Showing posts with label foreign investment. Show all posts
Showing posts with label foreign investment. Show all posts

Friday, June 28, 2024

How and why the tide of globalisation has turned

Politicians banging on about “security” should always be suspected of having ulterior motives, but when you to see the secretary to the Treasury giving a speech on security, that’s when you know the world has changed radically.

That’s what Treasury secretary Dr Steven Kennedy did last week. It was a sign of how much the distinction between economic issues and defence and foreign affairs has blurred as rivalry between the United States and China has grown.

We used to think of “Australia in the Asian century” as one big opportunity for us to make a buck but, Kennedy says, “we are facing a more contested, more fragmented and more challenging global environment, where trade is increasingly seen as a vulnerability as much as an opportunity”.

“In light of these challenges, it is incumbent on Australian policymakers to work together to develop sound policy frameworks and institutional arrangements that match the times. That take the long view and protect both economic and strategic interests,” he says.

We must strike a fine balance, he says. “If we fail to adequately adapt and respond to the new reality we face, we risk exposing our economy and our country to excessive risk...”

But “if we over-correct and adopt a zero-risk approach, shutting ourselves out of global markets and seeking to be overly self-sufficient, we will quickly undermine the productivity, competitiveness and dynamism of our economy,” he says.

Our economy benefited from decades of rising prosperity as international economic integration – globalisation – flourished under a stable, rules-based international order.

At the same time, economic reforms opened our economy to global competition by cutting tariffs (import duties), floating the exchange rate and deregulating the financial system.

But now, “tectonic shifts in the global economic order are underway” as the engines of global growth have shifted from west to east. China has gone from accounting for about 6 per cent of growth in the global economy in 1981, to more than 25 per cent today.

The United States’ share of growth has fallen from 26 per cent to 13 per cent.

However, this move to a more multipolar global order has brought with it “a sharpening of geostrategic [country versus country] competition and a far more contested set of global rules, norms and institutions,” Kennedy says.

As Treasurer Jim Chalmers has said, we are facing “the most challenging strategic environment since World War II” after a difficult decade and a half punctuated by the unmistakable signs of climate change, a pandemic and a European war, which exposed fragilities in our supply chains.

In this changing world, economic resilience – the capacity to withstand and recover quickly from shocks to the economy – is an essential component of assuring our national security.

The trade wars between the US and China during the Trump years have sharpened into an overt strategic rivalry and a contest for global influence.

The US has said it is not seeking to decouple from China – due to the significant negative global repercussions of a full separation – but is “de-risking and diversifying” by investing at home and strengthening linkages with allies and partners around the world.

In this new paradigm, Kennedy says, economic and financial tools are being deployed much more aggressively to promote and defend national interests.

According to the International Monetary Fund, more than 2500 new policies were introduced last year in response to concerns about supply chains, the climate and security. Since 2018, measures restricting trade flows have outnumbered measures that liberalise trade by about three to one.

Our primary economic and strategic (defence) partners are no longer the same. China now accounts for 30 per cent of our two-way (exports plus imports) trade, whereas the G7 countries combined account for just 26 per cent. China is now a larger trading partner than the US for more than 140 countries.

In the new world of greater rivalry, there is a small set of our systems, goods and technologies that are critical to the smooth operation of our economy and to the security of our country. Systems that are vulnerable to interventions and where a disruption could impact lives and threaten our national interest in a time of conflict.

In these parts of the economy there’s a clear role for government in regulating their operation and their ownership. This approach is called the “small yard, high fence” strategy, where a strong set of protections are put around a few critical economic activities.

But the key challenge in these types of reforms is to prevent overreach. The risk of foreign disruption has to be balanced in such a way that economic activity is not unnecessarily curtailed.

And there’s also a different kind of risk: that these types of regulatory regimes could be used as a form of industry protection, or to respond to community pressure, rather than to address genuine security risks.

Whereas our security and intelligence agencies are best placed to understand the vulnerabilities in our systems and the methods most likely to be used to exploit those vulnerabilities – including as part of the foreign investment screening process – they need to be in partnership with economic experts, such as Treasury.

We can’t afford to take the attitude that there should be zero risk of problems, nor dismiss the long-term economic costs of these restrictions.

There should be a high bar for what government puts inside the protected yard and each decision should be carefully weighed, we’re told, with both benefits and costs considered.

As for supply chain problems, it’s often argued that countries should build sovereign capability in areas of risk. This is often argued with little consideration of other ways of solving the problem, or of the cost of doing so.

But as Treasurer Chalmers has made clear, a Future Made in Australia cannot mean pursuing self-reliance in all things. That would undermine our key economic strengths and leave us less able to exercise strategic weight, not more.

Security, it turns out, is too important to be left to diplomats and generals.

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Friday, June 16, 2023

We're investing more overseas than foreigners are investing here

 For pretty much all of Australia’s modern history, our strategy for getting more prosperous was to be a “net importer of [investment] capital” from the rest of the world. But four years ago, that was turned on its head, and we became a net exporter of investment capital.

If you think that doesn’t sound like a good thing, I agree with you – though probably not for the same reason as you. I think it does much to explain why the economy – and the productivity of our labour – have grown so weakly over the past decade. And are likely to continue growing slowly once the Reserve Bank has beaten inflation out of our system.

How come you haven’t heard about this historic turnaround? Because, though economists hate to admit it, economics is subject to fashions, and for many years they haven’t been much interested in talking about what’s happening in the economy’s “external sector”, which accounts for about a quarter of the whole economy.

All of Australia’s households’, businesses’ and governments’ economic dealings with the rest of the world during a period are summarised in a document called the “balance of payments” – payments to foreigners and payments from foreigners.

The balance of payments is divided into two accounts, the “current” account and the “capital and financial” account.

The current account shows the value of our exports of goods and services ($171 billion in the latest, March quarter) less the value of our imports of goods and services ($129 billion), to give us a trade surplus for the quarter of $42 billion.

But then it takes account of our interest and dividend payments to foreigners of $57 billion, less their payments of interest and dividends to us of $24 billion, to give us a “net income deficit” of $33 billion.

Subtracting this deficit from the trade surplus of $42 billion leaves us with a surplus on the current account for the quarter of $9 billion.

So, we ended up making a profit during the quarter, as we have in every quarter for the past four years, whereas for almost every year before that we ran deficits. We’ve made some progress.

Is that what you think? Sorry, as the father of economics, Adam Smith – born 300 years ago this year – spent his life explaining, this “mercantilist” notion that a country gets rich by trying to export more than it imports is wrong.

We benefit from importing the things that other countries do better than we do, and they benefit from us exporting to them the things we do better than they do. Economists call this the “mutual gains from trade”.

In any case, like the accounts of every business, the balance of payments is based on “double-entry bookkeeping”, where every transaction is seen as having two, equal sides, a debit and a credit. So, it’s wrong to think that debits are bad and credits are good.

Similarly, it’s wrong to think that the resulting deficits (debits exceed the credits) are bad, and surpluses (credits exceed the debits) are good.

And remember that the “current” account is only one half of the balance of payments so, since the debits and credits are always equal, if we’re running a surplus on the current account, we must be running a deficit of equal size on the other, capital and financial account.

Until four years ago, we always ran a surplus on the capital account, but now we’re running a deficit. But what does this switch actually mean?

It means that, until recently, our households, businesses and governments always spent more on investment – in new housing, new business equipment and structures, and new public infrastructure – than they could finance from their own savings.

(Households save when they don’t spend all their income on consumption. Businesses save when they don’t pay out all their after-tax profits in dividends. Governments save when they raise more in taxes than they spend on their day-to-day activities.)

How can we, as a nation, spend more on new physical investment than we’re able to finance with our own saving? By getting the extra savings we need from abroad. We can borrow it, or we can allow foreigners to own Australian businesses or real estate.

And that’s exactly what we did until four years ago. We borrowed overseas and let foreigners own “equity” in our economy. This is what it means to say Australia was a “net importer of capital”.

Why did we do that? Because we had more opportunities for economic development than we could finance from our own saving, and figured that allowing foreigners to join us in investing in our economy would leave us better off.

The consequence was that, for more than 200 years, our economy grew faster and our standard of living improved faster than if we’d kept everything to ourselves.

So, what’s changed? Why have we switched to being a net exporter of investment capital? Why have we begun investing more of our savings in other countries than they’ve been investing in Oz?

Partly because the build-up of our compulsory superannuation system means we, as a nation, are saving a lot more of our income than we used to.

Now here’s the killer: but also because, particularly since the end of the mining investment boom a decade ago, we’ve been investing a lot less in improving and expanding our businesses.

You wonder why, until the government and the Reserve Bank mistakenly caused the present brief inflationary surge, the economy’s growth was so weak? Now you know.

You wonder why the productivity of our labour’s been improving so slowly? Because we haven’t had enough business investment in new and better machines. Or in research and development, for that matter.

And the main thing we’ve got to show for this deterioration is a current account surplus. You beaut.

Read more >>

Friday, December 3, 2021

A quick economic rebound seems assured - but then what?

The good news in this week’s “national accounts” for the three months to end-September is that the Delta-induced contraction in the economy was a lot less than feared – not just by the financial market economists (whose guesses are usually wrong) but by the far more high-powered econocrats in Treasury and the Reserve Bank. So now it’s onward and upward.

According to figures from the Australian Bureau of Statistics, real gross domestic product – the economy’s total production of goods and services – fell by 1.9 per cent in September quarter, thanks to the lockdowns in Sydney, Melbourne and Canberra.

This contraction of 1.9 per cent compares with the fall of 6.8 per cent in the June quarter of last year, caused by the initial, nationwide lockdown. We know that, as soon as that lockdown ended, the economy rebounded strongly in the second half of last year, and kept growing in the first half of this year – until the Delta variant came along and upset our plans.

So we have every reason to be confident the economy will rebound just as strongly in the present December quarter now the latest lockdowns have ended. We’ve yet to assess and respond to the latest, Omicron variant but, now so many of us are vaccinated, it shouldn’t require anything as drastic as further lockdowns.

We can be confident of another rebound not just because we now understand that the contractions caused by temporary, government-ordered, health-related lockdowns bear little relationship to ordinary recessions, but also because the early indicators we’ve seen for October and November – including those for what matters most, jobs – tell us the rebound’s already started.

In ordinary recessions, it can take the government months to realise there is a recession and start trying to pump the economy back up. With a government-ordered lockdown, the government knows what this will do to reduce economic activity so, from the outset, it acts to make up for the loss of income to workers and businesses.

As with all contractions, most people keep their jobs and their incomes and so keep spending. In a lockdown, however, they’re prevented from doing much spending by being told to stay at home.

This means everyone has plenty they could spend – even people whose employment has been disrupted. So their savings and bank balances build up, waiting until they’re allowed to start consuming again. When the lockdown ends, the floodgates open and they spend big.

After last year’s lockdown, the proportion of their income being saved by the nation’s households leapt to more than 23 per cent, up from less than 10 per cent. Over the following four quarters, it fell to less than 12 per cent.

What we learnt this week is that, following the latest lockdown, the household saving ratio jumped back to almost 20 per cent. So there’s no doubt households are cashed up and ready to spend.

The main drop during the September quarter was in consumer spending (down 4.8 per cent), with business investment spending down 1.1 per cent, and housing investment treading water. Even so, earlier government support measures mean the outlook for business and housing investment spending remains good.

Why was the blow from the latest lockdown so much smaller than that from last year’s? Mainly because it only applied to about half the economy. The other states grew by a very healthy 1.6 per cent during the quarter.

But the main reason this year’s contraction proved smaller than economists were expecting seems to be that businesses and households have “learnt to live with” lockdowns. We now know they’re temporary and we’ve found ways to get on with things as much as possible.

Businesses have thought twice about parting with staff, only to have trouble getting them back. Businesses have become better at using the internet to keep selling stuff and consumers better at using the net to keep buying.

The volume (quantity) of our exports rose during the quarter and the volume of our imports fell sharply, meaning that “net exports” (exports minus imports) made a positive contribution to growth during the quarter of 1 percentage point.

However, this was more than countered by a fall in the level of business inventories, which subtracted 1.3 percentage points from growth. The two seem connected.

The fall in imports seems mainly explained by temporary pandemic-related constraints in supply. And inventory levels are down mainly for the same reason. Seems cars are the chief offender.

Our “terms of trade” – the prices we receive for our exports relative to the prices we pay for our imports – improved a little during the quarter to give a 23 per cent improvement since September last year.

Both the improvement in our terms of trade and the improvement in net exports help explain some news we got earlier in the week: the current account on our balance of payments (a summary record of all the financial transactions between Australia and the rest of the world) rose by $1 billion to a record $23.9 billion surplus during the quarter.


The surplus on our trade in goods and services rose to almost $39 billion and, while our “net income deficit” (the interest and dividends we paid to foreigners minus the interest and dividends they paid us) rose to more than $14 billion, that was a lot less than it used to be.

If you think that sounds like good news, you have more economics to learn. We’ve run current account deficits for almost all the years since white settlement because, until recent years, we’ve been a “capital-importing country”.

The sad truth is, in recent years we’ve been saving more than we’ve needed to fund investment in the expansion of our economy, so we’ve been investing more in other people’s economies than they’ve been investing in ours.

But that’s because we haven’t had much investment of our own. The rebound to a growing economy seems assured, but returning to the old normal isn’t looking like being all that flash.

Read more >>

Saturday, June 27, 2020

We should get a fair share of foreign investors' profits

Australia has been a recipient of foreign investment in almost every year since the arrival of the First Fleet in 1788. Yet for much of that time the idea of foreigners being allowed to own so much of our businesses, mines, farms and land is one many ordinary Australians have found hard to accept.

For older Australians, the thought of “selling off the farm” to foreigners makes them distinctly uncomfortable. Why can’t we do it ourselves and own it ourselves?

The short answer is, we could. But had we chosen that path we wouldn’t be nearly as prosperous today as we are. As the Productivity Commission reminds us in a paper published this week, you need money to set up a business, let alone a whole industry.

That money has to be saved by spending less than all your income on consumption. And had we been relying solely on our own saving, we’d have been able to develop much less of this vast continent than we have done. So, from the days when we were a British colony and had no say in the matter, we’ve invited foreigners to bring their savings to Australia and join us in exploiting the golden soil and other of nature’s gifts with which our land abounds.

Total foreign direct investment – that is, where the foreigner owns enough of the shares in a company to have some control over its management – is now worth about $1 trillion. The largest sources of direct investment are, in order, the United States, Japan and Britain. In recent years, of course, most of the action – and the angst – comes from China.

The less poetic way to put it is that Australia has been a “net importer of capital” for more than two centuries. It’s thus not so surprising that, despite whatever reservations ordinary Australians may have, the dominant view among our politicians, business people and economists has been that we must keep doing whatever it takes to attract the foreign investment we need to keep the economy expanding strongly.

For many years it was felt that we always run a deficit on our balance of trade in goods and services with the rest of the world, so we always need to attract sufficient net inflow of foreign capital to be sure of financing that trade deficit – as well as covering all the regular payments of dividends and interest we need to make to the foreigners who have invested in local businesses or have lent us money.

This mentality made sense in the days when we had a “fixed exchange rate” – when the government, via the Reserve Bank, set the value of our country’s currency relative to other countries’ currencies – particularly the British pound and, later, the US dollar – and changed that value only very rarely in situations where it couldn’t be maintained.

The point is that when you choose to fix the price of your currency, you do have to worry about getting sufficient net inflow of foreign capital to cover the deficit on the “current account” of the “balance of payments”. Should you fail to attract sufficient inflow, you’re forced into the ignominy of cutting the price you’ve fixed.

Now, this problem went away a long time ago. In 1983, after we’d been having a lot of trouble keeping our exchange rate fixed and our balance of payments in balance, we decided to join most of the other advanced economies in allowing the value (or price) of our currency to float up and down according to the strength of the rest of the world’s demand for the Australian dollar (the Aussie, as it’s called in the foreign exchange market) relative to the supply of it.

From that day, the two sides of our balance of payments – the current account and the capital account – were in balance, the deficit on one matched exactly by the surplus on the other, at all times. How? Because the price of the Aussie adjusted continuously to ensure they were.

The “balance of payments constraint”, which had worried the managers of our economy for so long, just evaporated. But here’s the point: the attitude that we must always be doing as much as we can to attract as much foreign investment as possible continued unabated.

There’s this notion that, in the now highly competitive, globalised financial markets, if poor little Australia doesn’t try really, really hard, we’ll miss out.

This, of course, is the reasoning behind the unending push by big business for us to cut the rate of our company tax. Our system of “dividend imputation” means Australian shareholders have nothing to gain from a lower company tax rate. The only beneficiaries would be foreign shareholders because they aren’t eligible for “franking credits”.

We’re asked to believe that how well the level of the nominal rate of our company tax compares with other countries’ rates is the main factor determining whether we get all the foreign investment we need. Not even how the tax breaks we offer compare matters much, apparently.

I don’t believe it. It’s a try-on. As the Productivity Commission’s paper reminds us: “Foreigners invest in Australia because of our fast-growing and well-educated population, rich natural resource base, and stable cultural and legal environment.”

Just so. Mining companies flock to Australia because we have the high-quality, easily-won minerals and energy they need. The idea that global companies such as Google or Amazon would give Australia a miss because our company tax rate’s too high is laughable. Especially when they’re so adept at minimising the tax they pay in advanced countries.

We should take a more hard-nosed, business-like attitude towards foreign investors such as the miners, which make huge profits but employ very few workers. When state governments fall over themselves building infrastructure for them and offering royalty holidays and other inducements, it matters greatly how much company tax they pay before they ship their profits back home.
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Saturday, June 13, 2020

The tables have turned in our economic dealings with the world

If you know your economic onions, you know that our economy has long run a deficit in trade with the rest of the world which, when you add our net payments of interest and dividends to foreigners, means we’ve long run a deficit on the current account of our balance of payments and, as a consequence, have a huge and growing foreign debt.

Except that this familiar story has been falling apart for the past five years, and is no longer true. In that time, our economic dealings with the rest of the world have been turned on their head.

Last week the Australian Bureau of Statistics announced that we’d actually run a surplus on the current account of $8.4 billion in March quarter. Does that surprise you? It shouldn’t because it was the fourth quarterly surplus in a row.

But that should surprise you because the first of those surpluses, for the June quarter last year, was the first surplus in 44 years. And now we’ve clocked up four in a row, that’s the first 12-month surplus we’ve run since 1973.

Of course, when the balance on a country’s current account turns from deficit to surplus, its net foreign liabilities to the rest of the world stop going up and start going down.

What’s brought about this remarkable transformation? Various factors, the greatest of which is our decade-long resources boom, which occurred because the rapid development of China’s economy led to hugely increased demand for our coal, natural gas and iron ore.

A massive rise in the world prices of those commodities, which began in 2004 and continued until 2011, prompted a boom in the construction of new mines and gas facilities which peaked in 2013. From then on, the volume of our exports of minerals and energy grew strongly as new mines came online.

But while our mining exports expanded greatly, the completion of the new mines and gas facilities meant a fall in our extensive imports of expensive mining equipment. As a consequence, our balance of trade in goods and services – which between 1980 and 2015 averaged a deficit equivalent to 1.25 per cent of gross domestic product – has been in surplus ever since.

The rise of China’s middle class gets much of the credit for another development that’s helped our trade balance: strong growth in our exports of services, particularly inbound tourism and the sale of education to overseas students.

When our country has gone since white settlement as a net importer of foreign financial capital – which has been necessary because our own savings haven’t been sufficient to fund all the physical investment needed to take full advantage of our country’s huge potential for economy development – it’s not surprising we have a lot of foreign investment in Australian businesses and have borrowed a lot of money from foreigners.

In which case, it’s not surprising that every quarter we have to pay foreigners a lot more in interest and dividends on their investments in our economy than they have to pay us on our investments in their economies.

This “net income deficit” – which is the other main component of the current account - has grown enormously since the breakdown of the post-World War II “Bretton Woods” system of fixed exchange rates prompted us to float our dollar in 1983 and started a revolution in banks and businesses in one country lending and investing in other countries, including the rise of multinational corporations.

That was when Australia’s net foreign debt started rising rapidly and the net income deficit began to dominate our current account. The net income deficit has averaged a massive 3.4 per cent of GDP since the late 1980s.

It hasn’t changed much since the tables started turning five years ago. Except for one thing. The rapid growth in our superannuation funds since the introduction of compulsory employee super in the early 1990s has seen so much Australian investment in the shares of foreign companies that, since 2013, the value of our “equity” investment in other countries’ companies has exceeded the value of more than two centuries of other countries’ investment in our companies.

At March 31, Australia had net foreign equity assets worth $338 billion. You’d expect this to have significantly reduced our quarterly net income deficit, but it hasn’t. Why not? Because the dividends we earn on our investments in foreign companies aren’t as great as the dividends foreigners earn on their ownership of our companies. Why not? Because our hugely profitable mining industry is three-quarters foreign-owned.

If you add our net foreign equity assets and our net foreign debt to get our net foreign liabilities, they’ve been falling as a percentage of GDP for the past decade. If you look at the absolute dollar amount, just since December 2018 it’s fallen by more than 20 per cent.

If all this sounds too good to be true, it’s certainly not as good as it looks. The final major factor helping to explain the improvement in our external position is the weakness in the economy over the 18 months before the arrival of the virus shock.

The alternative way to see what’s happening in our dealings with the rest of the world is to focus on what’s happening to national saving relative to national (physical) investment. That’s because the difference between how much the nation saves and how much it invests equals the balance on the current account.

Turns out that national investment has fallen in recent times (business investment is weak, home building has collapsed and government investment in infrastructure is falling back) while national saving has increased (households have been saving more, mining companies have been retaining much of their high profits, and governments have been increasing their operating surpluses).

So much so that the nation is now saving more than it’s investing, giving us a current account surplus. But this is a recipe for weaker not faster “jobs and growth”.
Read more >>

Saturday, October 12, 2019

Why surpluses aren't necessarily good, or deficits bad

According to the Essential opinion poll, only 6 per cent of people regard the size of the national surplus as the most important indicator of the state of the economy. I think that’s good news, but I’m not certain because I’m not sure what “the national surplus” is – or what the respondents to the poll took it to mean.

They probably thought it referred to the balance on the federal government’s budget. But the federal budget is not yet back to surplus and, in any case, it can’t be the national surplus because it takes no account of the budgets of the state governments that, with the feds, make up the nation.

Assuming respondents took it to be the federal budget balance, its low score is good news about the public’s economic literacy, but bad news for Scott Morrison and Josh Frydenberg, who are hoping to make a huge political killing when, in September next year, they expect to announce the budget finally is back in surplus.

The pollies are assuming that voters know nothing more about the economy than that anything called a surplus must be a good thing, whereas anything called a deficit must be very bad.

Actually, no economist thinks all surpluses are good and all deficits bad. Sometimes surpluses are good and sometimes they’re bad. Vice-versa with deficits. It depends on the economy’s circumstances at the time.

But the confusion doesn’t end there. There are lots of measures in the economy that can be in deficit or surplus, not just governments’ budgets. When I wrote a column some weeks back foreshadowing that the current account on the nation’s balance of payments would probably swing into surplus for the first time in 44 years, some people assumed I must be referring to the federal budget.

Wrong. The federal budget records the money flowing in and out of the federal government’s coffers – it’s bank account. The “balance of payments” summarises all the money flowing into and out of Australia from overseas – covering exports, imports and payments of interest and dividends in and out (making up the “current account”), and all the corresponding outflows and inflows of the financial payments required (making up the “capital and financial account”).

The trick is that, thanks to double-entry bookkeeping, the balances on the two accounts making up the balance of payments must be equal and opposite. So the longstanding deficit on the current account was always exactly offset by a surplus on the capital account.

And that means the (probably temporary) current account surplus was matched by the capital account swinging from surplus to deficit. Oh no.

Although Australia has been a net importer of (financial) capital almost continuously since the arrival of the First Fleet, for the June quarter we became a net exporter, lending or investing more money in the rest of the world than the rest of the world lent or invested in us.

If you tell the story of this change in plus and minus signs from the current account perspective, it’s mainly that the resources boom has greatly increased our exports, while the slowing in the economy’s growth means our imports of goods and services are also weak.

But there’s also a story to be told about why the capital account has gone from surplus to deficit. As Reserve Bank deputy governor Dr Guy Debelle explained in a speech at the time, the composition of the inflows and outflows of financial capital have changed a lot since 2000.

Since Australia has always been a recipient of foreign investments in our businesses, by June this year, the value of the total stock of that equity investment amounted to a liability to the rest of the world of $1.4 trillion.

But the value of our equity investments in the rest of the world amounted to assets worth $1.5 trillion. So, when it comes to equity investment, the latest figures show we had net assets of $142 billion.

The fact is, the value of our shares in them overtook the value of their shares in us in 2013. That’s a remarkable turnaround from the previous two centuries of being a destination for foreign investment.

Why did it come about? Mainly because of our introduction of compulsory superannuation. Our super funds have invested mainly in local companies, but they’ve also invested a lot in the shares of foreign companies.

For the most part, however, our seemingly endless string of current account deficits has been financed by borrowing from the rest of the world. By June, our debt to foreigners totalled $2.4 trillion. Their debt to us totalled $1.3 trillion, leaving us with net foreign debt of a mere $1.1 trillion.

There was a time when Coalition politicians carried on about that debt – owed more by our banks and businesses, than our governments - rather than the (much smaller) debt of the federal government, only about 55 per cent of which is owed to foreigners.

Why does our huge net foreign debt rarely rate a mention these days? Because it’s always made economic sense for a young country with huge development potential to be an importer of financial capital – it’s part of what’s made us so prosperous.

Because all the debt we owe is denominated in Australian dollars or has been “hedged” back into Aussie dollars – meaning a sudden big fall in our dollar would be a problem for our creditors, not us.

But also because, though our net foreign debt keeps growing in dollar terms, our economy is also growing – and hence, our ability to pay the interest on the debt. That’s a sign that, overall, the money we’ve borrowed has been put to good use.

Adding our net foreign assets to our net foreign debt gives our net foreign liabilities. Measured against the size of the economy (nominal gross domestic product), our net foreign liabilities reached a peak of about 60 per cent in 2009, but have since fallen to about 50 per cent.
Read more >>

Saturday, August 31, 2019

If you think surpluses are always good, prepare for great news


Don’t look now, but Australians’ economic dealings with the rest of the world have transformed while our attention has been elsewhere. Business economists are predicting that, on Tuesday, we’ll learn that the usual deficit on the current account of the balance of payments has become a surplus.

If so, it will be the first quarterly surplus in 44 years. If not, we’ll come damn close.

You have to be old to appreciate what a remarkable transformation that is. Back in the 1980s we were so worried about the rise in the current account deficit and the foreign debt that it was a regular subject for radio shock jocks’ outrage. They knew nothing about what it meant, but they did know that “deficit” and “debt” were very bad words.

By the 1990s, Professor John Pitchford, of the Australian National University, had convinced the nation’s economists that the rises were a product of the globalisation of financial markets and the move to floating exchange rates, and weren’t a big deal.

By now, economists have become so relaxed about the “balance of payments” that it’s rarely mentioned. So news of the disappearing deficit will be a surprise to many.

To begin at the beginning, the balance of payments is a summary record of all the monetary transactions during a period that have an Australian business, government or individual on one end and a foreign business, government or individual on the other.

The record is divided into two accounts, the current account and the capital and financial account.  The balance on the current account is always exactly offset by the balance on the capital account. If one has a deficit of $X billion, the other must have a surplus of $X billion, so that the balance of (international) payments is in balance at all times.

As a Reserve Bank explainer says, the current account captures the net flow of money resulting from our international trade. The capital account captures the net flows of financial capital needed to make all the exporting, importing and income payments possible. These flows during the period change the amounts of Australia’s stocks of assets and liabilities at the end of the period.

To work out the balance on the current account, first you take the value of all our exports of goods and services and subtract the value of all our imports of goods and services, to get the balance of trade.

Then you take all the interest income and dividends we earnt from our investments in foreign countries and subtract all the interest and dividend payments we make to foreigners who’ve lent us money or invested in our companies.

The result is the “net income deficit” which, after you’ve added it to the trade balance, gives you the balance on the current account. As Michael Blythe, chief economist at the Commonwealth Bank, noted this week, that balance has been a deficit for 133 of the past 159 years.

Why do we almost always run a deficit? Because our land abounds in nature’s gifts, and there’s great opportunity to exploit those gifts and earn wealth for toil. What we’ve always been short of, however, is the financial capital needed to take advantage of all the opportunities.

Moving from poetry to econospeak, for pretty much all of our modern history Australia has been a net importer of (financial) capital, as Reserve deputy Dr Guy Debelle said in a revealing speech this week.

Because we don’t save enough to allow us to fully exploit all our opportunities for economic development, we’ve always drawn on the savings of foreigners – either by borrowing from them or letting them buy into Australian businesses.

Blythe says “the shortfall reflects high investment rather than low saving. By running current account deficits, we have been able to sustain a higher [physical] investment rate than we could fund ourselves. Economic growth rates and living standards have been higher than otherwise as result.”

True. And Debelle agrees, noting that Australia’s rate of saving is on par with many other advanced economies. (So don’t let any silly pollies or shock jocks tell you a current account deficit means we’re “living beyond our means”.)

Be sure you understand this: a current account deficit is fully funded by the corresponding surplus on the capital account, which represents the amount by which we needed to call on the savings of foreigners because the nation’s physical investment in new housing, business plant and structures, and public infrastructure during the period exceeded the nation’s saving (by households, companies and governments) during the period.

But if all that’s true, how come we’re expecting a current account surplus in the June quarter? It’s a combination of long-term changes in the structure of our economy that have been working to reduce the deficit, and temporary factors that may push us over the line.

Debelle says that between the early 1980s and the end of the noughties, the deficit averaged the equivalent of about 4 per cent of gross domestic product. But it’s narrowed since 2015 and is now about 1 per cent of GDP.

Most of this change is explained by the trade balance. It averaged a deficit of about 1.25 per cent of GDP over the three decades to 2015, but since then has moved into surplus. It hit record highs during the three months to June, totalling a surplus of $19.7 billion for the quarter.

The resources boom has hugely increased the quantity of our minerals and energy exports, and there’s been a temporary surge in the price we’re getting for our iron ore. At the same time, the end of the investment phase of the resources boom has greatly reduce our imports of mining and gas equipment.

The rise of China and east Asia also means protracted strong growth in our exports of education and tourism.

At the same time, the net income deficit has widened a little in recent years but, at 3.4 per cent of GDP, is in the middle of its range since the late 1980s.

The marked reduction in the current account deficit overall means that Australia’s stock of net foreign liabilities (debt plus equity in businesses) peaked at 60 per cent of GDP in 2009 and has now declined to 50 per cent. But that’s a story for another day.

Read more >>

Saturday, January 26, 2019

You'd be surprised what's propping up our living standard

It’s the last lazy long weekend before the year really gets started, making it a good time to ponder a question that’s trickier than it seems: where has our wealth come from?

The question comes from a reader.

“Australia has been without a recession for 25 or more years, the economy seems booming to me, just by looking around: employment, housing prices, explosive building in major capitals, etc. Where is the wealth coming from? Mining? Other exports? Because the resources have to come from somewhere,” he writes.

That’s the first thing he’s got right: it’s not money that matters (the central bank can create as much of that stuff as it sees fit) it’s what money is used to buy: access to “real resources” – which economists summarise as land (including minerals and other raw materials), labour and (physical) capital.

But here’s the first surprise: of those three, when you trace it right back, probably the most important resource is labour – all the work we do.

The first complication, however, is the word “wealth”, which can mean different things. It’s best used to refer to the value of the community’s assets: its housing, other land and works of art, the equipment, structures and intellectual property owned by businesses (part of which is represented by capitalised value of shares on the stock exchange), plus publicly owned infrastructure (railways, roads, bridges and so forth) and structures.

To get net wealth you subtract any debts or other liabilities acquired in the process of amassing the wealth. In the case of a national economy, the debts we owe each other cancel out, leaving what we owe to foreigners. (According to our national balance sheet, as calculated by the Australian Bureau of Statistics, at June last year our assets totalled $15.4 trillion, less net liabilities to the rest of the world of $3.5 trillion.)

But often the word wealth is used to refer to our annual income, the total value of goods and services produced in the market during a year, as measured by gross domestic product (which in the year to June was $1.8 trillion).

The people in an economy generate income by applying their labour to land and physical capital, to produce myriad goods and services. Most of these they sell to each other, but some of which they sell to foreigners. Why? So they can buy other countries’ exports of goods and services.

Only about 20 per cent of our income comes from selling stuff to foreigners and only 20 per cent or so of the stuff we buy comes from foreigners. This exchange leaves us better off when we sell the stuff we’re better at producing than they are, and buy the stuff they’re better at than we are.

Much of what we sell to foreigners is minerals and energy we pull from the ground and food and fibres we grow in the ground. So it’s true that a fair bit of our wealth is explained by what economists call our “natural endowment”, though it’s also true that we’re much more skilled at doing the mining and farming than most other countries are.

Speaking of skills, the more skilled our workers are – the better educated and trained – the greater our income and wealth. Economists call this “human capital” – and it’s worth big bucks to us.

How do the people in an economy add a bit more to their wealth each year? Mainly by saving some of their income rather than consuming it all. We save not just through bank accounts, but by slowly paying off our mortgages and putting 9.5 per cent of our wages into superannuation.

It’s the role of the financial sector to lend our savings to people wanting to invest in the assets we count as wealth: homes, business structures and equipment and public infrastructure. So if most of our annual income comes from wages, most of our savings come from wage income and our savings finance much of the investment in additional assets.

But because our natural endowment and human capital give us more investment opportunities that can be financed from our savings, we long have called on the savings of foreigners to allow us to invest more in new productive assets each year than we could without their participation.

Some of the foreigners’ savings come as “equity investment” – their ownership of Australian businesses and a bit of our real estate – but much of it is just borrowed. These days, however, our companies’ (and super funds’) ownership of businesses or shares in businesses in other countries is worth roughly as much as foreigners’ equity investments in Oz, meaning all our net liability to the rest of the world is debt.

Naturally, the foreigners have to be rewarded for the savings they’ve sunk into our economy. We pay them about $60 billion a year in interest and dividends, on top of the interest and dividends they pay us.

The main thing we get in return for this foreign investment in our economy is more jobs (and thus wage income) than we’d otherwise have, plus the taxes the foreigners pay.

People worry we can’t go on forever getting wealthy by digging up our minerals and flogging them off to foreigners. It’s true we may one day run out of stuff to sell, but our reserves – proved and yet to be proved – are so huge that day is maybe a century away (and the world will have stopped buying our coal long before we run out).

A bigger worry is the damage we’re doing to our natural environment in the meantime, which should be counted as reducing our wealth, but isn’t.

But mining activity accounts for a smaller part of our high standard of living than most people imagine – only about 8 per cent of our annual income.

Most of our prosperity – our wealth, if you like – derives from the skill, enterprise and technology-enhanced hard work of our people.
Read more >>

Saturday, March 24, 2018

Economic case for cutting company tax rate is weak

Most people don't realise it, but we're on the verge of letting foreign multinationals pay less tax on the profits they earn in Australia because we locals don't mind paying higher tax to make up the difference.

Our almost unique system of "imputing" to Australian shareholders the company tax already paid on their dividends means they have little to gain from Malcolm Turnbull's pressure on the Senate to phase the rate of company tax down from 30 per cent to 25 per cent, over about 10 years, at a cumulative cost to the budget of $65 billion.

So what can we hope to obtain in return for our generosity to foreign businesses? Economic theory (which may or may not prove realistic) assumes it would induce them to increase their investment in Australia which, in turn, would increase the demand for Australian workers relative to their supply, thus bidding up their price (otherwise known as wages).

Note that, contrary to all Turnbull's said about his "plan for jobs and growth", the theory does not promise a significant increase in employment – mainly because the theory assumes the economy is already at full employment before the company tax rate is cut.

As my colleague Peter Martin has written, Treasury's updating of its modelling of the theory finds that, after 10 to 20 years, consumer welfare (arising mainly from higher wages) would be $150 per person higher than it otherwise would be.

Doesn't seem a lot.

Apart from the initial benefits of the company tax cut going pretty much only to foreigners, another reason Treasury's modelling has always shown the ultimate benefits to us as being surprisingly small is Treasury's further assumption that the budgetary cost of the cut would have to be covered by some means.

Treasury's consultant modelled several possibilities: by cutting government spending (don't hold your breath), imposing a lump-sum tax (a textbook fav), increasing the goods and services tax, or by letting bracket creep quietly increase income tax (the most likely).

Trouble is, the model's assumption that increased taxes would harm the economy's performance diminishes the good the lower company tax is assumed to do. As Milton Friedman liked to say, there are no free lunches (you'll end up having to pay, one way or another).

So the impression the government and big business are trying to give us (and naive crossbench senators), that only an economic wrecker would oppose a lower company tax rate, is just spin.

As always, every possible economic policy change has costs as well as benefits, which should be debated. I think the case for cutting company tax is weak.

With the government taking such a propagandist line, the most dispassionate advice we've received has come from evidence Reserve Bank governor Dr Philip Lowe, and an assistant governor, Dr Luci Ellis, gave to a parliamentary committee last year.

Lowe pointed out something no other official has mentioned: the main countries are engaged in a bidding war, in which each moves to a lower company tax rate than the others, hoping to pick up a bigger share of the world's foreign investment - before some other country cuts to an even lower rate.

You can imagine how much the world's chief executives love this game and are urging their own government to put in the lowest, supposedly winning, bid.

But the longer everyone keeps playing, the closer we'll come to the point where no country has any company tax to speak of – and no country has any competitive advantage over the others. All we'll be left with is a distorted tax system.

Lowe's point was that we should think twice before we join this mutually destructive game. Why would a tax war be good, whereas a trade war would be terrible?

The proponents' latest argument is that, now the US is cutting its company tax rate to 21 per cent, we'll get little foreign investment if we don't cut our rate from 30 per cent.

What no one seems to have noticed is that the case for a company tax cut has now turned from positive to negative. It's not that we'll gain anything by cutting, but just that we'll avoid losing if we don't.

But you don't have to accept that argument if you don't want to. Behavioural economics reminds us that the proponents have "framed" our choices in a way that favours their case.

They want us to accept without thinking that foreign companies make their decisions about whether or not to invest in Oz solely by comparing the rate of our company tax with other countries' rates.

That is, foreigners take no account of how our special tax breaks compare with other countries' tax breaks, nor any non-tax factors that make investing in Oz attractive (say, we've got better iron ore than everyone else) nor even that they don't have to worry about our taxes because their lawyers know how to avoid paying them.

As Lowe and Ellis explained to the parliamentary committee, the notion that multinationals focus solely on the rate of our tax is highly implausible.

I think all those other factors mean we're unlikely to attract insufficient foreign investment, even though the US has cut to 21 per cent.

But Treasury's been a great worrier about us attracting enough foreign investment for as long as I've been in the game, without there ever being much sign of a problem.

So, what's eating Treasury? My theory is that it hasn't adjusted its thinking since we moved from a fixed to a floating exchange rate in 1983.

What the proponents of a lower company tax rate don't tell you is that, with a floating dollar (and all else remaining equal), the more successful we are in attracting foreign investment – as we were in the resources boom - the higher our exchange rate will be. Is that what we want?
Read more >>

Saturday, March 3, 2018

Free-trade agreements aren't about freer trade

You may think spin-doctoring and economics are worlds apart, but they combine in that relatively modern invention the "free-trade agreement" – the granddaddy of which, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, is presently receiving CPR from the lips of our own heroic lifesaver, Malcolm Turnbull.

It's not surprising many punters assume something called a "free-trade agreement" must be a Good Thing. Economists have been preaching the virtues of free trade ever since David Ricardo discovered the magic of "comparative advantage" in 1815.

Nor is it surprising the governments that put much work into negotiating free-trade agreements – and the business lobbyists who use them to win concessions for their industry clients – want us to believe they'll do wonders for "jobs and growth".

What is surprising is that so many economists – even the otherwise-smart The Economist magazine - assume something called a free-trade agreement is a cause they should be supporting.

Why's that surprising? Because you can't make something virtuous just by giving it a holy name. When you look behind the spin doctors' label you find "free trade" is covering up a lot of special deals that may or may not be good for the economy.

This is the conclusion I draw from the paper, What Do Trade Agreements Really Do? by a leading US expert on trade and globalisation, Professor Dani Rodrik, of Harvard, written for America's National Bureau of Economic Research.

Rodrik quotes a survey of 37 leading American economists, in which almost all agreed that freer trade was better than protection against imports, and were in equal agreement that the North American Free-Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to eliminate tariff (import duty) barriers between the United States, Canada and Mexico, begun in 1994, had left US citizens better off on average.

Their strong support for freer trade is no surprise. One of the economics profession's greatest contributions to human wellbeing is its demonstration that protection leaves us worse off, even though common sense tells us the reverse.

And that, just as we all benefit from specialising in a particular occupation we're good at, then exchanging goods and services with people in other specialties, so further "gains from trade" can be reaped by extending specialisation and exchange beyond our borders to producers in other countries.

What surprised and appalled Rodrik was the economists' equal certainty that NAFTA – a 2000-page document with numerous exceptions and qualifications negotiated between three countries and their business lobby groups – had been a great success.

He says recent research suggests the deal "produced minute net efficiency gains for the US economy while severely depressing wages of those groups and communities most directly affected by Mexican competition".

So there's a huge gap between what economic theory tells us about the benefits of free trade and the consequences of highly flawed, politically compromised deals between a few countries.

Rodrik says trade agreements, like free trade itself, create winners and losers. How can economists be so certain the gains to the winners far exceed the losses to the losers - and that the winners have compensated the losers?

He thinks economists automatically support trade agreements because they assume such deals are about reducing protection and making trade freer, which must be a good thing overall.

What many economists don't realise is that the international battle to eliminate tariffs and import quotas has largely been won (though less so for the agricultural products of interest to our farmers).

This means so-called free-trade agreements are much more about issues that aren't the focus of economists' simple trade theory: "regulatory standards, health and safety rules, investment, banking and finance, intellectual property, labour, the environment and many other subjects besides".

International agreements in such new areas produce economic consequences that are far more ambiguous than is the case of lowering traditional border barriers, Rodrik says, naming four components of agreements that are worrying.

First, intellectual property. Since the early 1990s, the US has been pushing for its laws protecting patents, copyrights and trademarks to be copied and policed by other governments (including ours). The US just happens to be a huge exporter of intellectual property – in the form of pharmaceuticals, software, hardware, music, movies and much else.

Tighter policing of US IP monopoly restrictions pits rich countries against poor countries. And though free trade is supposed to benefit both sides, with IP the rich countries' gains are largely the poor countries' losses. (Rich Australia, however, is a huge net importer of IP).

Second, restrictions on a country's ability to manage cross-border capital flows. The US, which has world-dominating financial markets, always pushes for unrestricted inflows and outflows of financial capital, even though a string of financial crises has convinced economists it's a good thing for less-developed economies to retain some controls.

Third, "investor-state dispute settlement procedures". These were first developed to protect US multinationals from having their businesses expropriated by tin-pot governments.

Now, however, they allow foreign investors – but not local investors – to sue host governments in special arbitration tribunals and seek damages for regulatory, tax and other policy changes merely because those changes reduced their profits.

How, exactly, is this good for economic efficiency, jobs and growth?

Finally, harmonisation of regulations. Here the notion is that ensuring countries have the same regulations governing protection of the environment, working conditions, food, health and safety, and so forth makes it easier for foreign investment and trade to grow.

Trouble is, there's no natural benchmark that allows us to judge whether the regulatory standard you're harmonising with – probably America's - is inadequate, excessive or protectionist.

Rodrik concludes that "trade agreements are the result of rent-seeking, self-interested behaviour on the part of politically well-connected firms – international banks, pharmaceutical companies, multinational firms" (not to mention our farm lobby).

They may result in greater mutually beneficial trade, but they're just as likely to redistribute income from the poor to the rich under the guise of "free trade".
Read more >>

Monday, February 26, 2018

Not even the IMF is worried by our huge foreign debt

In its latest report on Australia, the International Monetary Fund says it isn't worried by our net foreign debt, now just a squeak short of $1 trillion. Just as well, since none of us ever worries about it either.

Still, it's nice to have the fund's judgment that "the external position of Australia in 2017 was assessed to be broadly consistent with medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies".

Australia's negative "net international investment position" – consisting of our net foreign debt plus net foreign equity investment – has varied between 40 and 60 per cent of gross domestic product since 1988, it says. At the end of 2016, it was equivalent to 58 per cent.

That's high. So why's the fund so relaxed? Because, it says, both the level and the trajectory of our net international investment position are "sustainable".

It has calculated that a current account deficit between 2.5 and 3 per cent of GDP, which is larger than the deficit of 1.9 per cent it expects for 2017, would allow our total net foreign liabilities to be stabilised at about 55 per cent of GDP.

Note that, for some years now, our net foreign debt actually exceeds our total foreign liabilities (debt plus equity). That's because the value of our equity investments abroad (mainly foreign businesses owned by Australian multinationals and our super funds' holdings of foreign shares) now exceeds the value of foreigners' equity investments in Australia, to the tune of about $30 billion.

The fund derives much comfort from the knowledge that our foreign liabilities (both debt and equity) are largely denominated in Australia dollars, whereas our foreign assets (debt and equity) are denominated in foreign currencies.

Get it? In a globalised world of floating currencies and free capital flows between countries, the big risk for an economy heavily indebted to the rest of the world is a sudden loss of confidence by its foreign creditors, which would be manifest in a sudden drop in its exchange rate (as we experienced at the turn of the century, when the Aussie briefly fell below US50¢).

But when our foreign liabilities are expressed in Australian dollars, the depreciation doesn't increase their Australian-dollar value, whereas it does increase the Australian-dollar value of our foreign assets, leaving our net foreign liabilities reduced.

The broader conclusion is that an indebted country able to borrow abroad in its own currency has a lot less to worry about. And the fact that foreigners are willing to lend to us in our own currency is a sign of their confidence in our good economic management.

And, of course, a big drop in our dollar does improve the international price competitiveness of our export and import-competing industries.

Speaking of which, the fund estimates that, after the heights it reached in 2011 when prices for our coal and iron ore exports were at their peak, our "real effective exchange rate" (that is, the Aussie's average value against all our major trading partners' currencies, adjusted for the difference between our inflation rate and their's) depreciated by 17 per cent between 2012 and 2015.

Since then it's appreciated by about 5 per cent, up to September last year. The fund calculates that, by then, it was about 17 per cent above its 30-year average, leaving it between zero and 10 per cent higher than it probably should be, making it "somewhat overvalued".

The fund says our gross foreign liabilities (debt plus equity) break down into about a quarter as "foreign direct investment" (foreign control of Australian businesses, starting with our mining companies), about half as "portfolio investment" (mainly our banks' borrowings abroad, plus foreigners' holdings of Australian government bonds) and a quarter of odds and sods.

So the mining investment boom was mainly funded directly by the foreign mining companies themselves, including by ploughing back much of the huge profits they made while export prices were sky high.

But this was happening when, after the global financial crisis, our banks were increasing the stability of their funding by borrowing more from local depositors and less from overseas financial markets.

What most people don't know is that most of our net foreign debt is owed by our banks, though that's less true than it was, particularly because recent years have seen more central banks buying Australian government bonds from their original Aussie holders.

Though the central bankers like our higher interest rates, it's another indication that the rest of the world isn't too worried about our financial stability.
Read more >>

Saturday, April 8, 2017

Why we needn't worry about our massive foreign debt

When you consider how many people worry about the federal government's debt, it's surprising how rarely we hear about the nation's much bigger foreign debt. When it reached $1 trillion more than a year ago, no one noticed.

That's equivalent to 60 per cent of the nation's annual income (gross domestic product), whereas the federal net public debt is headed for less than a third of that – about $320 billion – by June.

Similarly, when you consider how much people worry about the future of the Chinese economy, American interest rates and all the rest, it's surprising how little interest we take in our "balance of payments" – a quarterly summary of all our economic transactions with the rest of the world.

Note, I'm not saying we should be worried about our foreign debt. We already do more worrying about the federal government's debt than we need to.

No, I'm just saying it's funny. Why do we worry about some things and not others?

Short answer: the politicians don't want to talk our "external sector" because it sounds bad. The economists don't want to talk about it because they know it isn't bad.

But since we're on the subject – and since Reserve Bank deputy governor Dr Guy Debelle gave a speech about it this week – let's see what's been happening while our attention's been elsewhere.

If you're unsure of the difference between the two debts, it's simple. The federal net public debt is all the money owed by the federal government to people, less all the money people owe it (hence that little word "net").

According to Debelle, about 60 per cent of all bonds issued by the feds is owed to foreigners and 40 per cent to Australian banks and investors. About a quarter of all bonds issued by the state governments is held by foreigners.

In contrast, the nation's net foreign debt is all the money Australian businesses and governments (and any other Aussies) owe to foreigners, less what they owe us. (For every $1 we owe them, they owe us 52¢.)

But how did we rack up so much debt?

Long story. Let's start with the balance of payments, which is divided into two accounts. The "current" account shows the money we earn from all our exports of goods and services, less the money we pay for all our imports, giving our "balance on trade".

Our imports usually exceed our exports, giving us a trade deficit. This deficit has to be funded (paid for) either by borrowing from foreigners or by having them make "equity" (ownership) investments in Australian businesses or properties.

Of course, when we borrow from foreigners, we have to pay interest on our debts. And when foreigners own Australian businesses, they're entitled to receive dividends.

The interest and dividends we pay to foreigners, less the interest and dividends they pay us (actually, our superannuation funds and Australian multinationals), is the "net income deficit".

We've been running trade deficits for so long, and racking up so much net debt to foreigners, that the net income deficit each quarter is much bigger than our trade deficit.

But add the trade deficit and the net income deficit (plus some odds and ends) and you get the deficit on the current account of the balance of payments.

The money that comes in from various foreign lenders and investors to cover the current account deficit is shown in its opposite number, the "capital and financial account".

Because the price of our dollar (our exchange rate) is allowed to float up and down until the number of Aussie dollars being bought and sold is equal, the deficit on the current account is at all times exactly matched by a surplus on the capital account, representing our "net [financial] capital inflow" for the quarter.

It turns out that, in the years since the global financial crisis of 2008-09, the current account deficit has narrowed.

In the 14 years to then, it averaged 4.8 per cent of GDP. In the years since then it's averaged 3.5 per cent. And in calendar 2016 it was just 2.6 per cent.

Why has it narrowed? Well, Debelle explains it's mainly a reduction in the net income deficit component of the overall deficit, which is at its lowest as a percentage of GDP since the dollar was floated in 1983.

The rates of interest we're paying on our foreign debt are lower because Australian – and world – interest rates are a lot lower since the crisis. And our dividend payments to foreign owners of Australian companies fell as the fall in coal and iron ore prices hit mining company profits.

That's nice. But while ever we have any deficit on the current account, our foreign debt will grow, and it already exceeds $1 trillion. Isn't that a worry?

Not really. It's not growing faster than our economy (GDP) is growing, and thus our ability to afford the interest payments.

More to the point, the current account deficit is just the counterpart to all the foreign capital flowing into Australia and helping us develop our economy faster than we could without foreign help.

The proof that such a massive debt doesn't mean we're "living beyond our means" is, first, that the nation – households, businesses and governments combined – saves a high proportion of its income rather than spending it on consumption.

Everything the nation saves each year is used to fund new investment in houses, business structures and equipment, and infrastructure. This investment is further proof we're not living beyond our means.

In fact, the nation invests more each year than we save. Huh? Well, the extra funding is borrowed from foreigners.

You can call it the surplus on the capital account of the balance of payments, or the "net foreign capital inflow" or – get this – the current account deficit.
Read more >>

Saturday, March 11, 2017

The low down on our concerns about investment

Governments and economists have been worried for ages about investment. First we had too much, then we didn't have enough. But what is "investment"? What's so special about it and why are we likely to be living with less of it in future?

The first trap is that the word "investment" is used to mean two quite separate – though related - things.

People say they've invested in some shares in a bank or invested in some government bonds. This is financial investment in financial assets – a piece of paper (or, these days, an entry in an electronic ledger) that records the owner's legal claim on the finances of the particular company or government.

Companies and governments originally issue these securities to raise money from the public. Mostly, however, people buy the securities second-hand (in the "secondary market") from someone who no longer wants to own them.

What do the original issuers use the money they raise for? Mainly to invest in – to build or buy – tangible or physical assets, such as equipment, buildings and structures in the case of businesses, and buildings (schools, hospitals, police stations), roads, bridges, rail and power lines and so forth in the case of governments.

This is the "investment" economists keep on about – investment in the building of new (not second-hand) physical assets.

Households invest in new housing; businesses invest in new equipment, buildings and mines, and governments invest in new infrastructure (see above).

Economists divide the spending done by households and governments into two categories: on consumption and on new physical investment.

Both kinds of spending add to "economic activity" – the production and consumption of goods and services, the value of which is measured by gross domestic product. Our participation in this economic activity allows us to earn an income and use it to meet our physical needs for food, clothing, shelter and all the rest.

But here's the trick: although all spending, whether on consumption or investment, generates income and employment at the time it's done, spending on investment goods does something extra: it increases our ability to produce more goods and services and, thus, generate more income and employment.

In econospeak, both consumption and investment spending add to demand, but investment spending also adds to supply – our capacity to produce more goods and services in the future. (The future service produced by new housing, by the way, is accommodation – shelter – for many years to come.)

It's this special characteristic of investment in physical capital (but also, in "human capital" – the education and training of our workforce) that explains economists' obsession with "investment".

Four main factors contribute to economic activity, and hence to increasing it: using more hours of labour, investing in more physical capital (including infrastructure), investing in more human capital (education and training) and improving productivity – through better machines, economies of scale, better ways of organising work, and so on.

Now we've got all that clear, what's been happening lately to new physical investment spending?

Well, households have been investing in a lot more housing, particularly in Melbourne and Sydney, though this looks like easing back before long.

Governments – state more than federal – have increased their investment in infrastructure, though many would say they should be doing more, and some (like me) would say the investment they are doing could be in much more useful stuff than it is.

Which brings us to the main thing preoccupying economists, business investment spending.

According to a report by Jim Minifie and colleagues at the Grattan Institute, Australia's investment has been "exceptionally strong".

"Since 2005, the capital stock [aka the stock of physical capital at a point in time] per person has grown by a third. Even excluding mining, capital per person has growth by more than 15 per cent. By contrast, in both the US and Britain the capital stock per person grew by just 7 per cent," Minifie said.

"Strong investment has helped to increase output per person in Australia by 10 per cent between 2005 and 2015, compared to 6 per cent in the US and just 4 per cent in Britain."

But – there had to be a but – we're now experiencing the biggest ever five-year fall in mining investment as a share of GDP.

"And non-mining business investment has fallen from 12 per cent to 9 per cent of GDP, lower than at any point in the 50 years from 1960 to 2010."

This, of course, is what's been worrying economists: the failure of non-mining investment to grow strongly as the mining investment boom ends. Latest figures do show growth in the non-mining states of NSW and Victoria, however.

What factors encourage greater investment? Textbooks tell us lower interest rates – lowering the "cost of (financial) capital" – helps, but the Reserve Bank believes that, while its manipulation of interest rates has a big effect on the behaviour of households, it doesn't have much effect on businesses.

Minifie says the Turnbull government's proposed cut in the rate of company tax would probably attract more investment by foreigners, but it "would also reduce national income [the bit Australians get to keep] for years and would hit the budget". Oh.

But the biggest direct effect on businesses' investment spending is how much spare production capacity they've got and how fast they're expecting the demand for their products to grow beyond their present capacity.

My guess is that many firms still have a fair bit of spare capacity and that many aren't confident of strong growth in the future.

Minifie reminds us, however, that there are good reasons business doesn't need to invest as much as it used to. The cost of capital goods – particularly computerised equipment – has fallen, and service industries, which make up an ever-growing share of the economy, don't need as much physical capital as goods-producing industries do.
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Monday, March 6, 2017

Reserve Bank spells out company tax choices to politicians

The pollies can't help themselves. When the Reserve Bank heavies make their regular appearance before the House of Reps economics committee, the main game is to get the governor to say something that favours your side of politics and gives the finger to the other side.

So, when Dr Philip Lowe and friends appeared before the committee a fortnight ago, the Liberal chair of the committee, David Coleman, saw his chance to get Lowe to repeat his remarks in favour of cutting the rate of company tax to make it internationally competitive, remarks that drew headlines of Governor Slams Labor in the national press.

Sorry, Lowe had seen this game before, and wasn't playing. He'd switched to "analytical" mode. In truth, he was backing off at a rate of knots.

Tax, he said, is one of the considerations that internationally mobile capital takes into account when deciding where to do investment, but only one.

"There are a lot of other factors as well," Lowe said. "The kind of legal and political environment, human capital [how well-educated our workers are] and all the other things we value in this country."

Corporate tax rates had been edging down around the world, but in the post-crisis environment some countries had seen lowering the corporate tax rate as a potential strategic advantage to attract business from elsewhere, so we heard governments talking about 15 and 20 per cent rates, he said.

"I think you could argue … that, from a global perspective, this is not actually that useful, because the lowering of the corporate tax rate from one country to another just changes the location of investment and does not increase aggregate [global] investment.

"I hear some economists saying that in a perfect world we would have a common global corporate tax rate, so business would decide where to locate based on the strategic and comparative advantages and not on corporate tax.

"But that is not the world we live in."

So the analytical choice the Parliament faced was to respond to this international competition or to say, "No, we are not going to respond to that because we have other advantages that [make] people want to invest in Australia", he said.

"Australia has other advantages, and the tax system is supposed to deal with issues other than attracting investment – there is equity and fairness and other considerations," he said.

Soon it was time for another Liberal, Scott Buchholz, from my ancestral home of Beaudesert, to try his luck with the assistant governor economic, Dr Luci Ellis. Sorry, no luck.

"If you are a primarily locally oriented corporate entity, you have dividend imputation and it is more or less irrelevant what the corporate tax rate is from the perspective of people who wish to invest in your firm," she said.

"That is also true for the very large pool of superannuation savings that we have in this country."

So the benefit from cutting the company tax rate was limited to its ability to attract investment from foreigners.

But not all foreign capital was equally valuable. Foreign direct investment, she implied, was more valuable than portfolio investment involving "purchasing of existing securities or existing assets [such as businesses]".

Direct investment was where, if the decision to cut the rate was put off, this could "potentially be more damaging to an economy" but – here comes the two-handed economist – "investors think about more than just differential tax rates when they are making foreign direct investment decisions".

"Also," Ellis went on, "you have to remember that many multinational corporations do have the capacity to decide where the revenue [they earn in Australia] is recognised".

"To the extent that there are transfer-pricing alternatives to where you locate your income, it is not clear to me that [the level of our company tax rate] changes people's decisions about whether Australia is a good place to have some business. It might change which government gets the revenue.

"You could imagine that it would become increasingly attractive for multinational firms to seek to locate their revenue recognition in lower tax havens.

"But there are already very low tax jurisdictions where [multinationals] can do that, and we still see investment happening in [this] country.

"I cannot imagine a scenario where a few more countries moving in this direction [of cutting their rates below ours] results in the entirety of that activity moving outside Australia's borders," Ellis said.

What a comfort it is that, while our politicians do little more than try to score points off each other, our econocrats are still capable of laying out the choices we face.
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