Friday, July 1, 2022

THE STATE OF THE ECONOMY

Although most of us would like to think the pandemic is receding into the past and we can move on to other things, we’re starting to realise that it’s still with us and is still having a big effect not only on our health and our overstrained hospitals, but also on our economy. It’s still being greatly affected by the pandemic itself and by our response to the threat it poses to life and limb.

When the pandemic began in March 2020, federal and state governments closed our borders to travel, and locked down the national economy, so as to limit the spread of the virus. They ordered many retail businesses and forms of entertainment to close or severely limit their activities. People were required to stay in their homes and, if possible, work or study from home. Knowing this could cause much unemployment of workers, the government introduced the JobKeeper wage subsidy scheme to maintain the link between employers and their employees, even if they had little work for those employees to do. It had other spending programs to support the incomes of businesses and households, as well as particularly industries, such as housing. The first, national lockdown lasted only about six weeks, but then a second, longer lockdown became necessary for NSW, Victoria and the ACT in the middle of 2021.

Although many economists feared we had entered a severe recession, with the government spending huge sums to limit the effect on incomes the national economy bounced back strongly after the first lockdown and again after the second one. Real gross domestic product contracted heavily in the June quarter of 2020 and to a lesser extent in the September quarter of 2021, but ended up growing by 1.4 pc over the year to March 2021, and by 3.3 pc over the year to March 2022.

The strength of the economy’s bounceback can be seen in what happened to employment and unemployment. Total employment actually grew by about 60,000 over the year to March 2021, and by about 390,000 over the year to March 2022. This meant that, although the rate of unemployment shot up to 7.5 pc in July 2020, it had fallen back to 5.7 pc by March 2021 and to 3.9 pc in March 2022. By June, it had fallen to 3.5 pc, its lowest in 50 years. Because most of the new jobs created have been full-time, the rate of under-employment has also fallen considerably. There is a shortage of suitable labour, with the number of job vacancies now at record levels. Yet another sign of how “tight” the labour market is: the “participation rate” – that is, the proportion of the working-age population participating in the labour force either by working or actively seeking work – is at a record high of 66.8 pc.

Why is the jobs market so tight? Partly because of the massive economic stimulus applied to the economy by governments, but also because the closure of our borders for two years has cut off employers’ access to what you could call “imported labour”. So job vacancies that normally would have been filled by backbackers, overseas students and skilled workers on temporary visas have either had to go to locals, or go begging. Our borders have now been re-opened to foreign workers, so the labour market’s present tightness is temporary, but it’s likely to take more than several months for the inflow of foreign workers to return to normal.

As I’m sure you know, the pandemic has led to big changes in the settings of both fiscal policy and monetary policy. Those changes do much to explain where the economy is now and what the economic managers must do ensure we stay on the path of material prosperity.

Starting with fiscal policy, the former Morrison government had just got the budget back to balance when the pandemic arrived in early 2020. It’s decision to limit the spread of the virus by locking down the economy, while using the budget to protect the incomes of households and businesses, ended any prospect of returning the budget to surplus. Instead, the lockdowns caused a big fall in tax collections, while the spending and tax cuts to protect household and business incomes cause the budget to return to huge deficits, peaking at a record $134 billion (6.5 pc of GDP) in 2020-21, then falling to an expected $78 billion (3.4 pc) in the present financial year, 2022-23. Note that, even if the government had not decided to lockdown the economy while protecting incomes, the economy would still have slowed and the budget returned to deficit as many people took their own measures to protect themselves from the virus by avoiding crowded shops and venues and staying at home as much as possible. The government’s response to the pandemic and the huge budget deficits it led to added to its already-high level of public debt, causing the gross debt to rise to an expected almost $1 trillion (43 pc of GDP) by June 2023. Despite its own promises of further government spending and tax cuts, the new Albanese government will try to reduce prospective budget deficits and limit further growth in the debt in the budget it will announce in October.

Turning to monetary policy, low world interest rates and weak growth in our economy had the cash rate already down to 0.75 pc before the pandemic. In March 2020 the RBA cut the rate to 0.25 pc and, some months later, to 0.10 pc. It began engaging in unconventional monetary policy – “quantitative easing”, QE – by buying second-hand government bonds so as to reduce government and private sector interest rates on longer-term borrowing. Since it paid for these second-hand bonds merely by crediting the exchange settlement accounts of the banks it bought the bonds from, this had the effect of creating money. Note that the resulting increase in the RBA’s holdings of government bonds meant that about $350 billion of the government’s gross debt of nearly $1 trillion has been borrowed not from the public but from the central bank that is owned by the government.

The RBA’s most recent forecast is for real GDP to grow by a super-strong 4 pc this calendar year, but slow to a relatively weak 2 pc in 2023. But this prospect has been upset by the emergence of a new problem. For about six years before and during the pandemic, the problem was that the rate of inflation was too low, falling below the RBA’s 2 to 3 pc inflation target. But by the end of last year, 2021, the annual inflation rate had risen to 3.5 pc and by March 2022 it had risen to 5.1 pc. It’s expected to rise further over the rest of this year, reaching a peak of about 7 pc before starting to fall back slowly towards the target rate next year.

The first thing to note is that the rise in prices has been a global problem, with largely global causes. Inflation has risen in all the advanced economies, and by more than it has in Australia. In the US and many European countries, it’s up to about 10 pc, the highest rate in decades.

There are three main causes of this sudden reversal in inflation. Two of the three are “imported inflation” and all three involve problems and price rises coming from the supply side of the economy, rather than price rises caused by excessive demand. The first and most important is the major interruptions to global supply chains caused by the pandemic and, in particular, by the spending of locked-down households switching from services to goods. The increased demand for goods led to shortages of container ships and containers themselves, shortages of computer chips and many many other things, including timber and other building supplies. When the demand for goods exceeds their supply, business tend to increase their prices. These effects are temporary, however, and many supply bottlenecks are easing. But the problems China is having in coping with the pandemic suggest there may be further supply disruptions to come.

The second major global and imported source of higher prices is Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which has caused major disruptions to the global markets for energy and food. But recently world oil, wheat and other commodity prices have fallen somewhat.

The third major, but little-noticed source of higher prices is also global and on the supply side: climate change. This is true even though its effects are specific to Australia. Restock of herds following the end of the most recent drought has seen beef prices rise by 12 pc over the year to March and by about 30 pc over the past three years. Lamb prices rose by 7 pc over the year to March and by 30 pc over the past four years. All the recent talk of paying $10 for an iceberg lettuce is a product of all the flooding in Queensland and NSW this year.

To these three causes the RBA adds a fourth factor, coming from the demand side of the economy: the strong demand for goods during the pandemic has allowed businesses to pass any rise in their costs on to customers, without fear of losing business. There has also been some increase in wage rates but, as yet, there is little sign employees have sufficient bargaining power to achieve wage rises of more than 3 pc or so, meaning wages are likely to continue falling in real terms.

In response to the rise in inflation, the RBA began a series of rate rates during the election campaign in May. In three months it has lifted the cash rate from 0.1 pc to 1.35pc, and is expected to continue raising it until it has reached “more normal levels” of at least 2.5 pc. It is moving the “stance” of monetary policy from the pandemic’s emergency levels of stimulus to a “neutral” stance – that is, a rate that’s neither expansionary nor contractionary. In other words, it is taking its foot off the monetary accelerator, not jamming on the brakes. Its goal is to ensure that excessive demand in the economy doesn’t cause temporary inflationary pressure coming from the economy’s supply side to become entrenched, rather than having inflation fall back to the 2 to 3 pc target range over the next year or two. It hopes to achieve this without causing a recession – which won’t be easy.

Read more >>

Monday, June 27, 2022

Business volunteers its staff to take one for the shareholders' team

An increase in wages sufficient to prevent a further fall in real wages would do little harm to the economy and much good to businesses hoping their sales will keep going up rather than start going down.

It’s hard enough to figure out what’s going on in the economy – and where it’s headed – without media people who should know better misrepresenting what Reserve Bank governor Dr Philip Lowe said last week about wages and inflation.

One outlet turned it into a good guys versus bad guys morality tale, where Lowe rebuked the evil, inflation-mongering unions planning to impose 5 or 7 per cent wage rises on the nation’s hapless businesses by instituting a “3.5 per cent cap” on the would-be wreckers, with even the new Labor government “bowing” to Lowe’s order that real wages be cut, and the ACTU “conceding” that 5 per cent wage claims would not go forward.

ACTU boss Sally McManus was on the money in dismissing this version of events as coming from “Boomer fantasy land”. What she meant was that this conception of what’s happening today must have come from the mind of someone whose view of how wage-fixing works was formed in the 1970s and ’80s, and who hadn’t noticed one or two minor changes in the following 30 years.

No one younger than a Baby Boomer could possibly delude themselves that workers could simply demand some huge pay rise and keep striking – or merely threatening to strike – until their employer caved in and granted it.

Or believe that, as really was the case in the 1970s and 1980s, the quarterly or half-yearly “national wage case” awarded almost every worker in the country a wage rise indexed to the consumer price index. Paul Keating abolished this “centralised wage-fixing system” in the early ’90s and replaced it with collective bargaining at the enterprise level.

John Howard’s changes, culminating in the Work Choices changes in 2005, took this a lot further, outlawing compulsory unionism, tightly constraining the unions’ ability to strike, allowing employers to lock out their employees, removing union officials’ right to enter the workplace and check that employers were complying with award provisions (now does the surge in “accidental” wage theft surprise you?) and sought to diminish employees’ bargaining power by encouraging individual contracts rather than collective bargaining.

Julia Gillard’s Fair Work changes in 2009 reversed some of the more anti-union elements of Work Choices but, as part of modern Labor’s eternal desire to avoid getting off-side with big business, let too many of them stand.

As both business and the unions agree, enterprise bargaining is falling into disuse. On paper, about a third of the nation’s employees are subject to enterprise agreements. But McManus claims that, in practice, it’s down to about 15 per cent.

All these changes in the “institution arrangements” for wage-fixing are before you take account of the way organised labour’s bargaining power has been diminished by globalisation and technological change making it so much easier to move work – particularly in manufacturing, but increasingly in services – to countries where labour is cheaper.

In the ’80s, about half of all workers were union members. Today, it’s down to 14 per cent, with many of those concentrated in public sector jobs such as nursing, teaching and coppering.

All this is why fears that we risk returning to the “stagflation” of the 1970s are indeed out of fantasy land. Only a Boomer who hasn’t been paying attention, or a youngster with no idea of how much the world has changed since then, could worry about such a thing.

The claim that Lowe has stopped the union madness in its tracks by imposing a “3.5 per cent cap” on wage rises misrepresents what he said. It ignores his qualification that 3.5 per cent – that is, 2.5 per cent as the mid-point of the inflation target plus 1 per cent for the average annual improvement in the productivity of labour – is “a medium-term point that I’ve been making for some years” (my emphasis) that “remains relevant, over time,” (ditto) and is the “steady-state wage increase”.

Like the inflation target itself, it’s an average to be achieved “over the medium term” – that is, over 10 years or so – not an annual “cap” that you can fall short of for most of the past decade, but must never ever exceed.

Supposedly, it’s a “cap” because of Lowe’s remark that “if wage increases become common in the 4 to 5 per cent range, then it’s going to be harder to return inflation to 2.5 per cent.”

That’s not the imposition of a cap – which, in any case, Lowe doesn’t have to power to do, even if he wanted to – it’s a statement of the bleeding obvious. It’s simple arithmetic.

But it’s also an utterly imaginary problem. It ain’t gonna happen. Why not? Because, as McManus “conceded”, no matter how unfair the unions regard it to force workers to bear the cost of the abandon with which businesses have been protecting their profits by whacking up their prices, workers simply lack the industrial muscle to extract pay rises any higher than the nation’s chief executives can be shamed into granting.

While we’re talking arithmetic, however, don’t fall for the line – widely propagated – that if prices rise by 5 per cent, and then wages rise by 5 per cent, the inflation rate stays at 5 per cent. As the Bureau of Statistics has calculated, labour costs account for just 25 per cent of all business costs.

So, only if all other, non-labour costs have also risen by 5 per cent does a 5 per cent rise in wage rates justify a 5 per cent rise in prices, thus preventing the annual inflation rate from falling back.

In other words, what we’re arguing about is how soon inflation falls back to the target range. Commentators with an unacknowledged pro-business bias (probably because they work for big business) are arguing that it should happen ASAP by making the nation’s households take a huge hit to their real incomes. This, apparently, will be great for the economy.

Those in the financial markets want to hasten the return to target by having the Reserve raise interest rates so far and so fast it puts the economy into recession. Another great idea.

Meanwhile, Lowe says he expects the return to target inflation to take “some years”. What a wimp.

Read more >>

Saturday, June 25, 2022

Nobbling Afterpay would stifle competition and protect bank profits

There’s nothing new about buying now and paying later. You can do it with lay-by or a credit card. But the version of it invented by Afterpay, and copied by so many rivals, is so different and so hugely popular it’s not surprising it’s raised eyebrows.

The most obvious reaction is to see it as a new way of tempting young people, in particular, to overload themselves with debt and make their lives a misery. The government should be regulating its providers to limit the harm they do.

But to see Afterpay as purely a matter of “consumer protection”, as I used to, is to miss the way this prime example of “fintech” – the use of digital technology to find new ways of delivering financial services – is subjecting the banks and their hugely overpriced credit cards to strong competition from a product many users find more attractive.

And not just that. When you think it through – as I suspect the politicians and financial regulators haven’t – you see that this new approach to BNPL – buy now, pay later – is also threatening the big profits Google and Facebook are making from their stranglehold on online advertising.

The man who has thought it through is Dr Richard Denniss, of the Australia Institute. With Matt Saunders, Denniss has written a paper, The role of Buy Now, Pay Later services in enhancing competition, commissioned by ... Afterpay.

Normally, I’m hugely suspicious of “research” paid for by commercial interests, but Denniss is one of the most original thinkers among the nation’s boring economists.

Buying something via Afterpay allows you to receive it immediately, while paying for it in four equal, fortnightly instalments over six weeks. Provided you make the payments on time, you pay no interest or further charge. The fortnightly payments fit with most people’s fortnightly pay.

If you’re late with a payment, you’re charged a late fee that varies from a minimum of $10 to a maximum of $68, depending on how much you’ve borrowed. If you don’t pay the late fee and get your payments up to date, Afterpay won’t finance any more BNPL deals until you have.

If you never get up to date, you’re not charged interest or any further late fees. Eventually, Afterpay ends its relationship with you and writes off the debt.

The individual amounts people borrow are usually for just a few hundred dollars. You can have more than one loan running at a time, but only within the credit limit Afterpay has set, and only if your existing payments are up to date.

Afterpay sets a fairly low limit initially, but increases it as you demonstrate your payment reliability.

So, what’s in it for Afterpay? It charges the shop that sold you the stuff a merchant fee of about 4 per cent of the sale price. I used to suspect they made a lot from their late fees, but these remain a small part of their total revenue, almost all of which comes from merchant fees.

Despite its huge expansion, Afterpay has yet to turn a profit, putting it in the same boat as Uber, Twitter and other digital platforms. Of late, the BNPLs have had greatly increased bad debts and the sharemarket has fallen out of love with them. This doesn’t affect Afterpay, which has been taken over by a big American fintech, Square, which has many other irons in the fire.

Obviously, Afterpay and its imitators are offering a way to BNPL that’s an alternative to a conventional credit card, which involves charging merchants a fee of a couple of per cent, and offering interest-free credit - provided you pay your balance on time and in full each month.

If you can’t keep that up – as the great majority of credit-card holders can’t – you get hit with interest on your purchases of an extortionate 20 per cent-plus. These rates haven’t changed in decades while other interest rates have fallen. That’s a sign the banking oligopoly has huge pricing power in the provision of consumer credit.

It seems clear from the declining growth in credit-card debt and the amazing popularity of Afterpay and its imitators that people are jack of credit cards and keen to shift to a less onerous form of BNPL.

Many young adults, in particular, seem to have sworn off credit cards because they’re just too tempting. Behavioural economists call this a “pre-commitment device”. The best way to ensure you don’t end up deep in ever-growing debt is not to have a credit card in the first place.

These people regard Afterpay & Co as a much less risky way to BNPL, a ubiquitous practice economists sanctify as “consumption smoothing”.

Those who want to regulate the new BNPL by stopping providers from prohibiting merchants from charging users a surcharge – the way they stopped Visa and Mastercard from banning surcharging – see this as levelling the competitive playing field between the two different forms of BNPL.

But Denniss’ insight is to point out that the two merchant fees are quite different. The credit-card merchant fee can be regarded as a transaction fee – that is, merely covering administrative costs – but in Afterpay’s case it covers much more than that, to justify its much higher cost.

What Afterpay offers is something marketers understand, but economists have yet to: better “customer acquisition”. Being able to offer free credit is one aid to acquiring customers, but Afterpay does much more to attract customers to those merchants who offer its BNPL service.

Younger consumers like the new BNPL so much they search the internet for sellers of the item they want to buy that also offer Afterpay. Afterpay uses a directory of stores on its website – and also its mobile app – to direct potential customers to participating merchants.

Afterpay also sends messages to its users advertising its merchants’ special offers and the like.

So Afterpay’s merchant fee also provides its merchants with a new form advertising, thus reducing their need for online advertising through Google or Facebook.

Afterpay is genuinely disruptive, offering users what they may justifiably regard as a better product. Regulators should think twice before they seek to discourage it by presenting customers with a misleading comparison: a merchant fee of 4 per cent versus 2 per cent.

Read more >>

Wednesday, June 22, 2022

Why interest rates are going up, and won't be coming down

It’s time we had a serious talk about interest rates. And, while we’re at it, inflation. Someone in my job knows it’s time to talk turkey when the man in charge of rates, Reserve Bank governor Dr Philip Lowe, decides to go on the ABC’s 7.30 program to talk about both.

There’s much to talk about. Why are interest rates of such interest to so many (sorry)? Why do some people hate them going up and some love it? How do interest rates and the inflation rate fit together? Why do central banks such as our Reserve keep moving them up and down? When rates go up, they normally come back down – so why won't that happen this time?

Starting with the basics, interest is the price or fee that someone who wants to borrow money for a period has to pay to someone who has money they’re prepared to lend – for a fee.

Legally, the “person” you’ve borrowed from is usually a bank, while the person with savings to lend deposits them with a bank. But economists see banks as just “intermediaries” that bring borrowers on one side together with ordinary savers on the other.

The bank charges borrowers a higher interest rate than it pays its depositors. The difference reflects the bank’s reward for bringing the two sides together, but also the risk the bank is running that the borrower won’t repay the debt, leaving the bank liable to repay the depositor.

You see from this that interest is an expense to borrowers, but income to savers. This is why there’s so much arguing over interest rates. Borrowers hate to see them rise, but savers hate to see them fall. (The media conceal this two-sided relationship by almost always treating rate rises as bad.)

Now we get to inflation. Economists think of interest rates as having two components. The first is the compensation that the borrower must pay the saver for the loss in the purchasing power of their money while it’s in the borrower’s hands. The second part is the “real” or after-inflation interest rate that the borrower must pay the saver for giving up the use of their own money for a period.

This implies that the level of interest rates should roughly rise and fall in line with the ups and downs in the rate of inflation – the annual rate at which the prices consumers pay for goods and services (but not for assets such as shares or houses) are rising.

This explains why, when the inflation rate was way above 5 per cent throughout the 1970s and ’80s, interest rates were far higher than they’ve been since.

Now it gets tricky. Central banks have the ability to control variable interest rates by manipulating what’s known confusingly as the “overnight cash rate”. This “official” interest rate forms the base for all the other (higher) interest rates we pay or receive.

The Reserve Bank uses its control over this base interest rate to smooth the ups and downs in the economy, trying to keep both inflation and unemployment low.

When it thinks our demand for goods and services is too weak and is worsening unemployment, it cuts interest rates to encourage borrowing and spending. When it thinks our demand is too strong and is worsening inflation, it raises interest rates to discourage borrowing and spending.

The pandemic and the consequent “coronacession” caused the Reserve (and all the other rich-country central banks) to cut the official interest rate almost to zero.

The economy has bounced back from the lockdowns and is now growing strongly, with very low unemployment and many vacant jobs. But now we’ve been hit by big price rises from overseas, the result of supply bottlenecks caused by the pandemic and a leap in oil and gas prices caused by the war on Ukraine, plus the effect of climate change on local meat and vegetable prices.

As Lowe explained to Leigh Sales on 7.30, these are once-only price rises and, although he expects the inflation rate to reach 7 per cent by the end of this year, it should then start falling back toward the Reserve’s target inflation rate of 2 to 3 per cent.

His worry is that the economy’s capacity to produce all the goods and services being demanded is close to running out – and already has in housing and construction. This raises the risk that the rate of growth in prices won’t fall back as soon as it should.

This is why Lowe’s started raising the official interest rate from its pandemic “emergency setting” near zero – zero! – to a “more normal setting”. Such as? To more like 2.5 per cent, he told Sales.

Why 2.5 per cent? Because that’s the mid-point of his inflation target.

Get it? Interest rates are supposed to cover expected inflation plus a bit more. Once Lowe’s able to get them back up to that level without causing a recession, they won’t be coming back down until the next pandemic-sized emergency.

A base interest rate of zero was never going to be the new normal. The nation’s saving grandparents would never cop it.

Read more >>

Tuesday, June 21, 2022

Perrottet's bold re-election bid: the world's first teal budget

A budget can tell you a lot about the government that produced it, especially a pre-election budget.

This one reveals a reformist Premier anxious to persuade us his government has reformed itself. It’s your classic, all-singing, all-dancing pre-election affair, offering increased government spending on 101 different things.

In his effort to get re-elected, Dominic Perrottet has left no dollar unturned. Enjoy, enjoy.

But recent lamentations in Canberra remind me to remind you: whoever wins the state election in March, next year’s budget won’t be nearly so jolly. If there’s bad news in the offing, that’s when we’ll get it.

For a government going on 12 years old and up to its fourth premier, this budget should be the Coalition’s swansong. But Perrottet wants us to see him as new, young, energetic and reforming.

On the face of it, proof of his reforming zeal is his controversial plan to press on with replacing conveyancing duty with an annual property tax, despite Canberra’s lack of enthusiasm for helping to fund the loss of revenue during the transition.

Most economists would loudly applaud such reform. On close examination, however, the budget’s first stage doesn’t add up to much.

Even so, let’s not forget that the desire to make their people’s lives radically better has become almost non-existent among today’s self-interested politicians.

Perrottet wants a return to co-operative federalism, and will happily work with a Labor Victorian premier and Labor prime minister to achieve it.

And the reform doesn’t stop there. This pre-election budget is also the first post-election budget following the crushing defeat of the Morrison federal government. The NSW Liberal Party, with the least to learn from Scott Morrison’s many failings, is also the one that’s learnt most.

Genuine action on climate change, measures to improve the treatment of women in the workplace and the home, promoting co-operation rather than conflict and division, increased spending on early education, childcare and hospitals, the educated talking to the educated, Perrottet’s rejection of the pork barrelling condoned by his predecessor – this budget has everything.

I give you ... Australia’s first teal budget.

Much of the credit needs to be shared with the new Treasurer, Matt Kean. He is a reforming Treasurer – with many of his predecessors’ mistakes needing reform. This budget is mercifully free of the funny-money deals that blighted so many previous efforts.

The spirit of positivity that pervades the Treasurer’s fiscal rhetoric also infects his confidence that the budget will be back to surplus in a year or three, and the debt will one day stop growing. Should this optimism prove misplaced, there’s always scope for adjustment after the election.

The government is rightly proud of all it’s done building new metros, light rail and expressways. But the Coalition’s original desire to get on with a hugely expensive transport infrastructure program while limiting the state’s debt and preserving its triple-A credit rating, led it into crazy arrangements to hide much of the debt by, for example, paying businesses such as Transurban over-the-odds to do the borrowing for it.

Now Sydney, much more than any other city, is girdled by a maze of private tollways, most with a licence to whack up the tolls quarterly or annually by a minimum of 4 per cent a year. What was that about fighting inflation and the cost of living?

This was always a way of keeping official debt down by shifting the cost onto the motorists of present and future decades.

This ill-considered mess has proved so costly to people in outer-suburban electorates that the latest “reform” is for taxpayers to subsidise the worst-affected motorists – and thereby the excessive profits granted to the tollway companies.

Another false economy was to fatten the sale price of privatised ports and electricity companies by attaching to them the right for the new owner to increase prices and profitability. This has played a small part in all the trouble we’re having now making the National Electricity Market work for the benefit of users rather than big business.

In my home town, a formerly secret deal to enhance the sale price of Port Botany is effectively preventing the Port of Newcastle from responding to the looming decline of the coal export trade by setting up a container terminal.

And all that’s before you get to the creative accounting madness of transferring the state’s railways to the still-government owned Transport Asset Holding Entity.

Perrottet, who was up to his neck in that trickery, seems to be making a better fist of Premier than treasurer. And Kean seems a better Treasurer than his many Coalition predecessors. But will that be enough to cover all the missteps of the past?

Read more >>

Monday, June 20, 2022

Economic times are tricky, but they're far from 'dire'

It’s a funny thing. The easily impressionable are packing down for imminent recession, while the economic cognoscenti are fretting that the economy is “overheating”. Unfortunately, the two aren’t as poles apart as you may think. Even so, both groups need to calm down and think sensibly.

There was much talk of recession last week as the sharemarket dropped sharply. We dropped because Wall Street dropped. It dropped because the thought finally occurred that if the US Federal Reserve whacks up interest rates as far and as fast as the financial markets are demanding, high inflation might be cured by putting the US into recession.

It’s true that when central banks try to cool an overheating economy by jamming on the interest-rate brakes, they often overdo it and precipitate a recession.

But a few other things are also true. One is Paul Samuelson’s famous quip that the sharemarket has predicted nine of the past five recessions. As the pandemic has taught us to say, it has a high rate of “false positives”. Assume that a sharemarket correction equals a recession, and you’ll do a lot more worrying than you need to.

In truth, the chances of a US recession are quite high. But another truth is that the days when a recession in the US spelt recession in Australia are long gone. Our financial markets are heavily influenced by America, but our exports and imports aren’t. Remember, during our almost 30 years without a serious recession, the Yanks had several.

China, however, is a different matter, and its continuing strength is looking dodgy. But even though a Chinese recession would be bad news for our exports, of itself that shouldn’t be sufficient to drop us into recession.

That’s particularly so because much of the blow from a drop in our mining export income would be borne by the foreigners who own most of our mining industry. It would be a different matter if modern mining employed many workers, or paid much in royalties, income tax and resource rent tax.

Remember, too, that contrary to what Paul Keating tried telling us, all recessions happen by accident. The politician who thinks a recession would improve their chances of re-election has yet to be born. And few central bank bosses think a recession would look good on their CV.

They occur mainly because an attempt to use higher interest rates to slow an overheated economy goes too far and the planned “soft landing” ends with us hitting the runway with a bump. It follows that the greatest risk we face is that the urgers in the financial markets (the ones whose decision rule is that whatever the US does, we should do) will con the Reserve Bank into raising interest rates higher than needed.

But I’m sure Reserve governor Dr Philip Lowe is alive to the risk of overdoing the tightening.

He mustn’t fall for the claim that, because a combination of fiscal stimulus and an economy temporarily closed to all imported labour has left us with a record level of job vacancies and rate of labour under-utilisation of 9.6 per cent, the economy is “red hot”.

Is it red hot when almost all the rise in prices is imported inflation caused by temporary global supply constraints? Or when the latest wage price index shows wages soaring by 2.4 per cent a year and all the Reserve’s tea-leaf reading shows wages rising by three-point-something? And (if you actually read it right, which most of the media didn’t), last week’s annual wage review awarded the bottom quarter of employees a pay rise of 4.6 per cent, not 5.2 per cent.

Is it red hot when employers are reported to be offering bonuses and non-economic incentives to attract or retain staff? That is, when they aren’t so desperate they feel a need actually to offer higher wage rates. Or is it when oligopolised businesses are still claiming they can “afford” pay rises of only 2 per cent or so and, predictably, there’s been no talk of strikes?

Is an economy “overheating” and “red hot” when real wages are likely to fall even further? That is, when the nation’s households will be forced by their lack of bargaining power to absorb much of the temporary rise in imported inflation (plus, the delayed effects of drought and floods on meat and vegetable prices)?

And, we’re asked to believe, households will be madly spending their $250 billion in excess savings despite the rising cost of living, falling real wages, rising interest rates, talk of imminent recession and falling house prices. Seriously?

No, what’s most likely isn’t a recession, just a return to the weak growth we experienced for many years before the pandemic, thanks to what people are calling “demand destruction” by our caring-and-sharing senior executive class.

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Saturday, June 18, 2022

Why Albanese needs to protect capitalism from the capitalists

One of the first things Anthony Albanese and his cabinet have to decide is whether the government will be “pro-business” or “pro-market”. If he wants to make our economy work better for all Australians, not just those at the top of the economic tree, Albanese will be pro-market, not pro-business – which ain’t the same as saying he should be anti-business. Confused? Read on.

It’s clear Albanese wants to lead a less confrontational, more consultative and inclusive government – which is fine. He’ll bring back into the tent some groups the Morrison-led Coalition government seemed to regard as enemies: the unions, the universities and the charities.

Conversely, it’s obvious he wants to retain big business within the tent – as, of course, it always is with the Liberals. Business is so powerful the sensible end of Labor never wants to get it offside.

Trouble is, over the years in which the Hawke-Keating government’s commitment to “economic rationalism” degenerated into “neo-liberalism”, big business got used to usually getting its own way – even if the process needed to be lubricated with generous donations to party funds.

If Albanese is genuine in wanting to govern for all Australians, he’ll have to get big business used to being listened to but not blindly obeyed. Which means he and his ministers will have to resist the temptation of having the generous donations diverted in the direction of whichever party happens to be in power.

Labor could do worse than study a recent speech, Restoring our market economy to work for all Australians, by the former boss of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Rod Sims. He is now a professor at the Australian National University’s inestimable Crawford School of Public Policy, home to many of the nation’s most useful former public servants.

Sims starts with an important disclaimer: “I am a strong proponent of a market economy. All the alternatives do not work well. Further, our market economy has delivered significant benefits to all Australians.

“For it to endure, however, it needs improvement. Without this, it and our society will be under threat.”

Couldn’t have said it better myself. Sometimes people criticise an institution not because they hate it, but because they love it and don’t want to see it go astray. And capitalism is too important to the well-being of all of us to be left to the capitalists.

So, what’s the problem? “Running a market economy, where companies are motivated by profit, can only work as expected if there is sufficient competition, and we don’t have this now. We currently have too few companies competing to serve customers in the markets for many products; we need policies that promote competition, not thwart it,” Sims says.

A market-based economy is one where decisions regarding investment, production and distribution to consumers are guided by the price signals created by the forces of supply and demand, he explains.

But here’s the key proviso on which the satisfactory functioning of such an arrangement is based: “An underlying assumption is that there are many suppliers competing to meet consumer demands.”

Right now, that assumption isn’t being met. Sims quotes Martin Wolf, of the Financial Times, saying “what has emerged over the last 40 years is not free-market capitalism, but a predatory form of monopoly capitalism. Capitalists will, alas, always prefer monopoly. Only the state can restore the competition we need.”

What? Wolf is some kind of socialist? Of course not. Sims puts it more clearly: “A market economy also needs the right regulation in place so that companies pursue profit within clear guardrails.” We need some changes to Australian consumer law to provide these guardrails, particularly an unfair practices provision.

Market concentration – meaning there are only a few dominant companies seeking to meet the needs of consumers in many product markets – is high in Australia. “Think banking, beer, groceries, mobile service providers, aviation, rail freight, energy retailing, internet search, mobile app stores and so much more,” Sims says.

He quotes the Harvard economist Michael Porter, a corporate strategy expert, writing as long ago as 1979 that companies achieve commercial success by finding ways to reduce competition, by raising barriers to entry by new players, by lowering the bargaining power of suppliers including their workforce [No! he didn’t include screwing their own workers, did he?] and by locking in the consumers of their products and services.

“Companies don’t want markets . . . with many suppliers all with relatively equal bargaining power,” Sims says. “Instead, what firms seek is market power where they can price, or pay their suppliers, as they want, without being constrained by other competing companies.

“They seek above-normal profits based on using some form of market power.”

This is not controversial, he says. “Every businessperson would agree. None wants to work in a competitive market where they simply seek to outperform their competitors. They want an edge from some form of market power.”

Too much market power in our economy can cause a range of harms to many Australians and to our society. “The most obvious harm is higher prices, which occur particularly when supply is limited relative to demand.

“When supply is plentiful, however, market power means pressure comes on workers and other suppliers.”

Sims points to the way the profits share of national income has been rising at the expense of the wages share. He also notes concerns about the lack of innovation in Australia, as well as our low productivity.

Guess what? When so many markets are dominated by a few big firms, the resulting lack of competitive pressure reduces the incentives to invest, create new products and do other things that increase productivity.

The message for the new government is clear: keep giving big business what it wants – weak merger and competition laws, plus prohibitions on union activity – and the economy will continue performing poorly. Profits will keep growing while household income shrinks.

And it will prove what the Liberals have always said: Labor’s no good at running the economy.

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Thursday, June 16, 2022

THE GLOBAL ECONOMY

Aurora College Economics HSC Study Day, Sydney

Every year there’s some event in the news that’s relevant to your study of the global economy, and this year it’s Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This has combined with the continuing disruptions to supply caused by the pandemic to greatly increase imported inflation in all the advanced economies. These supply-side price rises have interacted with the huge fiscal stimulus the rich countries used to support their economies during the lockdowns to give them worries about continuing high rates of inflation. Most of the advanced economies have been increasing interest rates to slow their economy’s growth and ensure inflation does not become entrenched.

There’s nothing new or special about one country attacking another, but the invasion of Ukraine has major implications for the global economy for two reasons. First, because Russia is a major supplier of oil and gas to Europe, and the reduction of this trade has caused big increases in the world prices of all fossil fuels. Russia and Ukraine are also major exporters of wheat and other food, and the reduction in this trade is raising world prices and causing many countries to worry about having enough food. Second, world trade has been further disrupted by many countries siding with Ukraine and imposing economic sanctions on Russia, including restraints on its financial transactions. The point is that our more globalised world economy – where countries are more closely integrated by trade and financial flows – has caused a war between two countries to significantly affect far more economies than would have happened in earlier times.

The pandemic

It’s the same story with the pandemic. There’s nothing new about epidemics starting in one country then spreading to many other countries. It’s been happening for millennia. Even so, it’s the world’s worst pandemic since the “Spanish” flu epidemic immediately after World War I, and the first where the greater economic integration of the world’s countries – and particularly, the huge number of people at any time flying around the world on jumbo jets – caused the virus to reach all corners of the world in a few weeks rather than years. But globalisation and co-operation between pharmaceutical companies in different advanced economies – plus billions in government subsidies – have also helped us produce effective vaccines in record time, thus greatly reducing the pandemic’s economic and social disruption.

With the pandemic now in its third year, it’s easier to see its effect on world trade. International trade fell after the start of the pandemic in 2020, but recovered sharply in 2021, to be back to pre-pandemic levels in 2022. However, not all countries and not all products are back to where they were. In many countries, the lockdowns saw a surge in demand for goods (which could be bought without leaving home) and a corresponding decline in demand for services (many of which couldn’t be, including tourism, overseas education, and live entertainment). The sudden surge in demand for imported goods (including cars) led to shortages of shipping containers and ships, and hence delays and higher prices. There was a worldwide shortage of semiconductors (chips). Many other shortages and bottlenecks occurred, but these are being resolved. However, China’s continuing difficulties in controlling the virus via lockdowns, is likely to lead to continuing supply shortages in the rest of the world and possibly a recession in the Chinese economy.

Definition

The OECD defines globalisation as “the economic integration of different countries through growing freedom of movement across national borders of goods, services, capital, ideas and people”.

That’s a good definition, but I like my own: globalisation is the process by which the natural and government-created barriers between national economies are being broken down.

Globalisation’s two driving forces

With this definition I’m trying to make a few points. One is that globalisation has had two quite different driving forces. The one we hear most about is the decisions of governments around the world to break down the barriers they have created to limit flows of goods and money between countries by reducing their protection of domestic industries and by deregulating their financial markets and floating their currencies.

But the second factor promoting globalisation is just as important, if not more so: advances in technology – including advances in telecommunications, digitisation and the internet, which have hugely reduced the cost of moving information and news around the world, as well as increasing the speed of its movement. This has allowed a huge increase in trade in digitised services. As well, advances in shipping – containerisation, bigger and more fuel-efficient ships – and in air transport have led to increased movement of goods and people between countries.  

Globalisation is a process

Another point my definition makes is that globalisation is a process, not a set state of being. Because it’s a process, it can go forward – the world can become more globalised – or it can go backwards, as national governments, under pressure from their electorates, seek to stop or even reverse the process of economic integration. Among the advocates of globalisation there has tended to be an assumption that the process of ever greater integration is inevitable and inexorable. That was always a mistaken notion.

Earlier globalisation

The process of globalisation is and always was reversible. People should know this because this isn’t the first time the process of globalisation has occurred and then been rolled back. The decades leading up to World War I saw reduced barriers and greatly increased flows of goods, funds and people between the old world of Europe and the new world of America, Australia and other countries. But this integration was brought to a halt in 1914 by the onset of a world war. And the period of beggar-thy-neighbour increases in trade protection, to which countries resorted in response to the Great Depression of the early 1930s, greatly increased the barriers between national economies. Indeed, in the years after World War II, the many rounds of multilateral tariff reductions brought about under the GATT – the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which has since become the World Trade Organisation – were intended to dismantle all the barriers to trade built up in the period between the wars.

The era of hyperglobalisation

The period between the end of World War II in 1945 and the late 1980s saw huge growth in trade between the advanced economies, as a consequence of those successive rounds of tariff reductions. But from the late ’80s until the global financial crisis and Great Recession of 2008 there was a period of “hyperglobalisation” in which trade between the developed and developing countries grew hugely. This was partly because of the way the digital revolution and other technological change broke down the natural barriers between countries. But also the result of the eighth and final “Uruguay round” of the GATT in 1994 reducing tariff and other trade barriers between the developed and developing countries.  Many poor countries joined the new WTO at this time, with China joining in 2001.

One measure of the extent of globalisation is the growth in two-way trade between countries (exports plus imports) as a proportion of gross world product (world GDP). Between 1990 and 2008, global trade rose from 39 pc to 61 pc of GWP – the period of rapid globalisation.

Note that the poor countries did well out of the quarter-century of rapid globalisation. Between 1995 and 2019, real GDP per person in the emerging economies more than doubled, whereas in the advanced economies it grew by only 44 pc (after allowing for differences in purchasing power).

The era of deglobalisation

But the end of hyperglobalisation can be dated to the global financial crisis in 2008, and the new era of “deglobalisation” has continued during the pandemic. Two-way trade as a proportion GWP fell after the global financial crisis, and even by 2019 had not regained its peak in 2008.

Among the signs of deglobalisation are Britain’s vote in 2016 to leave the European Union – Brexit – and thus to reduce its degree of economic integration with the rest of Europe – a decision most outsiders see as involving a significant economic cost to the Brits’ economy. Second, the Trump administration withdrew from the Trans Pacific Partnership, an agreement between the US and 11 other selected countries (including Australia) to reduce barriers to trade between them – although the remaining 11 finalised an agreement without the US.  Third, the Trump administration withdrew from the Paris global agreement on reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Fourth, Trump launched a trade war with China. President Biden has re-joined the Paris agreement and repaired America’s relations with its allies, but continues the contest with China.

The temptation of returning to protectionism

The period of hyperglobalisation saw the shift of much manufacturing from the rich countries (including Australia) to China and other developing countries with cheaper labour. But it’s likely that, in the period of slower growth that followed the global financial crisis, some countries yielded to the temptation to return to protecting their domestic industries against foreign competition, returning to the (failed) strategy of growth through “import replacement” rather than “export-led” growth. Regrettably, this trend is being led by the two biggest developing economies, China and India. China has raised its import barriers against many Australian exports.

This trend has continued during the pandemic, with The Economist magazine reporting that countries have passed more than 140 special trade restrictions during the pandemic. Some of these may arise from concerns in the rich countries over the lack of availability of personal protective equipment, or vaccines. Worries about the pandemic’s disruption of global supply chains may be another reason for the return of protectionist attitudes in the advanced economies.

The channels of globalisation

The four main economic channels through which the world’s economies have become more integrated are:

1) Trade in goods and services

2) Finance and investment

3) Labour

4) Information, news and ideas.

Trade is probably the channel that gets most attention from the public. Donald Trump’s populist campaigning against globalisation focused on the belief that America’s greater openness to trade – particularly with developing countries – has caused it to lose many jobs, particularly in manufacturing, as cheaper imports caused many domestic producers to lose sales, or as factories have been moved offshore to countries where wages are lower, without America receiving anything much in return.

Surprisingly, financial globalisation didn’t get as much blame as it could have for the global financial crisis and the Great Recession it precipitated. Most countries have not liberalised the flow of labour into their economy in the way they have the other factors of production.

Income distribution and the gains from trade

One of economists’ core beliefs is that there are mutual gains from trade. Provided the exchange of goods is voluntary, each side participates only because it sees some advantage for itself. This is undoubtedly true, but in the era of renewed globalisation we’ve been reminded that, though the gains may be mutual, they are not necessarily equal. Some countries do better than others.

Similarly, the benefits to a particular country from its trade aren’t necessarily equally distributed between the people within that country. When, for example, a country imports more of its manufactured goods because they are cheaper than its locally made goods, all the consumers who buy those goods are better off (including all the working people), but many workers in the domestic manufacturing industry may lose their jobs.

Another factor that has been working in the same direction is digitisation and other technological change which, in its effect on employers’ demand for labour, seems to be “skill-biased” – that is, it tends to increase the value of highly skilled labour, while reducing the value of less-skilled labour. It seems likely that, between them, trade and technological advance have worked to shift the distribution of income in America, Britain and, to a lesser extent, Australia, in favour of high-income families and against many middle and lower-income families.

The unwelcome surprise many politicians and economists have received from the high protest votes for Brexit, Trump and One Nation is causing them to wonder if too little has been done to assist the workers and regions adversely affected to retrain and relocate, and too little to ensure the winners from structural change bear most of the cost of this assistance.

Shares of the World Economy, 2021


GWP Exports Population


China          19   13     18

United States   16     9         4

Euro area (19 countries)   12   26         4

India     7     2       18

Japan     4     3         2



Advanced economies (40) 42   61       14

Developing economies (156) 58   39       86

            100 100     100


Source: IMF WEO statistical appendix; GWP based on purchasing power parity                 


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