Showing posts with label global economy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label global economy. Show all posts

Friday, February 10, 2023

Globalisation has stopped, but it's not actually reversing - yet

In case you’ve been too worried about your mortgage to notice, the era of ever-increasing globalisation has ended. There’s a backlash against greater economic integration and a risk it will start going backwards, causing the global economy to “fragment”.

The process of globalisation involves the free flow of ideas, people, goods, services and financial capital across national borders, leading to economic integration. But, as a new post on the International Monetary Fund’s blog site reminds us, globalisation is not new, and the process has ebbed and flowed over many decades.

The post charts the progress of globalisation back more than 150 years. Using openness to international trade – measured as global exports plus imports as a proportion of world gross domestic product – it divides that period into five successive eras.

First came the era of industrialisation between 1870 and 1914, when increasing trade between Europe and the “new world” of North America, Argentina and Australia was driven largely by technological advances in transportation – including steel-hulled, steam-driven ships and refrigeration for shipping meat – which lowered the cost of trade.

The laying of undersea cables to improve communication between countries also helped.

Then came the era of wars and protectionism, beginning with the start of World War I in 1914 and finishing with the end of World War II in 1945.

In between came the Great Depression of the 1930s, which was made much worse than it needed to have been by governments trying to protect their domestic industries by using high import duties (“tariffs”) to keep people buying local.

It sounds like a great idea when you do it to other countries. It turns into a stupid idea when they retaliate and do it to you, leaving everyone worse off.

After trade had increased from 30 per cent of world GDP to more than 40 per cent during the era of industrialisation, it had fallen back to about 15 per cent by the end of World War II.

Third came the era of tariff reform between 1945 and 1980. Even before the war had ended, the Allies knew they’d have to fix the world economy. They decided to move to a system of fixed exchange rates and establish the IMF and the World Bank. Most importantly, they set up the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (now the World Trade Organisation).

The GATT arranged eight successive “rounds” of multilateral trade negotiations, in which the developed countries agreed to big reductions in their barriers to imports. Thanks to all this, trade doubled from 15 per cent of world GDP to 30 per cent.

This led on to the era of “hyperglobalisation” between 1980 and 2008, with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and collapse of the Soviet Union, bringing the Cold War to an end.

The eighth, biggest and final, “Uruguay” round of the GATT, in 1994, focused on increasing trade between the developed and developing countries, with many poor economies joining the WTO.

China’s economy began growing rapidly after it was opened up in the late 1970s, and in 2001 it was permitted to join the WTO, hugely increasing its trade.

The era also brought a move to floating exchange rates and deregulation of banking systems, leading to much increased investment between rich and poor countries.

As well, big advances in telecommunications, computerisation and the advent of the internet allowed a surge of trade in digital services, including data processing.

Resulting from all this, trade reached a peak of more than 55 per cent of world GDP in 2008, on the eve of the global financial crisis and the ensuing Great Recession.

The IMF bloggers label the present period, with figures from 2008 up to 2021, the era of “slowbalisation”. To date, those figures bear this out: trade has reached a plateau of about 55 per cent. More recent figures show world trade has largely bounced back from the initial effects of the pandemic’s global coronacession.

It seems the combined effect of the Great Recession and rising protectionist sentiment has stopped trade from continuing to shoot up relative to world GDP, but not caused it to fall back – or not yet.

Less optimistic observers, however, refer to present as the era of “deglobalisation”. They worry that we’re in the early stages of a period of “policy-induced geoeconomic fragmentation”.

It’s not hard to see what’s worrying them. First we had Britain deciding to leave the European Union, then the election of Donald Trump, vowing to “make America great again” by whacking up tariff barriers against the exports of friend and foe alike, and starting a trade war with China.

Now we have the use of trade and other economic sanctions by many countries to punish Russia in its war against Ukraine, which is fragmenting world trade.

US President Joe Biden has toned down his predecessor’s excesses, but not abandoned the trade war. This doesn’t seem to be about protectionism so much as America’s desire not to be overtaken by China as the world’s dominant superpower. In particular, the US wants to stay ahead of the Chinese in advanced digital technology, by denying them access to the latest and best semiconductors.

The risk is that the two could end up dividing the global economy into separate trading blocs, America and its democratic friends versus China and its autocratic friends. This would almost certainly slow the economic growth of both groupings.

And, as economist Dr John Edwards has written, dividing the trading world into good guys and bad guys would not suit us, nor our region. Our exports to China greatly exceed our exports to the US and other close security allies.

And all the East Asian economies – including Japan and South Korea – have China as a major trading partner. For that matter, China and the US are major trading partners of each other.

Fortunately, and despite all the sparring we’ve seen, Edwards and others find no evidence that the US and China have yet started to “decouple”.

Let’s hope economic sense prevails, and it stays that way.

Read more >>

Wednesday, February 1, 2023

Labor's new plan to reduce our emissions is riddled with loopholes

While I was on holiday, I noticed a tweet that left me in no doubt about the subject of my first column back. It said: “I genuinely think the next generation will not forgive us for what we have done to them and the world they will have to live in.”

I, too, fear they won’t. I don’t know whether our political leaders ever think such thoughts, but it fills me with dread. Maybe the pollies think what I reluctantly think: With any luck, I’ll be dead before the next generation realises the full extent of the hell our selfish short-sightedness has left them in.

But the climate seems to be deteriorating so rapidly I’m not sure I’ll get off that easily. I love my five grandkids, but I’m not looking forward to the day they’re old enough to quiz me on “what I did in the war”. What was I saying and doing while our leaders were going for decades kicking the problem down the road as the easiest way to get re-elected?

“Well, I was very busy writing about the shocking cost of living – oh, and rising interest rates.” Really? Is that the best excuse you can offer, Grandad?

We elected a bloke called Albo who promised to try a lot harder than his predecessors to reduce our emissions of greenhouse gases. He said he’d cut them by 43 per cent by 2030. He was quick to put that target into law, and his people worked through the Christmas holidays to outline the “safeguard mechanism” he’d use as his main measure to achieve the reduction.

While the rest of us were at the beach, Climate Change Minister Chris Bowen announced a few weeks ago that Australia’s 215 biggest industrial polluters – running coal mines, gas plants, smelters and steelworks – will have their emissions capped, with the caps lowered progressively by 30 per cent come 2030.

Businesses whose emissions exceed their cap will face heavy fines. To the extent they can’t use cleaner production processes to reduce their emissions, they’ll be allowed to buy “carbon credits” from other heavy polluters who’ve been able to reduce their emissions by more than required, or from farmers who’ve planted more trees.

Trouble is, it wasn’t long before the experts started pointing to all the holes in the scheme. For a start, the combined emissions of these biggest polluters account for only 28 per cent of Australia’s total emissions.

For another thing, the notion that, as well as reducing the carbon we’re adding to the atmosphere, we should find ways to remove some of the carbon that’s already there is a good one in principle, but riddled with practical problems.

Whereas the carbon we emit may stay in the atmosphere for 100 years or more, the carbon sequestered by a new tree will start returning to the atmosphere as soon as it dies or is cut down. It’s hard to measure the amount of carbon that tree-growing and other agricultural activities remove, which makes such schemes particularly easy to rort.

In his recent report into expert criticism of our carbon credits scheme, Professor Ian Chubb sat on the fence. While judging the scheme to be “well designed”, he identified various dubious practices that should be outlawed. And he stressed that big polluters must not rely on buying carbon credits to the extent that they’re able to avoid reducing their emissions in absolute terms.

A further weakness in the government’s scheme comes from its refusal to prohibit any new coal mines and gas plants, despite the International Energy Agency and other international agencies saying the world won’t have any chance of avoiding dangerous climate change if it’s relying on new gas or coal projects.

So, the scheme involves leaning on our existing 215 biggest polluters to reduce their emissions by 30 per cent, while allowing a bunch of new big emitters to set up, provided they then start cutting those emissions back.

Really? This is how we’re going to cut our total emissions by 2030? Seriously?

Last year a reader rebuked me for failing to make it clear that nothing Australia does to reduce its own emissions can, by itself, have any effect on our climate. Why not? Because climate is global, and we’re not big enough to have a significant effect on total world emissions.

The best we can do is set a good example, then pressure the bigger boys to do likewise. So far, we’ve been setting them a bad example.

It’s the global scale of the problem that makes our efforts actually to increase our exports of coal and gas so irresponsible – and, to our offspring, unforgivable. We’re the world’s third-largest exporter of fossil fuels, after Saudi Arabia and Russia.

Australia’s emissions within our borders are dwarfed by the emissions from the coal and gas we export. But never mind about that. Let’s just extract a few more shekels before the balloon goes up.

Read more >>

Friday, December 23, 2022

RBA warning: our supply-side problems have only just begun

In one of his last speeches for the year, Reserve Bank governor Dr Philip Lowe has issued a sobering warning. Even when we’ve got on top of the present inflation outbreak, the disruptions to supply we’ve struggled with this year are likely to be a recurring problem in the years ahead.

Economists think of the economy as having two sides. The supply side refers to our production of goods and services, whereas the demand side refers to our spending on those goods and services, partly for investment in new production capacity, but mainly for consumption by households.

Lowe notes that, until inflation raised its ugly head, the world had enjoyed about three decades in which there were few major “shocks” (sudden big disruptions) to the continuing production and supply of goods and services.

When something happens that disrupts supply, so that it can’t keep up with demand, prices jump – as we’ve seen this year with disruptions caused by the pandemic and its lockdowns, and with Russia’s attack on Ukraine.

What changes occurred over the three decades were mainly favourable: they involved increased supply of manufactured goods, in particular, which put gentle downward pressure on prices.

This made life easier for the world’s central banks. With the supply side behaving itself, they were able to keep their economies growing fairly steadily by using interest rates to manage demand. Put rates up to restrain spending and inflation; put rates down to encourage spending and employment.

The central banks were looking good because the one tool they have for influencing the economy – interest rates – was good for managing demand. Trouble is – and as we saw this year – managing demand is the only thing central banks and their interest rates can do.

When prices jump because of disruptions to supply, there’s nothing they can do to fix those disruptions and get supply back to keeping up with demand. All they can do is strangle demand until prices come down.

So, what’s got Lowe worried is his realisation that a lot of the problems headed our way will be shocks to supply.

“Looking forward, the supply side looks more challenging than it has been for many years” and is likely to have a bigger effect on inflation, making it jump more often.

Lowe sees four factors leading to more supply shocks. The first is “the reversal of globalisation”.

Over recent decades, international trade increased significantly relative to the size of the global economy, he says.

Production became increasingly integrated across borders, and this lowered costs and made supply very flexible. Australia was among the major beneficiaries of this.

Now, however, international trade is no longer growing faster than the global economy. “Trading blocs are emerging and there is a step back from closer integration,” he says. “Unfortunately, today barriers to trade and investment are more likely to be increased than removed.”

This will inevitably affect both the rise in standards of living and the prices of goods and services in global markets.

The second factor affecting the supply side is demographics. Until relatively recently, the working-age population of the advanced economies was steadily increasing. This was also true for China and Eastern Europe – both of which were being integrated into the global economy.

And the participation of women in the paid labour force was also rising rapidly. “The result was a substantial increase in the number of workers engaged in the global economy, and advances in technology made it easier to tap into this global labour force,” Lowe says.

So, there was a great increase in global supply. But this trend has turned and the working-age population is now declining, with the decline projected to accelerate. The proportion of the population who are either too young or too old to work is rising, meaning the supply of workers available to meet the demand for goods and services has diminished.

The third factor affecting the supply side is climate change. Over the past 20 years, the number of major floods across the world has doubled and the frequency of heatwaves and droughts has also increased.

This will keep getting worse.These extreme weather events disrupt production and so affect prices – as we know all too well in Australia. But as well as lifting fruit and vegetable prices (and meat prices after droughts break and herd rebuilding begins), extreme weather can disrupt mining production and transport and distribution.

The fourth factor affecting the supply side is related: the transition from fossil fuels to renewables. This involves junking our investment in coal mines, gas plants and power stations, and new investment in solar farms, wind farms, batteries and rooftop solar, as well as extensively rejigging the electricity network.

It’s not just that the required new capital investment will be huge, but that the transition from the old system to the new won’t happen without disruptions.

So, energy prices will be higher (to pay for the new capital investment) and more volatile when fossil-fuel supply stops before renewables supply is ready to fill the gap.

Lowe foresees the inflation rate becoming more unstable through two channels. First, shocks to supply that cause large and rapid changes in prices.

Second, the global supply curve becoming less “elastic” (less able to respond to increases in demand by quickly increasing supply) than it has been in the past decade.

Lowe says bravely that none of these developments would undermine the central banks’ ability to achieve their inflation target “on average” - that is, over a few years – though they would make the bankers’ job more complicated.

Well, maybe. As he reminds us, adverse supply shocks can have conflicting effects, increasing inflation while reducing output and employment. The Reserve can’t increase interest rates and reduce them at the same time.

As Lowe further observes, supply shocks “also have implications for other areas of economic policy”. Yes, competition policy, for instance.

My conclusion is that managing the economy can no longer be left largely to the central bankers.

Read more >>

Sunday, May 22, 2022

Who's in government matters, but pollies have far from total control

According to Scott Morrison’s last-minute appeal, in deciding our vote we should have considered nothing but the economy and stuck with the Coalition, the only team to be trusted with financial matters. But we spurned his advice and put Labor in charge. Now what happens?

Will the economy be better or worse under Anthony Albanese and a new treasurer, Jim Chalmers?

Short answer: whether economic conditions get better or worse in the next three years will be changed only to an extent by a new government. Things will be different, but not hugely so.

That’s for four reasons. First, because, in our more globalised world, much of what happens is beyond the ability of any government to control. Second, because economies are like ocean liners: they take a long time to answer the helm.

Third, because in this small-target election, Labor’s stated policies weren’t greatly different from the Liberals’. And finally, the elected government shares the management of the economy with the independent Reserve Bank, which made its intention to continue raising interest rates crystal clear earlier this month.

In their response to the pandemic, Morrison and his erstwhile treasurer, Josh Frydenberg, stuck pretty closely to Treasury advice about the budget’s role. And I’ll be surprised to see Labor doing much freelancing.

But aren’t the Libs much better at economic management than Labor? That’s the stereotype deeply ingrained in the thinking of many voters – which Morrison was seeking to evoke in his last-minute appeal.

Trouble is, hard evidence to support this pre-judgment is hard to find. In a recent extensive review of the figures by the independent economist Saul Eslake, he could find no strong support for the idea that one side was clearly better than the other.

Why not? For the four reasons I’ve just listed.

So how is Labor likely to do? Not as well as the new government’s supporters hope, but not as badly as its opponents predicted. At this early stage, however, when we’re so fully conscious of the failings of the last lot, we’re entitled to hope for some improvement.

One we can hope for is that the new government won’t be playing favourites and enemies like Morrison did.

Whatever does happen to the economy in the next few years, one thing we can be sure of is that the Libs will claim to have handed over an economy in tip-top condition. Morrison and Frydenberg spent the entire campaign telling us how “strong” the economy is.

It is in some respects, but not in others. It’s certainly true that the jobs market is in better shape than it’s been in decades. At 3.9 per cent, the unemployment rate is at its lowest in 48 years and underemployment is its lowest in 14 years. The proportion of working-age people with jobs has never been higher.

You’d expect this to mean wages are also growing strongly, but not a bit of it. Wages have struggled to keep up with prices for the past decade and, with the recent surge in prices, have fallen well behind.

Part of the reason is that, thanks to weak business investment in better equipment, there’s been little improvement in the productivity of labour. Living standards have hardly improved in since before the Coalition took the reins in 2013.

It’s weak wage growth that does most to explain why the high cost of living seemed the biggest issue in this election. And it’s the cost of living that helps explain why voters turned on the self-proclaimed great economic managers.

Business profits are doing fine, but the Liberals have failed to deliver ordinary working families their fair share of the lolly – and allowed many of their jobs to become less secure. And that’s before you get to the huge budget deficits the government itself foresaw extending further than the eye could see.

There’s one issue it’s reasonable to expect Labor to care more about and do more to fix: making wages grow faster. Can any government do much about wages? Of course. They can start by urging the Fair Work Commission to lift award wages in line with prices. And give their own employees a decent pay rise after years of wages being held back.

A staunch Liberal mate thinks this was a good election for his side to lose. He thinks the world economy’s likely to weaken and this, combined with our problem using higher interest rates to control inflation, might see us fall back into recession.

I’m not so pessimistic.

There may be some rocky times ahead as the world copes with its various problems. But the Reserve Bank knows if it raises interest rates so high they capsize the economy, all fingers will be pointing to it, not to Albanese and Chalmers.

Read more >>

Saturday, February 13, 2021

Why we're stuck with low interest rates for a long time

When it comes to interest rates, we’re living in the strangest of times, with rates lower than ever.

Savers are getting next to no reward for lending their money. Does this make sense? Not really. But we’re moving through uncharted waters and aren’t sure how we’ll get out of them, nor what happens next.

When Reserve Bank governor Dr Philip Lowe appeared before Parliament’s economics committee last Friday, he was asked whether we get the interest rates the world forces on us, or whether our authorities are free to set the rates they want.

Lowe’s answer was “we have the freedom, but we don’t”. Huh? “It’s complicated,” he explained.

Sure is. What he could have said is that we have some freedom, but not much. Were we to set our interest rates at a very different level to those in the rest of the world, there’d be a price for us to pay.

His own explanation was as clear as mud: we don’t have freedom in a structural sense, but we still have freedom in a cyclical sense.

Let me have a go. Remember that, as part of the process of globalisation over the past 40 years, the rich countries’ national financial markets are now so closely integrated with each other that each country exists in what’s pretty much a single global market, producing a single long-term real interest rate.

Purely by virtue of its big share of the global market, the things an economy as big as the US does can influence the level of the global interest rate. But nothing a middle-size economy like ours does is big enough to move the world rate. We are, as economists say, a “price taker”. We’re free only to take it or leave it.

The market price of something (including the price of borrowing money – the rate of interest) is set by the interaction of demand and supply: how much of it the buyers want to buy, relative to how much the sellers want to sell.

Lowe explained that the reason the “world equilibrium interest rate” has fallen so close to zero since the global financial crisis of 2008 is that, around the world, there’s been an increased desire by people to save, but a reduced desire to invest. That is, savers want to lend a lot more money than investors want to borrow, so interest rates have fallen sharply.

I think by now most economists accept this as the best explanation for the amazing low to which interest rates have fallen. It’s what Lowe means by “structural”. Just why saving is so much greater and investment so much smaller are questions economists are still debating.

Note that this explanation laughs at the standard view in neo-classical economics that saving increases when interest rates are higher, while investment increases when interest rates are lower.

Nor does it fit with the view that the “natural” rate of interest should reflect the rate of business profitability. Although the profits of some businesses have been hard hit by the pandemic, before it arrived – and even since, for most businesses – profitability has been high.

An alternative, minority view – pushed by economists at the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, the central bankers’ central bank – is that world interest rates have fallen so low because of the Americans’ excessive use of “quantitative easing” (central banks buying second-hand bonds and paying for them with money they’ve just created) after the global financial crisis and then, once the US economy had recovered, their failure to sell those bonds back to the market and so push interest rates back up.

An economy where households are saving too much of their incomes, and businesses don’t want to invest in expansion, is an economy that’s growing too slowly and not creating many new jobs. The solution, Lowe said, was to give people confidence to spend (and so get their rate of saving down) and give firms the confidence to invest.

How is he doing this? By cutting the official interest rate as close to zero as possible, and using quantitative easing to lower longer-term government and private sector interest rates. Really? Sounds to me like hoping to recover from a hangover by having another drink.

But back to the point. If interest rates ought to be higher to give savers a decent reward on the money they lend, why can’t our central bank set our interest rates higher than those being paid in other parts of the world?

Well, it can. We do retain that freedom. But because our financial markets are just part of the global market, what that would do is push up our exchange rate.

Why? Because financial institutions around the world would shift money into Australian dollars so as to get into our market and take advantage of our higher interest rates. When the demand for “the Aussie” exceeds the supply, the price goes up.

Such a rise in our currency’s rate of exchange against other currencies would reduce the international price competitiveness of our export and import-competing industries, thus reducing our economy’s growth and job opportunities.

That’s the price we’d pay for stepping out of line.

Lowe told the committee that the two main factors that drive the value of our dollar are world commodity prices and relative interest rates – that is, the level of our interest rates relative to other countries’ rates.

The prices we receive for the commodities we export (particularly iron ore) are up but, he said, the Aussie hadn’t appreciated (risen) by as much as you’d expect from past relationships. Why not? Because our lower official interest rates and quantitative easing have narrowed the interest rate “differential” between our rates and the rest of the world.

So, although rising commodity prices have caused our exchange rate to go higher, our quantitative easing has nevertheless caused the dollar to be “lower than it otherwise would be”. Ah. That’s the game he’s playing.

Read more >>

Saturday, August 22, 2020

It may be a terrible recession, but it could have been worse

In economics, everything is relative. Relative to you, the coronacession is likely to be the worst economic disaster you’ll experience in your lifetime. Relative to Australia, it is – as the media (including yours truly) keep telling us – the worst recession since the Great Depression of the 1930s.

But, as a report published this week by the Lowy Institute reminds us, there’s another side of the story. Relative to what we were expecting initially, the recession isn’t as bad as feared. And relative to many other developed economies, we’ve got off lightly.

The report is by Dr John Edwards, a former member of the Reserve Bank board. Perhaps in reaction to his former career as a journalist, Edwards has a penchant for highlighting the aspects of an economic story his former colleagues have tended to gloss over. Which means he finds the not-so-bad bits – and so is always worth hearing from.

How badly a country is suffering economically is largely a function of how well it responded to the pandemic. Those that followed the medicos' injunction to "go early, go hard" have done better than those that procrastinated. Fortunately, and thanks in large part to Scott Morrison’s leadership, we’re in the former group.

Edwards says that, because of our early success in controlling the virus, the "pandemic in Australia is fading sooner and with less economic damage than expected. While the secondary wave of infection in Victoria is a big setback and there may yet be other regional or local outbreaks, the economic recovery already evident is set to continue."

The pandemic "from which Australia is now emerging was the most abrupt, savage and frightening economic shock in the lifetime of most Australians. But the jolt was also short and unexpectedly shallow."

If you judge it by the progress of the economy’s output (real gross domestic product), you may not be convinced the recovery has begun. But judging it by the state of the jobs market, which is what matters most, leaves little doubt.

The best measure of the immediate employment response is the total number of hours worked in the economy. Between March and April we experienced an astonishingly swift fall of 9 per cent. The following month it fell by less than 1 per cent. In June, however, it rose by 4 per cent. The 1.3 per cent rise in July signals a slowdown in the rate of the jobs recovery.

So in July we were still down 5 per cent on July 2019. But here's Edwards’ other way of looking at it: "Through the four months of what was widely portrayed as a general economic cessation, a large proportion of Australian employees kept working.

"New networking technologies permitted most office work to be performed at home. Mining and farming continued. So did much of manufacturing and construction. Electricity, gas and water utilities employees kept their jobs.

"Throughout Australia, public servants continued working, often at home. Tradespeople, cleaners and gardeners more often than not were working. Most health employees remained on the job, busier than ever. Childcare facilities remained open in most places and, where necessary, classroom teaching continued remotely. Media workers struggled to keep up with the demand for news and entertainment.

"The economic cessation, such as it was, centred on restaurants, clubs, pubs and accommodation, discretionary retail such as clothing and furniture, local and international travel, sports, entertainment, and the arts.

"Take-up of the JobKeeper program, which helped businesses retain employees, was far lower than expected because the economic damage was less than expected. All up, most of the Australian workforce remained on the job, either from their usual place of work or from home."

Surprisingly, most of the economic downturn took the unusual form of a sudden cessation in household consumption.

While it’s true that colleges and universities have been hurt by the suspension of foreign student arrivals, Edwards says the majority of international students living in Australia before the pandemic stayed. Indeed, many of them had little choice. Quarantines will remain necessary, but plans are now being made to permit the resumption of student arrivals.

More than nine million foreigners, mostly tourists, visited Australia last year. The number arriving since March this year is “scarcely worth counting," he admits. The resumption of mass foreign travel, unimpeded by quarantine, awaits not only the discovery and approval of a vaccine, but also its worldwide distribution in millions of doses.

But get this: in the short term, however, the suspension of normal international travel actually adds to Australia’s gross domestic product. That’s because Australians’ spending abroad exceeds foreigners’ spending in Australia.

Now, compare how we’ve fared with how the other rich countries have. Taking total coronavirus deaths as a proportion of the population, Edwards calculates that our rate is less than a thirtieth of the rates for the United States and Britain.

So it’s little wonder our economy hasn’t been as badly hit. Using the forecasts of the International Monetary Fund, the economic contraction in the United States, the whole of the Euro area, Britain and Canada will be twice the size of our contraction.

Global economic growth will be lower than it would otherwise have been for years to come. And, "while unemployment will be the principal domestic problem, the changing global context will also shape the Australian economy for years to come", Edwards predicts.

Doesn’t sound good. But he has found a silver lining: “The impact for Australia of lower global demand and production is mitigated because three-quarters of its goods exports are to East Asia, a region that is growing faster than Europe or the United States and which, in most cases, has handled the pandemic well.

"While world output [gross world product] will contract nearly 5 per cent in 2020 on IMF forecasts, developing Asian countries will contract by less than 1 per cent."

For us, it all could have been much worse.
Read more >>

Wednesday, January 29, 2020

Zero net carbon choice: do we want to be losers or winners?

You may regard economists as a dismal lot, always reminding us of the cost of this or the risk of that. But there’s one prominent economist with a much more positive story to tell.

Professor Ross Garnaut is more prophet than gloomy economist, a man with the vision of a better future that our politicians have lost as they squabble over votes.

The Morrison government trembles at the thought of the Paris agreement’s goal of achieving zero net carbon emissions by 2050. All it can see is the need for higher taxes and the loss of jobs in coal mining. Garnaut, by contrast, sees a golden opportunity for us to shift from an industry in terminal decline to a new set of industries with bright prospects in the low-carbon world that’s coming.

Garnaut foresees that, if we rise to the challenge of climate change, we "will emerge as a global superpower in energy, low-carbon industry and absorption of carbon in the landscape".

This vision is set out in his latest book, Superpower, which seems to offer something for everyone. Do you regret the decline of manufacturing? Garnaut sees how we could give it a new lease on life.

Have you always thought that, rather than sending our minerals off for further processing abroad, we should do it ourselves? Garnaut sees how we can.

With climate change making the land hotter, drier and more prone to bushfires, do you fear for the future of farming? Garnaut sees the bush getting a whole new source of income and activity.

Do you fear that, with the decline of coal mining, regional Australia will be left even further out of the economic action? Garnaut see all the new industries created by the world’s move to renewable energy being located in the regions.

Of course, as the author of two government reports on our response to climate change, Garnaut has form as a prophet. In his first report in 2008, he relied on scientists’ advice to predict that "fire seasons will start earlier, end slightly later, and generally be more intense. This effect increases over time, but should be directly observable by 2020."

On the other hand, Garnaut now admits that even his second report, in 2011, has been overtaken by events. Then, he calculated that the cost of moving to renewable energy would come early and reduce our rate of economic growth for many years before it was eventually outweighed by the benefits of climate change avoided.

Now, he sees that the move to renewable energy won’t cost a lot, low-carbon electricity will be cheaper and will give us major new export opportunities. These more positive benefits will come earlier than the benefit of less climate change.

The cost of moving to all-renewable electricity has been transformed by two things. First, the huge reduction in the cost of solar panels and lesser falls in the cost of wind turbines and batteries.

Second, by the fall in global interest rates to record lows, which seem likely to persist. Whereas much of the cost of coal-fired electricity comes from the cost of the coal, with solar and wind power almost all of the cost comes from setting up the system – sun and wind are free. Lower interest rates mean the capital cost is much reduced.

So far, a chunk of Australia’s prosperity derives from our huge natural endowment of coal and gas. Now Garnaut has realised that, relative to the size of our population, Australia is more richly endowed with sun and wind than any other developed country – or our Asian neighbours.

So zero-emissions electricity will be cheaper to produce (though we may have to pay more in transmission costs). More significantly, our carbon-free power will be much cheaper than other countries’.

Carbon-free electricity is the key to our efforts to achieve zero net emissions overall, and to our various opportunities to profit from the world’s move away from fossil fuels. Our transport emissions will be slashed by moving to electric vehicles and increased use of public transport.

The scope for exporting our electricity through submarine cables – or via tankers of electrolysis-produced hydrogen – is limited. But this will now make it economic to further process alumina, iron ore, silicon and ammonia before we export them. That processing is best done adjacent to the mine site.

At present, plastics and many chemicals used in manufacturing are produced from fossil fuels. But we will have more plentiful supplies of (renewable) biomass – plant material – than many other countries, which we can use to produce plastics and chemicals for ourselves and for export.

The "net" in zero net emissions implies that the world will still be emitting some carbon dioxide, but these emissions will be offset by "negative emissions" as atmospheric carbon is captured and sequestered in soil, pastures, woodlands, forests and plantations.

Guess what? Few countries have more scope for "natural climate solutions" such as carbon farming than we do. We need research to improve the measurement of carbon capture, but we have so much scope that, after meeting our own needs, we could sell carbon credits to the rest of the world. This could be a new rural industry, much bigger than wool.

To maximise our chances of benefiting from the move to a low-carbon world, however, we have to get to zero net emissions sooner than the other rich countries, not later.
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Monday, January 6, 2020

Is Morrison the man who killed the Aussie summer?

This is the summer from hell. I can’t imagine anyone is enjoying their break – not with the quadruple whammy of drought, heatwaves, bushfires and smoke haze we’re experiencing. If it happens again next summer – or the one after – as it very well could, can you imagine the political doghouse Scott Morrison and his Coalition parties will be in?

Morrison is already bearing most of the ire of people displaced by the fires. So much so that he’s learned not to show up to offer his commiserations. But is it really his fault? No. Just one of the six prime ministers we’ve had over the past two decades can hardly take all the blame.

In any case, Morrison is right to protest that nothing Australia could have done by itself could have stopped the deterioration in climate we’re seeing. The only solution is global, so all the big, rich economies – particularly the Americans, less so the Europeans – must share the blame for the continuing rise in average temperatures.

And even the biggest developing economies – China and India, particularly – could have done more to reduce the intensity of their emissions (emissions per dollar of GDP) without abandoning their efforts to raise their living standards to some higher fraction of those we have long enjoyed.

But Morrison doesn’t escape the responsibility of leadership as easily as that. For one thing, it’s his side of politics that’s done most to sabotage the limited and belated efforts Australia has made, since the defeat of the Howard government, to contribute to the global effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

And you have to go back to John Howard’s refusal to ratify the Kyoto agreement of 1997 to find an instance of Australia actively disrupting efforts to reach international agreement on stronger action, to match the shamefully destructive contribution Angus Taylor made at the conference in Madrid last month by insisting that Australia be allowed to use an accounting trick to shirk its responsibilities.

For any Australian leader to claim, hand-on-heart, to have done all they reasonably could to reduce global warming, they have to be able to say they committed us to a disproportionate reduction in our emissions, so as to have the moral authority to press the bigger players to do more. None of our leaders can say that, least of all Howard and Morrison.

And then there’s the law of politics that says if it's fair enough for the government of the day to claim the credit when things go well – even when the seeds of that success were sown by an earlier administration – it’s equally fair for the government of the day to cop the blame when the neglect of earlier administrations finally hits the fan, as it has this summer.

Not Morrison nor any of his predecessors can honestly claim to have been caught unawares by what’s happening before our eyes and noses. The CSIRO has been warning for at least a decade of just this concurrence of adverse and costly events – in lives and health, as well as property – as the planet warms.

At last year’s election, the climate change deniers demanded to be told the economic cost of stepping up our contribution to reducing global warming. The more sensible among us should have been demanding to be told the economic cost of allowing global warming to roll on. We’re finding that out as we speak, but doing so the hard way.

It’s tempting to wonder whether, in his heart of hearts, Morrison is himself a climate-change denier. But that hardly matters. These days, what politicians truly believe doesn’t have much bearing on what they do and say. Conviction politics is dead. These days, politicians seek out the position that, while sitting easily with their heartland supporters, is likely to give them the greatest short-term advantage over their political opponents.

Whatever he believes, Morrison is too cagey to come out as a denier. Like Malcolm Turnbull before him, he’s bound hand-and-foot by the deniers in his own party and the Nationals. So, until now, his safest position has been to say he accepts the science, while falsely claiming to be comfortably on target to reach the (inadequate) emissions reduction we committed to in the Paris agreement.

There are two approaches to the “wicked” problem of global warming: mitigation (reducing emissions) and adaptation (changing in response to whatever warming we get). The greenies have seen these as in conflict and frowned on efforts to adapt. But Morrison and his predecessors have been so bound up by their deniers that they haven’t wanted to talk about even such issues as getting set to cope with much worse bushfire seasons. No excuses for that, Scott.
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Wednesday, August 7, 2019

One day the world's population will start falling

For those who worry about global warming and all the other damage humans are doing to our planet, the latest news on world population growth doesn’t seem good. Fortunately, however, the relationship between population and the environment is paradoxical.

The United Nations Population Division updated its projections in June. From its present 7.7 billion, the world’s population is projected to have grown by 2 billion in 2050. It should reach a peak of nearly 11 billion at about the end of this century, before it starts to fall.

Fortunately, projections are just projections, based on a lot of assumptions that may or may not prove to have been accurate. Some prominent demographers believe the UN’s assumptions are too pessimistic.

It’s a mistake to imagine that controlling world population growth is just a matter of access to effective contraception. Economic development also plays a big part.

It’s the activity of humans that generates greenhouse gas emissions and does other damage to the natural environment, using up non-renewable resources, over-using renewable resources such as fish stocks and forests, damaging soil and waterways, and making species extinct.

So the more people, the more damage. Most human activity is economic – people earning their living. And, the way economies are organised at present, the richer people become, the more damage they do.

But here’s the paradox: the richer people become, the fewer children they have.

As my favourite magazine, The Economist, noted in an article, before the Industrial Revolution the typical woman probably had seven or more children. In 1960, the global fertility rate was six children per woman. Today it’s 2.5.

Within that global average, the fertility rate in rich countries is 1.7 children, below the replacement rate for a stable population of 2.1. In middle-income countries it’s 2.4, not far above replacement. In poor countries, however, it’s 4.9 children.

The first economic factor to reduce family size is urbanisation. When you leave the farm, you don’t need as many kids to help with the work. (Both my parents grew up on farms early last century. Dad was one of 14, and Mum one of eight. Their four children, however, had an average fertility rate of 2.5.)

But perhaps the most important factor is the spread of education, particularly of girls. It’s well established that the more years girls spend at school, the fewer babies they have.

“Education reduces fertility by giving women other options,” The Economist says. “It increases their chances of finding paid work. It reduces their economic dependence on their husbands, making it easier to refuse to have more children even if he wants them.

“It equips them with the mental tools and self-confidence to question traditional norms, such as having as many children as possible. It makes it more likely they will understand, and use, contraception.

“It transforms their ambitions for their own children – and thus the number than they choose to have.”

Worldwide, the proportion of girls completing primary school has risen from 76 per cent in 1997 to 90 per cent today. The proportion completing lower secondary school is nearing 80 per cent.

Fertility rates are low in Europe – particularly in Italy (1.33) – and in Japan (1.37). They’re below replacement rate in New Zealand (1.9), Australia (1.83) and the US (1.78).

But the lowest fertility rates are in emerging Asia: Taiwan (1.15) and South Korea (1.11). In the world’s most populous country, China, it’s 1.69, thanks to the one-child policy. After the relaxation of that policy it rose only briefly. Flats are too small and childcare too limited.

By contrast, India’s rate is 2.24, pretty close to replacement. And it varies greatly from 1.8 in wealthy states such as Maharashtra, to more than 3 in poor states such as Uttar Pradesh. Even so, India's population is expected to overtake China’s in 2027.

Because fertility rates cover the whole child-bearing lives of women, it takes a long time for the population of a country that's a bit below the replacement rate to start falling – assuming they don’t top up with immigration, as we do.

Even so, 27 countries’ populations have fallen since 2010 – sometimes with low fertility rates reinforced by high emigration. Over the next 30 years, 55 countries’ populations are projected to fall – almost half of them by more than 10 per cent. China’s may fall by about 31 million, or 2 per cent.

So what’s the problem? In a word: Africa. Its painfully slow rate of economic development leaves it still with fertility rates of five or six, including big countries such as Nigeria, the Congo, Ethiopia and Tanzania.

The best hope that the world’s population will stop growing sooner than the UN projects is that it has underestimated the rise of girls’ education in Africa (and India and Pakistan).

Of course, economic development is two-edged. It may stop population growth, but it makes everyone else richer and thus makes more demands on the environment.

Just as we can limit climate change without reducing energy use by switching to renewable sources, so we could reorganise the economy in ways that ensured continued economic growth didn’t involve continued destruction of the environment. If we had the will.
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Saturday, December 15, 2018

Trump's mad trade war has a hidden logic

Simple economics tells us Donald Trump’s stated reasons for starting a trade war with China make no sense. But more advanced economics tells us it’s no surprise he’s 'P’d off' over China’s economic rise.

Trump complains that the United States buys more from China than China buys from the US, meaning his country runs a trade deficit with China. He sees this as an obvious injustice and a sign China is cheating.

But economics teaches that bilateral trade imbalances are natural and normal, the inevitable consequence of countries’ differing “comparative advantage”. (Australia’s strength is rural and mineral commodities, for instance, whereas China’s is manufacturing.)

What matters is a country’s trade with all its trading partners. But, even here, economics teaches it’s not necessarily bad for a country to run an overall trade (or, strictly, current account) deficit.

Why not? Because a country runs a current account deficit when its investment in new homes, business equipment and public infrastructure exceeds its ability to fund this investment with its own saving by households, companies and governments, thus requiring it to call on the saving of foreigners.

Conversely, a country runs a current account surplus when it saves more each year than it needs to fund that year’s investment spending, thus allowing it to lend some of its saving to foreigners.

Because some countries (such as China, Germany) save more than their profitable investment opportunities can take up, they run current account surpluses most years.

On the other side of the coin are countries (the US, Australia) that have more profitable investment opportunities than their savings can cover, so they run current account deficits most years.

Put the two groups together and – at least in theory – the world’s annual saving flows to the most profitable investment opportunities to be found on the planet, thus leaving everyone in the world better off.

But a deputy secretary of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Dr David Gruen, noted in a recent speech that, at a more advanced level of analysis, some of the recent tension over trade is a consequence of the strong and sustained growth of Asian economies, including China.

“As economies in our region have grown and moved up the value-added chain, they have increasingly competed with more entrenched, influential and valuable industries in advanced countries [such as the US],” Gruen says.

When rapidly developing countries embrace some new technology, the consequent increase in their productivity constitutes an increase in their real income (because they’re producing more output per unit of input).

This should also help raise the income of the developed countries with which they trade, since the rich guys are usually getting access to imports that are cheaper than they can produce themselves.

“While some advanced-country industries [and their workers] have undoubtedly been harmed by a rising Asia-Pacific, a rising Asia-Pacific has also meant more demand for other goods and services from advanced countries [as the developing countries spend some of their higher income on imports from the rich world],” Gruen says.

So better technology and increased trade between the rich and poor countries don’t reduce the real incomes of the advanced countries, but they are likely to change the distribution of income.

More income is likely to flow to the owners of capital and to highly skilled workers, while some lower skilled workers’ real incomes stagnate or fall.

“Such disruption is likely to continue as technology makes it easier to trade services across borders, and economies in the Asia-Pacific become increasingly sophisticated. Some of these newly threatened advanced-economy jobs rely on intellectual property or skills premiums, providing an economic rent worth protecting.

“It is no surprise that the generally open-trade stance of those in places like Silicon Valley sits alongside [Trump’s] demand for strong enforcement of intellectual property rights,” Gruen says.

And, although the rich world is better off with free trade, as technology continues to bring down natural barriers to trade in sectors previously considered “non-tradeable” – particularly services – politically influential opposition to free and open trade is likely to continue, he says.

But there’s a second implication of the economic rise of Asia I bet you haven’t thought of. “It makes less sense for the largest economy in the world to bear the costs of maintaining an open trading system as its economy becomes a relatively smaller share of global output.

“Free trade is a 'public good' – we all benefit from it, but each country has an incentive to shift the cost of maintaining it to others.

“The United States shouldered that burden when it was the world’s largest economy. When you are half the global economy you tend to benefit wherever in the world trade is occurring.

“The logic of [it] continuing to do so is now less compelling. The rules-based [trading] system, including the World Trade Organisation, emerged at a time when the US was the dominant global superpower."

Small or medium-sized economies with limited bargaining power in global markets (such as us) are better off with free trade – even when other countries are being protectionist. Why? Because protecting a few of your industries against imports hurts the rest of your industries more than it hurts the countries whose imports you don’t take.

But that’s not always true for large economies with significant market power, such as the US. They can sometimes use tariffs to drive down the prices other countries charge them for imports.

How? Their market is so lucrative the country supplying the imports absorbs some of the cost of the tariff to keep its retail prices competitive. The lower price of imports across the docks improves the big country’s terms of trade, increasing its real income.

Get it? The US has less to lose from an outbreak of protectionism than do smaller countries like us. That’s why the rest of us have to put more effort into preserving and abiding by the WTO’s “rules-based system” and Trump isn’t quite the madman he seems.
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Monday, November 12, 2018

The G20 is a talkfest we need to keep talking

If it’s 10 years since the global financial crisis, it must be 10 years since the elevation of the Group of 20 to the status of a “leaders’ summit” – the next of which will be in Buenos Aires in two weeks’ time.

You could say the decision to supplant the G7 with the G20 as the premier forum for global economic co-operation is the one good thing to come out of the financial crisis.

The G7, like the various international bodies set up after World War II, is too Western and Eurocentric, being limited to rich North America, Europe and Japan.

The G20, by contrast, adds in the developing countries and all parts of the globe, encompassing the G7, all five permanent members of the UN Security Council and all five emerging-economy BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.

And did I mention it gives Australia a seat at the top table for the first time?

While the G7 accounts for only about 30 per cent of the world economy (measured according to purchasing-power parity), which is projected to have fallen below a quarter by 2040, the G20 accounts for almost 85 per cent of the world economy, which should still be about that in 2040.

The G20 also accounts for 84 per cent of global investment and 63 per cent of the world’s population.

The rich and poor worlds could have spent years arguing over the formation and composition of such a group, but in the heat of the financial crisis, no one doubted that a representative but not unwieldy whole-world body was needed to quickly achieve a co-ordinated response to the threat of a global depression.

The avoidance of such a calamity is all the proof anyone should need that the G20 has justified its existence.

At the time of the crisis, the G20 achieved co-ordinated discretionary fiscal (budgetary) stimulus averaging more than 2 per cent of world GDP in both 2009 and 2010.

It tripled the International Monetary Fund’s lending capacity and facilitated an increase in lending from multilateral development banks of $US 235 billion, at a time when private sector sources of finance were scarce.

Later, it established the Financial Stability Board to tighten up regulation of the world's financial institutions, including banks judged too big to fail.

It’s also working with the OECD to reduce tax avoidance by multinationals, through its BEPS project – base erosion and profit shifting – and having more success than many imagined it could.

But if you want to argue that, in the years since then, the G20 has done a lot of meeting, talking and passing of resolutions without achieving all that much, you wouldn’t be wrong.

You would, however, have missed the point. Do you imagine this was the last economic crisis the world’s leaders will have to cope with? Or that the next crisis is sure to be decades away?

As Scott Morrison’s G20 “sherpa” (every leader ascending summits needs the assistance of a personal sherpa), Dr David Gruen, said in a recent speech, the G20 is best thought of as an institution that comes into its own when it’s most needed - “more a ‘rough weather’ friend than a ‘fair weather' friend".

It is, he says, like a global fire department. It may sit around for days not doing much, but as soon as the need arises it rushes off to put out the conflagration.

What gives the G20 its fire power is its status as a “leaders’ summit” – all G20 leaders attend summit meetings, almost without exception. And when they attend, they talk to each other, just as Donald Trump and Xi Jinping are scheduled to have a meeting on the sidelines at the summit in Argentina, no doubt to chat about their little trade war.

Let me ask you, which would you prefer – world leaders who knew each other and talked regularly, or leaders who didn’t?

The more meeting and chatting they do, the safer the rest of us are.

Gruen reminds us it was the legendary American economist Thomas Schelling who realised international conflicts can arise simply because one side can't understand what’s eating the other side. That messages sent in public may differ from messages sent in private.

A book Schelling wrote led to the installation of the hotline between the White House and the Kremlin. The annual G20 summits are a big step up from that. Nor does it hurt to have the countries’ finance ministers and central bankers meeting regularly.

With Trump’s America behaving so crazily, picking fights with its allies and major trading partners and threatening the rules-based international order the Americans laboured so long to build, we need the G20 to hang together and keep our leaders talking to each other more than ever.
Read more >>

Wednesday, September 27, 2017

Closing out the world won't fix our problems

Talk about a slow burn. It's 10 years since the beginnings of the global financial crisis, the greatest economic collapse any of us will ever see. Things ought to be back to normal by now, but they aren't.

The world is still picking through the wreckage, deciding what should be kept and what dispensed with. What needs to be done differently to restore normality and ensure there's never another disaster like that one.

A lot of people were surprised the retribution didn't happen at the time: bankers sent to jail, famous economists and their theories discredited, presiding politicians pushed out to pasture, their reputations in tatters.

For a long time, it looked as though the same people who brought us the disaster were kept on to clean up the mess. "Sorry about that. Poor execution. Nothing wrong with the basic policies, of course. Won't let it happen again."

Now, however, there's a revolt by disillusioned and angry punters evident in many developed countries: the Americans voting in an outsider oddball like Trump, the Brits voting to quit the European Union then knackering the government trying to arrange it, the French electing a president from neither of the two main parties, the Germans re-electing Mummy Merkel, but only after reducing the combined vote of her party and the main alternative to their lowest share since the war.

It's a similar story in Oz, where last year's election saw one voter in four avoiding the two main parties and the resurrection of One Nation to scourge the establishment.

Fancy footwork by the Rudd government at the time allowed us to escape the GFC with only a few scratches. Turns out it's not that simple. The economy's been below par ever since and, for the past four years, our growth in wages has been as weak as in the other advanced economies.

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Trouble is, when the pressure for change comes from the grassroots rather than frank admission of failure on the part of the policy elite, the great risk is that we'll flip to populism – policies that are popular because they sound like they'd make things better, when they wouldn't really because they misunderstand the deeper causes of the problem.

Much of the discontent has centred around globalisation – the breaking down of barriers separating countries.

Globalisation is a popular target because it can be blamed for the fall in jobs in manufacturing as well as the admission to our country of people who look different and have strange habits. Are they taking our jobs or just taking over our country?

But though it's true that some of the jobs lost in manufacturing have shifted to other countries (providing employment and income to people much poorer than any of us), our compulsive fear of foreigners blinds us to the much greater role played by automation.

As Dr Andrew Leigh, federal Labor's shadow assistant treasurer and a former economics professor, writes in a new book for the Lowy Institute, Choosing Openness, advances in technology have been shifting jobs from the farm to the cities, and now from manufacturing to the services sector, continuously since Australia became a federation.

This means attempting to "make Australia great again" by restoring protection – reducing our openness to the world – can't work. We'd have trouble establishing many new factories, and those we did would employ a lot more machines than workers.

What restoring protection would do, however, is raise the prices of all the goods we protected – starting with cars, clothing and footwear – worsening the cost of living of all working people.

It's too easy to forget the benefits of globalisation along with the costs.

Apart from being a bit too late, trying to return to White Australia would rob us of greater human links with rapidly developing Asia, where we all know our best hope of future prosperity lies.

Overall, we've gained more than we've lost from the successive waves of new technology, as well as from the way we opened our economy to the world in the 1980s. Trying to re-erect the shutters would be a costly mistake.

Overall, employment has just kept growing – which is not to deny that many less-skilled men formerly employed in manufacturing have not been able to find satisfactory employment.

The sensible conclusion is that there have been losers as well as winners, but little has been done to help the losers – with the winners required to do more to kick the tin.

"The chief challenge," Leigh says, "is to deal with the inequality that can accompany technological change and economic openness.

"This is not just a matter of fairness; it is also essential if we are to deal with the political backlash against openness.

"A spate of studies in economics and psychology have shown that humans exhibit loss aversion [we prefer to avoid losses more than we prefer making gains] and are more conscious of headwinds than tailwinds.

"Open markets require egalitarian institutions," Leigh concludes.

He's right. This is the key principle of reform we lost sight of after the departure of Hawke and Keating.
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Saturday, July 15, 2017

Why global trade growth has slowed

One thing you can be sure of is that international trade grows much faster than the world economy. It's the classic proof of growing globalisation, and it's been happening for ages. Except that it seems to have stopped.

For two decades from the mid-1980s, world trade – measured as exports plus imports – grew at more than double the rate of growth in gross world product.

Between 1986 and 2007, the volume of trade grew at an average annual rate of 3.4 per cent of world real gross domestic product, meaning it went from being equivalent to almost 30 per cent of gross world product to almost 60 per cent.

But then it dipped sharply in 2008 and 2009, thanks to the fall-off in trade after the global financial crisis and the onset of the Great Recession.


It bounced back in 2010 but, since 2011, its growth has been only a little faster than world production of goods and services.

In the decades before 1986, the volume of trade grew faster than production, but at much slower rates than in the two decades that followed. That's how we know to date the modern era of globalisation – the breaking down of economic barriers between national economies – from the mid-80s.

So, why has trade growth slowed so noticeably, and is this merely cyclical (temporary) or is it structural (lasting)?

According to a study by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, a fair bit of both.

The study estimates that about 40 per cent of the slowdown between 2011 and 2015, as compared with the period from 1991 to 2007, is explained by the weak growth of demand in the global economy.

In particular, the crisis saw a sharp fall-off in businesses' investment spending on new physical capital – which happens to be import-intensive – but it hasn't recovered all that much in the years since then.

But that leaves roughly 60 per cent of the slowdown explained by deeper, more structural forces, ones that won't just go away if we wait a few more years.

Part of the explanation is that, in the two decades before the crisis, certain factors contributed to making trade growth exceptionally strong, but these factors have now lost their force.

The biggest cause of this exceptional growth in trade was various measures to reduce tariff and non-tariff restrictions on trade.

In 1989, and partly at Australia's instigation, the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation partnership between 21 countries was established to promote free trade.

The European Union moved to a single market in goods, services, labour and capital in 1992, increasing trade between its members. Because Europe consists of a number of separate countries, it's highly (international) "trade intensive" in a way that America – composed of states rather than countries – or even Australia, isn't.

In 1994, the "Uruguay round" of multilateral negotiations – the biggest of the many rounds of reductions in protection organised by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade since World War II – was reached.

This round extended membership of the GATT from the developed countries to about 150 developing countries – thus doing much to increase trade between the two groups. It also reached trade agreements covering new areas such as textiles, agriculture, services and intellectual property.

And, for good measure, the round turned the GATT into the World Trade Organisation.

The North American Free Trade Agreement between the US, Canada and Mexico began in January 1994.

And also hugely important to the growth of trade, China – now the world's second-largest trading nation – joined the WTO, cutting much of its protection as a condition of entry.

A second factor promoting the growth of trade in the two decades before the crisis was the widespread development of "global value chains" – value as in "value-added" – under which manufactured goods (cars, for instance) are assembled in one country using parts from many countries.

As trade liberalisation measures slowed in about 2000, continued growth in trade was supported by China's rapid emergence into the world economy.

By the second half of the noughties, however, these structural sources of growth had waned.

In this century, the WTO's Doha round of multilateral negotiations, launched in November 2001, has ground to a halt. According to the study, this halt in liberalisation explains about a quarter of the slowdown in the growth of trade between 2011 and 2015, compared with 1991 to 2007.

Many bilateral and regional trade agreements have been signed since then, but the only really significant agreement, the Trans Pacific Partnership, signed in February 2016, has since been scuttled by US President Donald Trump.

Add to this, "creeping protectionism from myriad small measures" in various countries, which has put trade liberalisation into reverse.

The spread of global value chains seems to have reached its limit, even declined.

Meanwhile, China's period of export-led growth has ended, with its authorities now aiming for growth led by domestic demand.

So what happens next, and what should be done?

The study says some cyclical recovery in the growth of trade is likely but, without further trade liberalisation, a return to the glory days seems unlikely.

"Trade", it reminds us, "and the related expansion of global value chains, boosts [economic] growth through increased productivity, by improving resource allocation, increasing scale and specialisation, encouraging innovation, facilitating knowledge transfer, fostering the expansion of more productive firms and the exit of the least productive ones."

All true. But, as the study acknowledges, the benefits of increased trade aren't spread evenly between or within the countries involved.

As a consequence of this – and the politicians' failure to ensure the losers from globalisation were compensated by the winners – the electorate in many rich countries is "increasingly polarised into pro- and anti-globalisation groups".

We have a lot of ground to make up before much enthusiasm for further globalisation returns.
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Saturday, March 12, 2016

China still our advantage in a dismal world

We are living in an era of exceptionally weak growth in the world economy. We can now look back and see that era began after the global financial crisis in 2008. We can look forward and not see when the era will end. It could be years, for all we know.

Naturally, this continuing global weakness has its effect on us. So we shouldn't blame ourselves for our own weaker growth relative to our earlier performance. Rather, we should recognise that, relative to the other developed economies, we've been doing pretty well.

But we do need to remember that, compared with the others, we have a secret weapon: our strong economic links with China.

Nigel Ray, a deputy secretary of Treasury, spelt out the unusual features of the world we've entered in a speech this week. He notes that "global growth has struggled to regain sustained momentum post-global financial crisis, and global aggregate demand remains weak".

This is despite monetary policy (interest rate) settings in nearly all the major economies remaining "extraordinarily accommodative", and global public debt increasing since the crisis.

Official forecasters have continued to downgrade prospects for global growth, he says. The International Monetary Fund downgraded its forecast in its January update - the 17th downgrade in five years.

Now get this. Slower world growth has been accompanied by a number of trends that can be seen across the global economy: slower growth in international trade, weak business investment, slower productivity growth, slower population growth in the advanced economies, low inflation, and lower expectations about future inflation.

Wow. That's the sort of poor performance you expect to see briefly at the bottom of a world recession, not as a semi-permanent state.

We knew that slower growth in the working-age population as a result of population ageing would mean slower economic growth, but now official forecasters in other countries are also reconsidering their view of long-run "potential" growth in gross domestic product (just as we've done recently, cutting it from 3 per cent to 2.75 per cent).

For the other countries, "this partly reflects the ongoing legacy of the global financial crisis - such crises have long-lived effects on investment in productive capital and on labour markets, increasing structural unemployment and lowering labour force participation rates".

In other words, if business goes for some years under-investing in new and improved capital equipment, this diminishes the economy's production capacity. And when some workers go for years unable to find another job, they tend to lose their skills and the self-discipline that goes with having to turn up to work on time every day and do as you're told.

But it's not only the after effects of a protracted recession. Ray says recent estimates by IMF economists suggest that productivity growth was slowing in the advanced economies even before the GFC.

More recently, we've noticed that the "convergence" between the emerging and the advanced economies (as the emerging economies catch up by growing at a much faster rate than the advanced countries) that we've seen since the turn of the century is showing signs of stalling.

If that happens, it means slower global economic growth and could have other undesirable consequences.

It happened that Reserve Bank deputy governor Dr Philip Lowe gave a speech in Adelaide on the same day, adding to Ray's description of the strange state the world economy finds itself in.

Lowe noted that, although the official interest rate in the United States has been increased for the first time in nine years, the Bank of Japan has unexpectedly moved its rate into negative territory.

In doing so it joined the European Central Bank, the Swiss National Bank, the Swedish Riksbank and the Danish central bank with negative interest rates. And there's an expectation in various countries that yet further monetary easing will take place.

Lowe says that, in earlier decades, it was very rare for central banks to worry that inflation and inflation expectations were too low.

"Yet today we hear this concern quite often, and the 'unconventional' has almost become the conventional," he says.

But back to China and the special advantage it gives us in a dismal world. Ray says we have a higher proportion of our exports - about 32 per cent of our exports of goods - going to China than any other advanced economy does.

Twenty years ago, China's economy was less than a third of the size of America's. Today it's the largest economy in the world when you measure it according to "purchasing power parity" (as you should).

China's rate of growth may be slowing, but it remains one of the fastest growing economies in the world.

What many foreign observers don't seem to understand is that, just as we are "rebalancing" our economy from mining-driven to other sources of growth, so the Chinese are doing something similar, shifting from growth based on heavy industry, investment and exports, to growth based on service industries, consumer spending and imports.

It's possible the Chinese economy could falter as it makes this transition, but they'll get there in the end and this is why it's possible for us to shift from selling them mainly minerals to selling them the goods (fancy Western foodstuffs) and, particularly, the services their growing middle class demands.

We've been talking about this for years, but now it's actually happening. Ray says China is already our largest destination for services exports, taking about 14 per cent of them last financial year.

China is now our second largest source of overseas visitors, and their visitors spend far more than average. More than a million Chinese tourists arrived in 2015.

But get this: those million visits represented only about 1 per cent of China's overseas tourism market. They are so big relative to us that just a tiny share of their market is a big deal in helping us keep growing.
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Monday, February 13, 2012

TALK TO FAIRFAX MEDIA SENIOR MANAGEMENT FORUM

Sydney, Monday, February 13, 2012

Greg has asked me to talk to you about the state of the world economy we find ourselves coping with, particularly the problems in the euro zone. But before I do I have to issue a standard consumer warning: economists have a very bad record in forecasting what will happen in the economy, so you’d be wise not to take a blind bit of notice of anything I say.

I can say that confident you will take an interest in what I say because everyone already knows economists aren’t good at forecasting but it’s never stopped them asking for another forecast. That’s because the human animal has an insatiable curiosity about the future - an incurable belief that it’s possible to know about the future and the more we know about it the better our chance of controlling it. John Kenneth Galbraith said economists were created to make astrologers look good, but I prefer to say that if people don’t have economists to ask about the future, they’ll settle for asking witchdoctors.

Perhaps economists are modern-day witchdoctors. But I draw a distinction between understanding what’s going on in the economy and predicting what will happen next, so I’m going to focus more on what and why things are happening rather than what will happen next.

I’ll say a bit about China eventually, but I’m sure you realise the big problem area in the world economy at present is the North Atlantic economies, the United States and Europe (including Britain). Most people automatically assume that if these big economies are in trouble that spells trouble for us, but I think it’s important understand the various ‘channels’ by which developments in other countries flow through to us. The first and most obvious channel is via trade: if they reduce their demand for our exports that’s bad for us, of course. But these days the EU accounts for less than 10 pc of our export income and the US for only 5 pc, so direct trade with the North Atlantic shouldn’t be greatly affected. A second channel is via the global financial markets. We know that worries about worries about major problems in the world can push our sharemarket down. And now compulsory superannuation has made a lot more Australians conscious of sharemarket falls. We also know problems with banks can cause some international funds markets to freeze or can push up the cost of overseas funding to our banks, as is happening to a small extent at present. The third channel thru which adverse developments in other economies can adversely affect our economy is via confidence. Consumers and business people hear all the bad news and it tends to make them less confident and more uncertain about the future. Consumers tighten their belts, increase their saving and pay down debts and avoid making new commitments. Businesses put expansion plans on hold, try to improve their gearing, cut non-essential spending such as advertising and maybe lay off staff.

It’s clear this third, psychological channel is the main channel by which worrying developments in the North Atlantic economies become a worrying development in our economy. The more I see of the ups and downs of the business cycle, the more convinced I become that ‘confidence’ - and particularly our collective swings from excessive optimism to excessive pessimism - is the biggest single factor determining the swings in the economy. There are ‘real’ factors at work, of course, but they are greatly amplified by the way business people and consumers are feeling at the time. The trick is that when the way we feel affects the way we act, the merely emotional becomes real. To take an example close to home, when I decide to cut my advertising budget because I’m uncertain about the future, the effect on businesses that sell advertising is very real. And when negative sentiment takes hold, it tends to feed on itself, becoming self-fulfilling and self-reinforcing. This is why, as you may have noticed, in my writing I’m putting a lot more emphasis on ensuring I give our readers a reasonably balanced assessment of how good or bad things are, even tho it’s a lot more fun to scare the pants off them.

Two factors do most to explain why the North Atlantic economies have been in so much bother since the global financial crisis reached its peak with the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, and why they’re unlikely to be completely out of bother for many years. The first is ‘debt’ and the second is the euro. The crisis in 2008 brought an end to a debt-fuelled boom in the developed economies that lasted - with interruptions from mild recessions - for about 20 years. In the US it’s clear households borrowed too much, for housing and to maintain lifestyle; in their efforts to maximise profits banks became too highly leveraged, and the US government ran too many annual deficits and racked up too much debt. In Europe, the banks became far too highly geared and governments were far too undisciplined in their budgeting. When the crisis peaked, governments in the US and Europe borrowed heavily to rescue their banks, then borrowed again to get their economies moving. Coming on top of the already high debts acquired during the long boom, this took most governments to quite unsustainable levels.

But this brings us to a paradox: for individual households or businesses or banks, the best way to get on top of your debts is to tighten your belt; for whole economies, however, the best way is to grow your way out of them. The ideal for governments is to keep growing, while slowly mending your ways. The trouble for governments with lax budgeting records, however, is that markets, German governments and others don’t trust their promises to be good boys tomorrow but not today. This does much to explain the flirtation with policies of austerity which, by making economies even weaker, can make it even harder to reduce budget deficits. Then markets react badly when they see economies weakening. Of course, when a government reaches the point where people are no longer willing to lend to it - as with Greece - it has no choice but to accept austerity.

A point to note is that, because of this debt overhang, it’s idle to imagine (as I suspect some people still do imagine) there’s some way Europe - or even America - can get back to normal rates of growth within a year or two. For a start, the rates of growth we came to regard as normal in the 90s and the noughties turned out to be debt-propelled. It will be a long time before we see its like again. For another thing, the process of ‘deleveraging’ is always protracted. So the only options available to the North Atlantic economies are weak growth for the rest of the decade, or economic disaster for the rest of the decade.

Starting with the US, its households are likely to be preoccupied with getting on top of their debts for many years yet, which will constrain the growth of consumption spending. It has unsustainably high levels of government deficit and debt, but its ‘debt crisis’ is political rather than economic. The two sides in Congress can’t agree on how and when to get its budget under control but, in marked contrast to the Europeans, global financial markets remain so willing to continue financing its deficit that the yield on US Treasury bonds has fallen to 2 pc.

One point I want to leave you with is that the outlook for the North Atlantic economies has improved markedly since late last year. In the case of the US, its recovery faltered in the middle of last year, but has improved a lot since then. The economy grew at an annualised rate of 2.8 pc in the December quarter and the unemployment rate has been falling slowly for the past five months. The US sharemarket is up about 20 pc on its low point in October. Growth isn’t likely to continue at that healthy rate, but all the talk of a double dip has evaporated.

What makes Europe’s story much more worrying that America’s is the euro. The rationale for the single currency area was more political than economic. Even without the addition of the former communist countries, the economies of the foundation members of the area were at far too disparate states of development for this to be a sensible arrangement. The interest rate and exchange rate levels appropriate for Germany and France were never likely to be appropriate for Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain - even for Italy. The removal of currency barriers between the 17 members of the euro does increase trade between them and, for a time, the governments of the less developed and less fiscally disciplined members did benefit from being able to borrow in euros at much lower interest rates then they’d been paying.

But, as is now all too painfully evident, all that did was lure Greece and others into borrowing far more than was good for them. And now they’re having difficulty servicing that excessive sovereign debt, the drawbacks of the currency union are painfully apparent: no ability to regain lost competitiveness with the rest of Europe by devaluing your exchange rate rather than cutting nominal wage rates; no ability to set interest rates at levels appropriate to your own needs. And, indeed, no easy way to escape the straitjacket of the currency area. Greek firms that had borrowed in euro would find their debt levels greatly increased when expressed in new drachmas.

The founders of the Euro understood that budgetary indiscipline was the greatest threat to the single currency’s survival, and established deficit and debt limits and targets accordingly. But they failed to live up to or enforce those limits, and now they’re chained together whether they like it or not.

It’s by no means certain the Europeans can make the euro work. And it’s hard to imagine a way it could break up that wouldn’t turn the mild recession they’re already in, into a deep and prolonged recession that worsened the US recovery and made life a lot tougher for us as well. They’re having a lot of trouble agreeing on what they need to do, and the longer they dither the greater the risk of some unexpected but damaging accident.

But having conceded that, I have to remind you of my point that, even with Europe, the situation is now looking a lot less on-the-brink than looked late last year. Under a more pragmatic president, the European Central Bank has provided its banks with huge amounts of cheap three-year liquidity, which has calmed market concerns about the banks. They’ve used much of that liquidity to buy the bonds of euro governments, which has significantly lowered the rates those governments face when they borrow. The euro governments are moving towards a new fiscal responsibility treaty which, at least, seems to have mollified the Germans somewhat. And the Greeks have passed another milestone.

The IMF, the Reserve Bank and Treasury base their forecasts for growth in Europe on the assumption the euro leaders manage to ‘muddle through’ without a disaster occurring. That’s the only sensible basis on which a forecast could be based and, thankfully, it’s easier to see it coming to pass than it was three months’ ago.

I haven’t left myself enough time to talk about China and the rest of developing Asia, but let me make a few quick points. The adverse effect on trade from the North Atlantic economies comes to us mainly via China. So China is the economy whose health we need to be most concerned about. Fortunately the news from the orient is a lot less worrying. It’s true its exports to the North Atlantic have been hit, but many people overestimate its continuing reliance on export-led growth. It’s true the Chinese authorities have been acting to slow their growth and reduce inflation pressure, but they and other emerging Asian economies retain plenty of scope to stimulate domestic demand should the rest of the world slow by more than we’re expecting at present.

The IMF is forecasting world growth of 3.3 pc this year, which is below the average rate of about 4pc, but well above the 2 pc level regarded as a world recession. When you weight that 3.3 pc to take account of the countries to which we send most of our exports, you add 1 percentage point.
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