcome is essentially predetermined.

I think such models should be used only in private by consenting economists. They have a good understanding of the assumptions on which the model's results are built and they know whether they share the modeller's faith that the economy works the way her model assumes it does.

When the results of these models are paraded before the public - by governments and treasuries, as well as interest groups - they can't help but mislead. They appear to be proving some policy change would be good or bad but, in truth, they're coming to predetermined conclusions.

The sign that the sponsors and modellers are out to mislead is shown by their failure to highlight their model's key assumptions in some sort of comprehensible product disclosure statement.
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